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ABSTRACT
Objective: To examine the relationship between perceptions of equity among physicians
and the wish to reallocate time by creating a fitted, multistage model of the equity-
distress-wish to reallocate time pathway using structural equation modelling (SEM).
Background: The reorganizing of work among various health care professionals and
better management of scarce resources are seen as necessary for the delivery of effective
and efficient health care. Physicians playa key role in the health care system, and any
substantive changes in their work will require their cooperation. Gaining support from
physicians for changes in the allocation of their time will depend, in part, on the degree to
which these changes are seen to promote their professional and personal objectives.
Whether physicians perceive their practice conditions to be equitable, and how they
choose to respond to efforts by others to make changes in the work they do and the
rewards they receive, has important implications for the successful reform of health care
in Canada.
Design: A modified panel study using questionnaires mailed to a stratified random
sample of 840 physicians in Saskatchewan and British Columbia. A total of 384
physicians responded at baseline (110 from Saskatchewan and 274 from British
Columbia). At follow-up, 240 usable questionnaires were returned from the remaining
371 eligible respondents for a response rate of 64.7% (72 from Saskatchewan and 168
from British Columbia).
Measures: Reliable constructs were developed for: intrinsic and extrinsic equity; distress;
coping with practice demands; and the four components of professional activity (patient
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care, teaching and research, continuing education, and administration). Latent variables
were created for: local health care conditions; distributive equity; wish to reallocate
professional time; and wish to reallocate administrative time.
Results: SEM produced a well-fitted model (P = 0.112; NFl = 0.991; RMSEA = 0.029;
P for Test of Close Fit =0.965; and Hoelter 0.05 Index =255) that explained a substantial
amount of variance at each stage of the model, and supported the hypotheses of the main
pathway. The contributions of practice condition variables to the model, however, were
shown to relate almost exclusively to the equity stage of the model.
Discussion/Conclusions: Inequity was significantly associated with distress. In turn,
distress was significantly associated with the wish to reallocate time. The state of local
health care contributed substantially to perceptions of equity among physicians. The
physician's ability to cope with time demands was associated with the equity, distress,
and wish to reallocate professional time (patient care, teaching & research, and
continuing education). Wish to reallocate administrative time was associated with time
already allocated to administrative duties, but was not associated with ability to cope with
time demands. The impact of inequity on the allocation of time and the organization of
the work of physicians and other health care practitioners over time should be examined
in a larger study of a longitudinal design.
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Introduction and Statement of Principal Objectives
"Equity Among Physicians and the Wish to Reallocate Time" applies an
interdisciplinary approach to the study of the relationships between equity, distress and
the work of physicians, drawing on motivational and organizational theories, health
systems administrative science, and medical sociology. The Independent
Interdisciplinary PhD Program of the College of Graduate Studies and Research at the
University of Saskatchewan provides an effective means to address the study's objectives
by foregoing a single disciplinary orientation in favour of a more holistic approach.
The genesis of the study was a survey of 1030 Saskatchewan physicians by
Lepnurm and Henderson in 1992. The primary findings of the Lepnurm and Henderson
study were that the objectives of clinical teamwork, continuing education, teaching and
research, preventive medicine counselling and administrative duties were best achieved
by salaried methods of payment, and that the objectives of patient care, clinical autonomy
and adequacy of income were best met by fee-for-service methods of payment
(Lepnurm, 1996). In an independent examination of the same data, significant
differences were observed between physicians who felt that their remuneration was fair,
and physicians who felt that their remuneration was unfair, in terms of how they would
prefer to allocate their time to "wellness" activities (Dobson, 1997).
In expanding the investigation of the role of equity in the work of physicians,
remuneration was one of a number of factors contributing to the perception of fairness as
it related to the rewards received by physicians for services rendered. Differences in
perceptions of fairness can also be due to differences in the availability of intangible
rewards and to variations in the physician's practice setting and working conditions.
These non-monetary factors may potentially be more important than monetary incentives
in maintaining positive equity among physicians.
Making these concepts operational gave rise to a practice demand-practice
setting-equity triad in relation to the physician's wish to reallocate time (Figure 1). Based
on this initial model, the physician's workload (practice demands) and the practice setting
(practice environment, level of integration and method of remuneration) are seen to
contribute to the physician's perception of equity. In tum, the physician's perception of
equity was seen to act as a motivator for behavioural changes designed to restore equity.
Wish to Reallocate Time 4l11(f-----
.< practiceremandS
Equity
Practice 'Setting
Figure 1: Conceptual Starting Point
In reviewing the literature, it soon became apparent that the relationship between
the variables was more complex. The role of an intervening variable between equity and
wish to reallocate time was suggested by the work of Van Dierendonck et al. (1994,
1996). In their investigations of the relationship between patient demands and changes in
physician attitudes, these researchers found that perceptions of inequity led to distress,
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and that this distress was associated with changes in physician attitudes toward patients.
Rather than a biological or psychological response to stressful work conditions,
distress is seen as an emotional response to an unfair situation, and acts to motivate the
individual to correct the situation. The inclusion of distress in the pathway led to the
conceptualization of a multiple stage model (Figure 2) with possible pathways between
wish to reallocate time, distress, equity, and practice conditions.
EQUITY
1
PRACTICE
CONDITIONS ·I'--__D_IS_TRE_S_S _
WISH TO
REALLOCATE
TIME
Figure 2: Proposed Model Pathways
The principle objective of this study is to extend the work previously carried out
on the relationship between perceptions of equity among physicians and the wish to
reallocate time (Dobson, 1997), by creating a fitted multi-stage model of the equity-
distress-wish to reallocate time pathway using structural equation modelling (SEM).
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1. The Work of Physicians and the Changing Health Care Environment
This chapter of the literature review will describe the work of physicians and how
their time is allocated among a number of professional activities, including: patient care;
teaching and research; continuing education; and administrative duties. In deciding how
to allocate their time, physicians are confronted by changes in the conceptualization of
health and the role of health care, changing relationships between health care provider
groups, and a variety of health care reform initiatives. It will be shown that these changes
are pressing physicians to abandon traditional practices and to reallocate their time in a
manner consistent with these external constraints.
The ability of physicians to resist or delay these changes will also be discussed.
The literature will show that despite some loss of hegemony, Canadian physicians are
still able to control their time and the content of their work. This control has allowed
them to allocate their time and pursue activities in support of professional and personal
goals, rather than conforming to broader policy objectives. While various strategies have
been adopted to encourage physicians to change their practices, these strategies have had
only limited success or unintentional consequences.
The struggle between physicians and other health care stakeholders has also led to
a practice environment where the rewards traditionally expected by physicians continue
to be pursued while becoming harder to obtain. The literature will show that constraints
with the practice environment combined with the ability of physicians to still control their
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work and the allocation of their time has resulted in practices that sometimes conflict
with other important the professional and personal objectives, as well broader policy
objectives of the health care system.
1.1 The Work of Physicians
Weisman and Teitelbaum (1987) defined the work of physicians as, "those hours
spent on patient care, teaching, research, professional development, and administrative
tasks." Groenewegen et aI.( 1992) made a further distinction, defining two types of
professional work: direct patient care and other activities. Other activities included:
practice administration, education, and consultations with colleagues. Tompkins et al.
(1996) reiterated this dichotomy of the work of physicians, advising that one must track
the time allocated to both patient care and non-patient centred activities in order to fairly
represent the entire contribution of the physician. Hurley (1986) presented the physician
as a health care professional performing four key and often conflicting roles or activities:
healer, technician, advocate and manager/rationer. More recently, Morrison (2000) cited
eight key roles that physicians will be expected to play in the future including: clinical
data collector, shaman, health advisor and wellness coach, knowledge navigator,
proceduralist, diagnostician, physician manager, and quality assurance specialist.
For each activity, a minimum time commitment by the physician is required to
ensure the activity is carried out in an effective manner. For most physicians, the
majority of their time is devoted to the delivery of patient care (Sullivan & Buske, 1998;
Chan et aI., 1998). Patient care activities carried out by physicians are diverse and occur
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in a variety of health care settings (Lepnurm, 1996), however, most can be broadly
described as the assessment and treatment of disease, either by the individual physician or
as part of a multi-disciplinary team. In either case, the physician assumes a central
position in the delivery of patient care services, with emphasis on the roles of healer and
technical specialist (Hurley, 1986).
Due to the growing importance of chronic diseases as a share of the medical
practice, and the importance placed on health promotion and disease prevention,
physicians are frequently called upon to counsel patients on health issues and to
encourage their participation in the maintenance of their own health and well-being
(McAvoy et al, 1999; Jaen et aI., 1994). Because of these new demands and expectations,
physicians increasingly rely on other health care professionals to assist them (Bezjak,
1987), or to take on the principal provider role (Aquilino, 1999). The physician must
then assume the role of coordinator or case manager, allocating tasks and communicating
with others to ensure optimal patient care.
Patient-centred services draw on the traditional training and skills of the
physician, but increasingly require the physician to work within a health care team. The
physician is also expected to coordinate care and communicate effectively with patients
and with other health care providers (Morrison, 2000; Hurley, 1986). Most physicians
allocate a substantial portion of their time to patient-care activities, and generally
speaking, would prefer to spend more time with their patients (Blendon et al., 2001).
Non-patient centred activities are also an important part of medical practice.
These activities affect the quality of care delivered to the individual patient, but also the
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overall quality of medical care and the health care system as a whole, by promoting and
maintaining: knowledge; skills; and the efficient use of resources. Among the non-
patient centred activities carried out by physicians are: teaching and research; continuing
medical education; and practice administration.
Although teaching and research activities often involve the participation of
patients, these activities are generally engaged in by the physician for the purpose of
creating and transferring knowledge to medical students, practising physicians, and other
health care providers. As such, they represent opportunities to apply and develop areas of
expertise, and to receive rewards not directly tied to patients and the delivery of medical
services (Eliason et aI., 2000; Hartley et aI., 1999; Dodson, 1998).
Continuing medical education is another important activity carried out by
physicians, and most physicians are concerned about their ability to keep up with the
latest advancements (Blendon et aI., 2001). With rapid changes in standards of practice
and an ever expanding knowledge base, dedicating time to keeping up with the medical
literature is an essential part of ongoing professional development (Miller et aI., 1998).
The challenge of maintaining an acceptable level of knowledge about current
medical practices can be burdensome due to high workloads and an overall lack of time
(Ockene & Zapka, 2000; Miller et aI., 1998; Johnson et aI., 1997). At the same time,
investing time and effort to meet these requirements allows the physician to participate in
activities that can be professionally enriching and intrinsically rewarding (Fulkerson &
Wang-Cheng, 1997; Kelly & Murray, 1996).
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Finally, in light of growing concerns about the cost of care and the appropriate
allocation of resources, physicians are now expected to playa much more active role in
the administration and evaluation of health care services (Morrison, 2000). Such
activities are less likely to fall within the parameters of traditional medical training
(Schwartz & Pogge, 2000), and as such, often require additional effort and time from the
physician to develop a reasonable level of proficiency (Carty et aI., 1996). Unfortunately,
given the reasons most individuals elect to become physicians in the first place (Vaglum
et aI., 1999), the rewards associated with greater involvement in administration and in the
development of the necessary management skills, are often less evident or perceived as
less desirable than the rewards associated with other professional activities.
In carrying out their many divers~ activities, physicians are expected to: provide a
very high standard of care; advocate vociferously on behalf of their patients; provide
appropriate training to other health care providers; advance the understanding of disease
and its treatment; and properly maintain and develop their own skills, while effectively
managing the resources of the system. In meeting these expectations, a substantial
demand is placed on the physician's time and abilities. In exchange, physicians have
come to expect substantial benefits, including: relatively unrestricted authority over the
treatment of disease; the opportunity to participate in interesting and challenging work;
higher status; and a relatively good income (Epstein et aI., 1993, Williamson et aI., 1993).
Through most of the last century, this arrangement appeared to work to the mutual
benefit of both physicians and society (Starr, 1982; Parsons, 1951). In more recent years,
however, physicians have been pressed to take on new administrative tasks and other, less
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traditional duties. These duties often must be carried out in addition to the physician's
fundamental duty to provide quality care and maintain requisite clinical skills.
Spending more time on less traditional activities can be an opportunity to develop
new skills or to pursue new areas of interest. As such, time spent on these activities can
enrich the physician's work experience and can be rewarding, in and of themselves.
Alternatively, new tasks may represent additional burdens to physicians. As a result, new
tasks or expanded responsibilities may be viewed as trivial, monotonous, or overly
demanding; preventing the physician from spending time on personally or professionally
rewarding activities. In addition, these activities are often not remunerated, or are
remunerated at a lower rate of pay than patient care services, requiring the physician to
forego income to carry them out.
Unfortunately, very little consideration has been given by policy makers and
administrators to the inherent value of these activities to physicians. Non-clinical
activities associated with the modem medical practice are generally given only marginal
consideration when determining fee structures (Wright, 1996). The training required to
take on new roles is often inadequate (Carty et aI., 1996), and for the most part, financial
rewards are still based on the volume of clinical services provided to patients, and the
efforts and demands placed on physicians to deliver these services (Feldman et aI, 1994;
Hsiao, et aI., 1988). Not surprisingly, many Canadian physicians now perceive
themselves to be overworked and underpaid (Sullivan & Buske, 1998).
Given the traditional goals of physicians and their ability to control the nature of
their work and the allocation of their time, many physicians can be expected to resist or
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abandon tasks that, while valuable to the system as a whole, may be seen as being of less
value, or too time consuming for the individual physician. The challenge for policy
makers and health system administrators, given existing organizational constraints and
physician preferences, is finding effective ways to encourage physicians to allocate more
of their time toward activities likely to benefit the health care system.
1.2 The Changing Health Care Environment
Canadian physicians work in a system that is best described as a sickness-based
model of care. For decades, the emphasis of the system has been the delivery of
physician and hospital-based services focussing on the identification, treatment and
curing of disease and illness. Hospital and physician-based services are publicly funded,
and account for the majority of health expenditures (Health Canada, 1999). To a lesser
degree, services such as prescriptions drugs and dental care are publicly financed, using
age and need-based criteria to determine eligibility. Most Canadians have some form of
private insurance through their place of employment for services not funded publicly, or
receive supplemental coverage through social assistance programs. Only a small minority
of Canadians, primarily the self-employed and those not able to qualify for social
assistance, lack prospective coverage for services not covered by Medicare (WHO, 1996).
Canadian physicians function as the gatekeepers to the system and, as in most
Western industrialized countries, serve both as advocate for the patient and as the
principal decision-maker in the allocation of health care resources (Minogue, 2000;
Franks et aI., 1992). Patients are free to choose their own family physician, but are
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generally guided by the preferences of their physician in choosing therapies (OECD,
1994). Access to intensive or special medical treatment is somewhat restricted, and the
patient's choice of specialists is greatly influenced by the family physician. Once a
patient has been referred, specialists often follow practice patterns similar to the general
practitioners, influencing patient care decisions and determining resource allocation.
Within the Canadian health care system, physicians also have an important role in
the actual delivery of health care services (Barer & Stoddart, 1992a; Franks et aI., 1992;
Shortell, 1974). Through the gatekeeper function, physicians determine the services
provided to the patient and, to a large extent, oversee the delivery of these services.
However, changes occurring in the health care environment are increasingly affecting
physicians and the nature of their work; both in terms of its content and the manner it
which it is organized and integrated into the larger health care system (Ametz, 2001).
These environmental changes can be classified along three distinct, but
fundamentally interconnected, themes: an evolution in the understanding of the factors
that contribute to health; changes in the relationships between health care providers; and
system-wide changes in health care funding, administration and delivery of health care
(health care reform). The cumulative effect has been a re-configuration of the role that
physicians are expected to play, as well as the roles of patients, administrators, and other
health care providers in the delivery of health care services.
1.2.1 Changing Concepts of Health and Health Care
For most of the twentieth century, the delivery of health care, the roles of the
11
various health care professions, and the relationships between major health care
stakeholders have been largely determined by the medical model and its chief proponent,
the medical profession (Engel, 1977). Beginning in the 19th Century, the medical model
promoted the concept of a normal state of health and the delivery of health care services
(primarily by a physician) based on scientific objectivity. illness and disease were seen to
have specific causal agents, with treatment based on the identification of specific
pathology. The medical model also subscribed to dualism which promoted the separation
of mind and body, and reductionism which viewed the human body as a biological
machine best understood by the detailed examination of its parts (Roberts, 1994).
The medical model became the foundation for the professional and economic
success of physicians. By employing the 'new' medical model, the medical profession
was able to demonstrate that it could effectively control and cure many diseases
(Starr, 1982). Physician care, based on the medical model, was increasingly associated
with effective health care.
Broader public acceptance of the medical model was facilitated by the position of
physicians in the delivery of health care and within the larger society (Parsons, 1951). In
the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, groups were often defined by the role they were seen
to play within society (Reidy, 1984), so that the authority of an "effective" medical
profession over matters of health went largely unchallenged (Parsons, 1951). This
conceding of health authority to physicians gave the medical model almost complete
control over how illness and disease would be defined and treated.
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Having gained supremacy, the medical model and its chief advocate, the
physician, successfully maintained their authority over matters of health throughout most
of the twentieth century. This was due in large measure to the Flexner Report of 1910
(Coburn et aI., 1983). At that time, there were a large number of medical schools of
varying quality and competing practice philosophies (Starr, 1982). In response to
growing concerns within the medical profession, the famed educator Abraham Flexner
was asked to evaluated the quality of the education provided by medical schools in the
United States and Canada. Medical schools of poorer quality were identified by Flexner
and many were closed, greatly limiting the supply of new physicians while improving the
economic situation for existing practitioners.
Schools that did not subscribe to the medical model articulated by Osler and other
like-minded proponents of allopathic medicine also fared poorly in Flexner's report.
Following the release of the "Report" in 1910, many of these "unorthodox" schools were
eventually compelled to shut down. Some schools of osteopathic and chiropractic
medicine survived, but were largely marginalised by an increasing influential medical
profession. In the end, the narrow bio-mechanical concept of health advanced by
allopathic schools of medicine came to be seen among most health care practitioners as
the only legitimate approach to health care (Coburn et aI., 1983).
In time, the limitations of the medical model became evident. In most
industrialized countries, the morbidity and mortality associated with acute infectious
diseases were gradually replaced by a preponderance of chronic non-infectious ailments.
These "new" diseases were often resistant to medical intervention (Terris, 1992). As
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well, epidemiologists had begun to show that medical care had relatively little impact on
health compared to improvements that could be brought about by better nutrition,
sanitation and economic status (Drummond et aI., 1987; Lalonde, 1974). As a result, the
illness-based medical model that had served the medical profession so well was
supplanted in the minds of many by more comprehensive models of health and health
care (Terris, 1990; Webster, 1985; Engel, 1977).
The principal models of health that now challenge the allopathic medical model
are the social model and the holistic model. The social model emphasizes the
environmental and social causes of disease and holds the larger society and its political
and economic manifestations accountable for maintaining health and eliminating illness
(McBeath, 1991). The legitimacy of medicine as a contributor to health is still
recognized, but health care services are more often seen as supporting rather than
ensuring good health (Terris, 1990).
While somewhat similar to the social model, in that it recognizes the limited role
of medical care, the holistic model argues that there are no universal norms of health and
that the definition of health will vary across cultures and individuals (Jensen & Allen,
1993). The dualism and reductionism of the medical model are thoroughly rejected in
favour of the concept of the interdependence of the body, mind and spirit
(Armentrout, 1993). Like the social model, the holistic model prefers to deal with the
causes of disease rather than the mere control of symptoms (Dever, 1991). Unlike
supporters of the social model, who seek to integrate the medical model within a broader
approach to health care, advocates of the holistic model suggest the application of the
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medical model ends when symptoms of disease have disappeared (Jensen & Allen, 1993).
Proponents of the holistic model further argue that the medical model fails to
secure health and well-being (Webster, 1985). Some have gone so far as to suggest that
traditional (allopathic) medicine is not capable of taking up the actual practices associated
with more holistic care, and that integrating these models may not be possible (Roberts,
1994; Armentrout, 1993), nor desirable (Craddock & Reid, 1993).
Physicians are generally aware of the limitations of the medical model, and have
sought to accommodate these competing models of health by subsuming behaviour and
life-style into a newer version of the medical model; the bio-psycho-social model
(McAvoy et aI., 1999; Ametz, 1996). Indeed, the concepts of health promotion and
disease prevention are now accepted into the medical orthodoxy as integral to
maintaining good health.
While patient behaviour and life-style modification are aspects of health care over
which physicians seek to exercise authority, the actual adoption of competing health
models is most common among nursing and allied health professionals (Armentrout,
1993; Roberts, 1994; Robertson & Minkler, 1994). Physicians are more inclined to limit
their preventive activities to counselling their patients against smoking, or encouraging
them to exercise more (McAvoy et aI., 1999). Due perhaps to their ideological
orientation, or because these proactive "counselling" services do not provide
compensation comparable to reactive, intervention-based medical services, physicians
have generally failed to incorporate health promotion concepts into their daily practices
(Pineault, 1984; McEwen, 1977). On a practical level, most physicians continue to
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follow a model of health care based primarily on the assumptions of the medical model.
1.2.2 Changing Health Care Provider Relationships
In support of a more broadly defined concept of health, a number of factors are
seen to affect health care delivery. These include: technological advances~ demands for
new health services; stagnant health care budgets; and a growing expectation that patients
should be more actively involved in their own health care (Simpson, 1998; Mhatre &
Deber, 1992). In response to these changes, health care systems are making greater use of
multi-disciplinary teams when determining health needs and in the delivery of care
(Tremethick & Wallace, 1999). Greater interdisciplinary collaboration and service
integration have also meant an expanded role for non-physician providers in the delivery
of patient care (Bluml et aI., 1999; Kizer & Norby, 1998).
The multi-disciplinary health care team is particularly useful in the new health
care environment. It allows for a greater number of perspectives when evaluating or
treating a patient, it offers the potential to reduce costs through the use of non-physician
providers, and the health care team improves access for its members to expertise across a
variety of disciplines (Leaviss, 2000; Ray, 1998). Empirical research also provides good
evidence that a multi-disciplinary approach leads to better outcomes for patients (Feiger,
1979; Rubenstein et aI., 1984; Wood-Dauphinee, 1984; Knaus et aI., 1986; Lamb, 1991).
As a result, the multi-disciplinary health care team, rather than the individual
practitioner, is now the preferred method of health care delivery in a variety of clinical
settings (Hibberd, 1998; Wilson, 1998; Huffman, 1993; Hardy & Conway, 1988).
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Despite its advantages, health care systems have been slow to adopt this model of
health care delivery due to a number of factors (Hutchinson et aI., 2001). First, there is a
discrepancy between physicians and other groups of health care providers over how care
should be organized (Gutkin, 1997; Temkin-Greener, 1983). While other groups seek to
participate more fully in patient care, physicians are inclined to see nurses and allied
health providers as physician extenders (Bezjak, 1987). Even when other professional
groups are able to assume the principal provider role, they are often perceived by the
public as a less than desirable substitute for physician-based care (Lamb, 1991). This is
complicated by the fact that most physicians seem unwilling to accept the idea of shared
responsibility and decision-making authority (Buknoda, 1996).
Second, other professional groups often differ from physicians in their approach
to treatment and healing; physicians tend to focus on treating specific diseases while
groups such as nursing adopt more holistic perspectives. At the same time, increasing
awareness of the determinants of health and the contribution of medicine to individual
well-being are causing other health professions to reassess the expertise and relative
importance of physicians (Lamb, 1991).
Finally, non-physician groups tend to value teamwork and its associated practices
more than physicians (Buknoda, 1996). A shift in the perceived value of the work of
physicians is causing other stakeholders to question the role of physicians, including their
previously unassailable leadership position in the delivery of care (Ametz, 2001).
Attempts to expand or change professional roles within the multi-disciplinary
setting, however, are as much a struggle for resource control, professional aspirations, and
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a larger share of the health dollar, as they are about concerns over responsibility, the
appropriate assignment of authority, and the ability to deliver quality care (Hardy &
Conway, 1988). Changes in the social and political roles of women, for example, have
manifested themselves in health care as the demand by female dominated professions,
particularly nursing, to have a voice in the running of the health care system.
In addition to the greater role demanded by the female dominated professions,
social and economic changes have allowed the re-emergence of a number of health
professions (e.g. midwives, homeopaths, etc.) that had been suppressed or absorbed by
the medical profession almost a century earlier (Coburn et aI., 1983). Newly empowered
health professions are actively seeking to expand their professional domains to secure an
economic advantage previously denied due to the dominant position of physicians
(Freidson, 1989).
Many of the new provider groups have adopted individualistic-lifestyle paradigms
to differentiate themselves from physicians (Armentrout, 1993). The threat to medical
authority is further enhanced by research showing the limited contribution of traditional
medical services (Terris, 1990; Lalonde, 1974). As a result, these new provider groups
are able to extract clinical autonomy and economic benefit from the health care system,
often at the expense of the medical profession.
Allied health professionals such as pharmacists, physiotherapists, and nurse
practitioners have also begun to challenge the physician's control over patients and
resources within the health care system (Arnetz, 2001). In questioning the clinical
authority of physicians, these groups often promote themselves as experts in specific
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areas of health care. Nurses now promote themselves as the patient care experts,
pharmacists as the drug experts, and physical therapists as the rehabilitation experts
(Hardy & Conway, 1988).
With greater recognition of their expertise, these traditional provider groups are
able to promote themselves as the more appropriate service provider; gaining authority to
carry out activities traditionally offered by physicians and, through these activities,
gaining greater access to patients, resources and economic rewards (Cooper, 2001).
There is also a growing desire among provincial governments to delegate
authority away from physicians (Fyke, 2001; Marriott & Mable, 1998; Leatt et aI, 1996;
Simard, 1992). To improve both efficiency and the quality of care, some attempts have
been made to redefine the professions and the authority needed to carry out specific
activities (Coburn, 1993). These efforts are largely based on the belief that patients and
the health care system would be better served by replacing clinical authority based on
credentials, with clinical authority based on the abilities of the provider. By eliminating
the monopolistic control created by licenses and credentialing, providers would be
allowed to treat patients only after demonstrated competence, reducing the importance of
professional affiliation. Less reliance on credentials could also reduce conflicts based on
maintaining monopolistic profession-specific authority, encouraging a more integrated,
collaborative approach toward health care delivery (Cooper et aI, 1998).
A recent example of a government supported incursion by another health
profession into a traditional area of medical authority was the decision by British
Columbia to allow pharmacists to directly prescribe post-coital contraception (the
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morning after pill) without the authorization of a physician (BCPA, 2000). Despite
concerns raised by physicians and the British Columbia Medical Association, the
perceived expertise of pharmacists in drug therapy rather than their credentials per se,
was essential in the ultimate decision by the government to allow them to take on this
authority. No longer requiring the permission of a physician-based regulatory body, such
policy decisions blur the line between the physician and other health care providers in
delineating authority and in determining who will occupy the role of the patient's primary
advocate and care provider.
Despite some incursions on the authority of physicians and ongoing attempts by
health care systems, professional organizations, and regulatory bodies to expand the role
of nurses and other allied health professionals, physicians continue to exercise
considerable influence within the health care setting (Detsky, 1993; Evans, 1992;
Drummond et aI., 1987). Most health care is not still not integrated (Hutchinson et aI.,
2001), and the physician is still the patient's main contact with the health care system
(WHO, 1996). Defining the scope of practice and medical authority still rests primarily
with physicians, and the roles of nursing, pharmacy, and other professions in health care
delivery are still largely subordinate to the physician.
1.2.3 Health Care Reform
The disproportionately large role that physicians have played and continue to play
in most areas of health is well understood (Health Canada, 1999; Terris, 1990; Rosen,
1989). Because of their large role, the decisions made by physicians greatly impact on
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the type of care received by the patient (Siu et aI., 1986; Kemper, 1988), as well as the
efficiency of the health care system (Hutchinson & Foley, 1999). The ability of patients
to access the system and the quality of care depend to varying degrees on the choices
made by physicians (Godwin, 1996; Alter et aI., 1999, Cox et aI., 1996; Epstein, 1991;
Wenneberg et aI., 1987). Licensing requirements and a credential-based regulatory
environment still maintain physician authority over most aspects of health care, and the
emphasis on the biophysical component of illness tends to negate the contributions of
other groups of health care providers. Public deference toward medicine is still strong,
and the authority of the physician continues to be supported by the public.
However, with concerns about the effectiveness and efficiency of health services,
changes in our conceptualization of health, and demands for changes in the role of
various health care providers, it was inevitable that attempts would be made to
reconfigure the health care system. Historically, the principal objective of the Canadian
health care system has been to provide equality of access to necessary medical care.
While relatively successful in attaining higher levels of health for all its citizens, by the
late 1980s, persistent class-based disparities in health status illustrated the limits of the
current medical care system in achieving an equitable distribution of health (Epp, 1986).
At the same time, the health care system was facing a number of challenges arising from
changes in the social, political and economic environment of the country, and there were
a number of persistent problems within the health care system itself (Evans, 1992).
In an attempt to deal with these issues, various provincial commissions were
established to determine how best to carry out health care reform (Mhatre & Deber,
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1992). While the review processes differed between provinces, several common themes
were identified: shifting from institutional interventionist care toward health promotion;
increasing disease prevention and non-institutional delivery; enhancing regional
governance and management structures; addressing the need for sustainable funding;
establishing comprehensive management of health human resources; increasing the use
evidence-based decision making; promoting the wide-spread adoption of the determinants
of health framework; and enhancing system accountability (WHO, 1996).
The recommendations of the provincial commissions represented what was seen
to be the most appropriate strategies for improving the overall efficiency and efficacy of
the system, while also addressing the principle objective of "achieving health for all". In
response to the recommendations of the various commissions, enabling legislation and a
variety of programs were initiated by most provinces, and followed five general themes:
promote the determinants of health; shift the system away from intervention toward
health promotion and disease prevention, move toward the regionalisation of services;
pursue cost containment; and improve human resource management (WHO, 1996).
The extent to which the recommendations of the commissions were adopted by
health care organizations varied considerably (Lomas et aI., 1997). Given the wide
dissemination of the proposed health reforms, there was strong rhetorical support for the
initiatives, both from the Ministries of Health and the health care organizations who
depended upon the Ministries for most of their funding. However, a number of the
reforms represented a substantial threat to influential stakeholders, including physicians
(Mhatre & Deber, 1992).
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In areas where non-compliance did not impede the overriding imperative of cost
control, there was considerable variance between the expressed policy objectives of
health care reform and the rate of implementation. Most provinces adopted some form of
regionalisation, but there was a general lack of evaluation as to its effectiveness.
Commissions called for ways to shift the focus away from physicians and institutional
care, but the emphasis placed on health promotion and disease prevention was mostly
rhetorical. As well, recommendations relating to human resources were not fully
implemented (Lomas et aI., 1997), and continue to be a major area of concern.
Ten years after the first initiatives, reforms relating to regionalisation and
devolution of managerial authority have occurred in most provinces (Lomas et aI., 1997),
and the provinces have successfully constrained health care costs: down from more than
10% of gross domestic product in the mid-1990s to around 9% of GOP toward the end of
the decade (DECO, 1998). However, a number of the problems continue to persist
(Manga, 1998), and it is debatable whether real progress has been made in creating a
more effective, efficient, or equitable health care system.
1.3 Promoting Change in the Work of Physicians
When deciding how best to allocate their time or to organize their practices,
physicians can be expected to consider their own professional and personal objectives,
and the needs of their own patients, but are less likely to consider the needs of the larger
health care system. Therefore, health care systems have found it necessary to develop
strategies that encourage physicians to adhere to broader policy objectives.
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In their efforts to promote changes in the practice patterns of physicians, health
systems use a variety of strategies to influence and control behaviour (Cybert, 1997;
Collins et aI, 1994; Toon, 1994). Lomas et al (1989) suggest that a number of factors,
including economic, administrative and social factors, should be considered when
attempting to change physician behaviour. Greco and Eisenberg (1993) concurred that a
variety of methods can be used to influence physician behaviour and found that a
combination of methods to be more effective than any single approach. The scope with
which such strategies are applied will vary and with varying levels of success.
1.3.1 Current Strategies for Promoting Change
Common strategies used to promote changes in physician behaviour include: 1)
increasing awareness of best practices through training and continuing education; 2)
enacting regulations to control income levels and the movement of physicians, and 3)
adopting a specific method of remuneration to take advantage of the inherent incentives
associated with that method.
Training and Education: The formal training of physicians has long been
fundamental to professional self-regulation and the dissemination and adoption of new
ideas and practices (Huffman, 1993). For example, the gatekeeper role assumed by
general practitioners in most Western countries is more a function of their professional
training and socialization, than a reflection of specific financial incentives or regulatory
controls (Reagan, 1987). In addition to the behaviours created by formal training,
ongoing education is also perceived as an effective way to modify physician behaviour,
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and in the appropriate setting, can produce real and sustained changes in physician
practices (Schectman et aI, 1991).
Regulation: When health care costs began to escalate in the 1980s, some
provinces attempted to control expenditures by modifying the rules used to govern
payments to physicians by introducing global expenditure caps and by de-listing some
services (Barer & Lomas, 1996). Since then, all provinces have adopted some form of
global expenditure cap, specifying a total budget for medical for a defined period (Katz et
aI., 1997; Hurley & Card, 1996). To the extent that total expenditures for medical
services have been brought under control, these policies have been effective. However,
such policies were not able to control the types of services provided by physicians, nor
where physicians choose to practice their profession.
Lacking controls on physicians practices, a number of provinces sought to
discourage specific behaviour through, restricted formularies; clinical guidelines; and
other forms of regulatory action. In British Columbia, for example, with an over-supply
of physicians in the larger centres, the provincial government introduced Bills 24 and 41
as a way to restrict the supply of new physicians in Vancouver and Victoria, in favour of
the under-served parts of the province (Rosen, 1989; Barer, 1988).
Remuneration: In addition to restrictions on how much one can earn and where
one may practice medicine, explicit financial incentives and penalties are often used to
influence the behaviour of physicians (Goodpastor & Montoya, 1996: Scott & Hall, 1995;
Shimmura, 1988). In the United States of America, for example, financial incentives and
holdbacks are often used to encourage physicians to adopt cost-minimizing practices
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(Grumbach et aI., 1998), or to comply with policy objectives (Shortell et aI., 1996).
The inherent incentives associated with a particular method of payment can also
affect physician behaviour (Tompkins et aI., 1996; Hickson et aI., 1987; Kristiansen &
Hjortdahl, 1992; Lahaie & Chopyk, 1992; Pineault et aI., 1985). In Canada, most
physicians are paid fee-for-service by the public insurance system, although other
methods of payment, such as capitation, salary, or a combination of methods, are also
employed by a substantial minority (CCHSE, 2000). Each method has certain advantages
and disadvantages for physicians, patients and third party insurers (Hickson et al., 1987;
Kristiansen & Hjortdahl, 1992; Kristiansen & Mooney, 1993; Hemenway et aI., 1990;
Lahaie & Chopyk, 1992; Pineault et aI., 1985).
Under fee-for-service, physicians are relatively immune to the cost of the care that
they recommend to their patients. While this may allow the physician to act in the best
interests of the patient as an unbiased advocate, it can lead to the misuse of scarce
resources through costly and marginally beneficial procedures (Tompkins et aI, 1996).
Fee-for-service is generally favoured by physicians, but is seen to promote over
utilization of expensive technologies and an orientation toward patients with complex
illnesses and diseases (Lepnurm, 1996). Alternatively, capitation creates incentives to
provide low-cost care at the expense of patient welfare (Emmanuel & Brett, 1993).
Although capitation is seen to promote greater use of primary care and prevention
strategies, it introduces the potential for cream-skimming and under treatment (Chaix et
ai, 2000; Van Bameweld et aI., 1998; Grumbach et aI., 1998; Franks et ai, 1992). Salary
is seen neither to promote over utilization or under utilization per se, but has been
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perceived as reducing the physician's autonomy and of compromising their role as the
patient's advocate (Ragland, 1999; Lepnurm, 1996).
Methods of paYment can also affect how physicians respond to changes in practice
demands. Under fee-for-service, physicians may respond to added responsibility by
working more hours, provided additional compensation is forthcoming. Under capitation,
new activities are incorporated into the practice by spending less time on other activities.
Under a salaried system, new responsibilities tend to replace old responsibilities or are
not incorporated at all (Calnan et aI., 1992). Groenewegen et al. (1992) found that a
mixed method of payment might be more appropriate to properly reward non-patient
activities such as continuing education, peer review, and interdisciplinary cooperation,.
1.3.2 The Limitations of Current Strategies
Education: Although effective in promoting specific patterns of practice, the
socializing of individuals to adopt specific professional norms and values tends to isolate
one professional group or specialty from another. Medicine and other health professions
have created education and training curricula that often discourage interdisciplinary
collaboration and cooperation. The socialization process inherent in the intense
educational programs of medical students tends to isolate medical students from other
health care approaches, making effective communication and teamwork more difficult
once the physician enters the work environment (Huffman, 1993). Furthermore, studies
indicate continuing education programs have only limited influence on physician
behaviour, and the effect is often transient (Goodpastor & Montoya, 1996).
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Even when education is effective, in that the physician is aware of a more
appropriate method of care, less appropriate methods can persist (Ockene and Zapka,
2000; Lomas et aI, 1989). For example, in a study of Dutch general practitioners,
Veldhuis et al (1998) found that physicians often deviated from what they knew to be the
standard of practice in order to comply with patient preferences, and their own desire to
accommodate these requests.
Regulation: As a regulatory initiative, global caps on physician payments have
effectively controlled the total cost of payments to physicians, but often lead to the
skewing of physician reimbursement. Some physicians continue to generate high
incomes by seeing a higher volume of patients or by carrying out a higher number of
procedures (Chan et al., 1998a). Furthermore, physicians who persist with higher billing
rates are rarely affected by funding constraints (Katz et aI., 1997). Instead, the benefits of
increased billing accrue to the individual physician while costs in the form of holdbacks
or pay-backs are spread among all physicians (Hurley & Card, 1996). Reimbursement
caps and clawbacks limit income levels, but rarely reflect the workloads assumed by
individual physicians, or those who's skills are in high demand. The result is often an
unfair distribution of economic benefits within a single reimbursement system.
In seeking to regulate demand and redistribute the physician supply, governments
may restrict access to billing numbers or reduce fee schedules for physicians moving into
over-serviced areas (Katz et aI., 1997). However, such restrictive policies primarily affect
new physicians. Physicians already practising in over-serviced areas are rarely targeted.
The discriminatory nature of these policies invariably leads to legal recourse by the
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physicians affected, and a number of successful court challenges have been the result
(Barer, 1988; Levine, 1997).
A number of Canadian physicians have also responded to increased regulation by
moving, either inter-provincially or to the United States. Interestingly, while there has
been great public concern about the loss of physicians and fear of a doctor shortage, the
loss of physicians to the United States is a decades-old phenomenon, and the net impact
on the supply of physicians in Canada has been minimal (Evans, 1998). However, those
remaining are increasingly frustrated and dissatisfied with the health care environment,
and are often inclined to oppose policy initiatives perceived to erode their position within
the system (Sibbald, 1998; Stevenson et aI., 1988).
Remuneration: To reduce utilization and costs, alternatives to fee-for-service have
been considered and implemented to varying degrees in most jurisdictions (CCHSE,
2000; Victoria Report, 1995; Deber et aI., 1991). However, these alternative methods are
generally limited to small pilot projects, and of a voluntary nature. Although increasingly
acceptable to physicians (Lepnurm, 1996; Woodward et aI, 1996), the use of alternative
payment methods among Canadian physicians is not wide spread, and the fee-for-service
method of reimbursement continues to dominate (CCHSE, 2000).
Determining the form of remuneration that best supports the provision of all
necessary medical services, while curtailing unnecessary services, is difficult in the best
of circumstances. Whether it be fee-for-service, salary, capitation or some other form of
compensation, one does not have to look far to find both supporters and detractors of a
particular method of payment (Lepnurm, 1996; Reinhardt, 1985).
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There is also the issue of the effect of incentives within specific methods of
payment. Evidence suggests that physicians will change the intensity of their practice due
to a change in the incentives rather than the method of remuneration (Hemenway et aI.,
1990; Hillman et aI., 1989). For example, if a physician working in a clinic is drawing a
salary, but future employment and promotion is contingent on the income that the
physician generates for the clinic, then the physician may feel pressure to practice in a
manner that generates more income. If the fee schedule continues to emphasize discrete
quantifiable services, then the physician is operating in a de facto fee-for-service payment
system focussed on curative activities.
In Canada, strategies used to affect physician behaviour have been relatively
uncoordinated and lacking a broader policy focus. However, even when strategies are
applied in a coordinated and focussed manner, the medical profession has shown a
remarkable ability to minimize or eliminate the ability of others, such as third-party
payers, to determine the nature and scope of their work.
1.3.3 Managed Care in the United States - A Case in Point
In the United States, managed care has employed all three strategies (education,
regulation, and method of remuneration) in a more coordinated way in an attempt to
control rising health care costs, while also seeking to enhance the effectiveness of the
health services being provided. Yet, after ten years, one still finds a health care system
that is surprisingly resistant to fundamental change (Kuttner, 1999).
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from less integrated MCOs, the integrated health care model began to unravel.
Meanwhile, those physicians who could began to extricate themselves from the
influence of a single managed care organization. In a classic example of an industry
adjusting to the concentration of power among its customers, many physicians sought to
reduce the power of the MCOs by increasing the number of MCOs to whom they
provided services, or by banding together into larger practice groups to extract greater
concessions (Hellinger, 1996). Specialists and specialties in short supply began to form
regional monopolies to secure their incomes and to provide greater control over their own
practices (Bodenheimer, 1999). Service fragmentation as the result of various physician
and MCO behaviours was further exacerbated by a consumer backlash against MCO
attempts to restrict access to secondary care (Kuttner, 1999).
Today, the more integrated managed care organizations struggle to compete with
preferred provider organizations (PPOs) and independent practitioner associations (IPAs).
Although these new types of MCOs lack the integration of the earlier MCOs, they are
increasing favoured by patients, physicians and payers. Many specialists are pursuing
greater technical expertise and policy hegemony to secure professional autonomy, while
de-emphasizing primary care activities and administrative tasks (Arnetz, 2001). Unable
to adopt similar tactics, the less specialized physicians, in particular general practitioners,
are being pressured to take on a greater number of patients while reducing the intensity of
the services they deliver (Kuttner, 1999).
The potential for the further de-skilling of primary care physicians is seen with the
recent emergence of the hospitalists, a new group of specialists meant to take over
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responsibility from the primary physician once the patient enters the hospital (Schroeder
& Shapiro, 1999; Noyes & Healy, 1999; Showstack et aI., 1999; McConagby, 1998;
Morasch, 1998). Under pressure to increase efficiency, many primary care physicians are
now abandoning the hospital-based component of their practice.
While the hospitalist system can reduce and simplify primary physician workloads
(Fernandez et aI., 2000), such a model of practice is disconcerting in that it limits the
participation of many physicians in activities that are intrinsically rewarding. In addition
to a potentially negative impact on professional development, the further separation of the
primary physician from the patient represents a threat to the continuity of patient care.
1.4 Opposing Change: The Enduring Legacy of Medical Dominance
The failure by health system managers in Canada, and elsewhere, to more fully
implement appropriate changes in the work of physicians may be explained, in part, by
the clinical autonomy of physicians and their ability to gain public support for their
preferred orientation toward health care. Despite health care reform and the impact of
external trends on the health care system, medical practices and how physicians allocate
their time are for the most part left to the discretion of physicians; many of whom prefer
to maintain the status quo (Dobson, 1997).
With the possible exception of lawyers and the clergy, physicians are unique in
their ability to exercise professional autonomy and maintain almost exclusive authority
over what they do. The ability of physicians to influence the system and to control their
work is the logical manifestation of a historical dominance over issues relating to health
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and health care, first claimed and later maintained by physicians, for more than a century.
The source of physician hegemony is contentious, but is probably due to a number
of factors. Some suggest it was due to the ability of physicians to establish a perception
of trustworthiness at the end of the 19th century that allowed them to establish their
dominant position in health care (Coburn et aI., 1983). Parsons (1951) attributed the
authority and influence of physicians to a level of training that differed significantly from
others by being prolonged, specialized, and theoretical. Freidson (1971) disagreed,
arguing that many groups had identified themselves as professionals using these criteria,
yet did not occupy the same level of prestige as physicians. Instead, Freidson (1989) felt
that the professional dominance held by physicians was due primarily to their ability to
control other occupations through licensing and restrictive regulations.
A different explanation is offered by Light and Levine (1988). They argued that
cultural beliefs and deference toward those perceived as healers were fundamental
sources of power, and that physicians more than any other group were able to exploit
these factors to their own advantage. Another explanation for physician dominance in
health care is the neo-Marxist view, which argues that authority over health care was
conferred on medicine by the capitalist elites. Their purpose was to exploit the status of
medicine, with its ideology of glorifying efficiency and science, as a way to justify the
corporate capitalist class (Coburn et al., 1983).
Regardless of the source of medical hegemony, the result was the elimination of
irregular practitioners and the exclusion of those lacking the necessary credentials. By
the early part of the 20th Century, alternative practitioners, midwives and other health
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professions had been outlawed or severely restricted in the scope of their medical
practices (Coburn et aI., 1983). "Legitimate" health practitioners, such as pharmacists
and nurses, were not eliminated, but were subordinated to medical authority. In this way,
medicine was able to establish a seemingly unassailable claim to clinical autonomy based
on their "unique" expertise (Friedson, 1970).
By the middle of the twentieth century, physicians not only exercised dominance
over other health professionals, but enjoyed considerable influence over government
health policies (Stevenson et aI., 1988). As a result, physicians were able to ensure that
government sponsored health plans preserved the autonomy of physicians. Medical
dominance also allowed physicians to create and control working conditions conducive to
their own practice preferences (Globerman, 1990).
At present, medical hegemony is perceived to be in decline (Anderson, 1998).
This is seen to be evident through the increased public regulation of physician practices
and conduct, the control of fees, global payments, and attempts to control the number and
location of physicians. Theories used to explain this decline include corporatisation,
proletarianism, deprofessionalism (Calnan & Williams, 1995; ReIman, 1983); and greater
involvement by the state through national health insurance (Coburn et aI., 1983).
While a substantial portion of their power has been demanded by, or delegated to,
other health care providers, authority over health care still rests primarily with physicians
(Temkin-Greener, 1983). Blumenthal and Epstein (1996) suggest that physicians no
longer have the power to influence greatly the preferences of organized purchasers or
other providers, yet physicians through their clinical authority can effectively delay or
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prevent implementation of policies that do not reflect their preferences (Anderson, 1998).
As stated previously, medical hegemony has contributed to the persistence of
problems within the health care system; problems that have been known for some time
and for which remedies have been repeatedly proposed, but seldom pursued with any
vigour. These problems include: the mal-distribution of physicians (Sullivan et al., 1996;
Eisenberg, 1994); the under use of complementary services and providers; and the
fragmented nature of health care delivery (Thompson, 2000; Leatt et al., 1996).
Medicine's control over the Canadian health care system has adversely affected
the distribution of physicians. On a per capita basis, Canada is seen to have an
oversupply of physicians (Evans, 1996). The situation of over supply has persisted for
decades, and is generally attributed to the decision in the mid-1960s to create a number of
new medical schools in anticipation of a growth in the nation's population that did not
occur (Barer et al., 1989). Even as the over supply of physicians was becoming evident,
the supply of physicians in smaller centres was declining as physicians increasingly
congregated in larger urban centres (Colohan, 1996). A number of factors contributed to
the migration of physicians away from smaller centres (Ricketts et al., 1996; Pathman et
al., 1994; Rourke, 1993; Jennett; 1988; Carter, 1987), but the net effect was that Canada
was left with a severe mal-distribution of physicians.
Although there has been a decline in rural populations, the demand for physicians
services in smaller centres remains high. Various incentives and programs have been
used to encourage physicians to move to smaller cities and towns (Gray et al., 1994;
Connor et al., 1994; Stratton et al., 1991), but physicians continue to prefer larger centres.
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This behaviour among physicians suggests a preference for the benefits and conditions
associated with these centres (Ricketts et aI., 1996; Carter, 1987; Langwell et al, 1987), as
well as the ability to develop and maintain a viable practice in over-serviced areas.
With physicians concentrated in large cities, access to medical care is relatively
convenient for people living in these centres. Partly the result of easy access to
physicians and few financial barriers, urban patients have come to see physicians as their
primary health care provider. Other health care providers, by virtue of patient preference
(Gutkin, 1997), and physician dominance of the health system gateways, largely occupy
supporting roles in the delivery of health services. In smaller centres, the lack of
physicians has limited opportunities for other provider groups, due to the physician's
mandated gatekeeper role and legally entrenched authority.
Physician behaviour continues to have a substantial effect on the functioning of
the Canadian health care system, and diminished though it may be, the clinical authority
of the medical profession is still significant (Hafferty & Light, 1995). This residual of the
historic hegemony of the medical profession still allows physicians to successfully pursue
professional and personal objectives, while largely ignoring the broader policy objectives
of the health care system. As illustrated by the poor distribution of physicians, the under
utilization of other health practitioners, and the fragmented mature of the health care
system, the decisions made by largely autonomous physicians in pursuit of professional
and personal objectives have created a number of problems for the health care system.
Despite these difficulties, the work of physicians and how they choose to allocate
their time will continue, for the time being at least, to reflect the preferences of the
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medical profession, regardless of external attempts to change their behaviour. Perhaps a
better strategy for changing physician practices would be to create conditions within the
health care system that would allow physicians to pursue their own goals and objectives
in a manner that supports the objectives of the health care system. Consideration of how
physicians are motivated to change behaviour and how physicians might be encouraged to
pursue professional and personal objectives in a manner that is congruent with societal
objectives are the subjects of the next chapter.
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2 Motivation and the Work of Physicians
External incentives such as money or the threat of regulatory sanction rarely result
in willing compliance or permanent change, as the individual is likely to revert to old
practices once the incentive or threat is removed. Furthermore, poorly conceived
incentive strategies designed to change practices may actually cause the individual to
adopt or intensify counter-productive behaviours in pursuit of preferred goals and
outcomes. Recognizing that the goals of physicians and the capacity to pursue these
goals will often determine physician behaviour, broader health policy objectives may be
best promoted by allowing physicians to achieve their personal and professional goals in
a manner that supports the objectives of the health care system.
In this chapter, the focus will be on identifying the goals and objectives of
Canadian physicians and the process by which physicians are motivated to obtain these
goals and objectives. Various motivation theories will be discussed including a number
of content and process theories. Particular attention will be given to equity theory and the
contributions and rewards of physicians. The effect of perceived inequity due to an
imbalance between inputs and outcomes will be reviewed, with attention to distress
created by inequity and strategies adopted by groups and individuals to alleviate this
distress. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the relationships between equity,
distress and the wish to reallocate time among physicians.
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2.1 Pursuing Goals and Objectives: Conflict or Convergence?
The primary goal of the Canadian health care system is to provide equitable access
to quality health care services in a cost-effective manner (Health Canada, 1999). Toward
that end, considerable attention has been given to encouraging those involved in the
delivery of health care services to meet these goals. Getting physicians to pursue these
objectives is particularly important given their central role and clinical authority.
However, strategies used to encourage physicians to practice in a manner that is
supportive of broader health policy objectives have only resulted in limited, often
temporary changes in clinical practices.
One reason for the limited success of these strategies is that they generally fail to
reflect the personal and professional goals of physicians. The professional goals of
physicians include the successful treatment of disease, interesting work, status, and a
relatively high income (Arnetz, 2001; Epstein et al., 1993; Williamson et aI, 1993).
Personal goals will vary, but are likely to include: time for themselves and their families;
and the pursuit of interests and other goals unrelated to professional objectives (Wheeler
et aI., 1990; Tait & Platt, 1995). Meeting health system objectives often requires the
physician to take on new duties at the expense of both professional (treating disease,
income) and personal (personal and family time) goals (Vinson et aI., 1996).
The internal motivation of physicians to achieve their professional and personal
goals is rarely considered or incorporated into strategies designed to promote health
system goals. Instead, the focus tends to be on external incentives, both positive and
negative, and a reliance on the physician's sense of obligation to gain physician
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compliance (Wheeler et aI, 1990).
Although physicians can be induced to change behaviour through the use of
external stimuli, if the external incentives offered by the health care system are not
conducive to their needs, physicians will eventually return to practices and behaviours
seen to promote their own goals and objectives. The challenge for policy makers and
health system administrators, therefore, is to support physicians in achieving their
professional and personal goals in a way that also promotes the objectives of the health
care system in the long term.
2.2 Motivation and Motivation Theories
For a change in behaviour to occur, the physician must be motivated to make the
change. Motivation can be defined as the force that compels the individual or group to
adopt a specific behaviour, or behaviours, in pursuit of a particular goal or goals
(Wong et aI, 1983). Several theories have been advanced to explain the relationship
between motivation and behaviours and are divided into either content or process theories
(Longest, 1996). Content theories focus on the things that actually motivate people, and
seek to identify the factors that are likely to affect behaviour. Major content theories of
motivation include: Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs; Alderfer's ERG Theory; and
Herzberg's Two-factor Theory. Process theories of motivation explain how changes in
behaviour designed to maintain or obtain preferred outcomes are initiated. Process
theories include Vroom's Expectancy Theory and Adam's Equity Theory.
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Content Theories: Maslow (1970) argued that individuals are motivated by the
desire to fulfill needs, and that there is a progression in the satisfaction of these needs
(Maslow, 1970). Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs identified five layers of needs
(Hagerty, 1999), ranging from the lower needs, including: biological needs, such as food
and shelter; safety needs, such as security; and social needs, such as friendship and a
sense of belonging, to the higher level needs, including: esteem needs, such as
achievement and recognition of that achievement; and self-actualization needs, such as
creativity, self-expression, integrity and self-fulfilment. Failure to fulfill a specific need
causes frustration and fixation on that need until it is met (Sirgy, 1986). Lower order
needs must be met before higher order needs can be addressed (Maslow, 1970).
Although the theory has not been validated empirically, and the incremental
approach toward need fulfilment is somewhat simplistic, Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs is
important in providing a conceptual framework on which to build more sophisticated
theories about needs and how they affect human behaviour (Longest, 1996).
Alderfer's ERG Theory builds on the work of Maslow. Alderfer begins by
reducing Maslow's hierarchy of needs from five to three: ~xistence, relatedness and
2rowth. Like Maslow, Alderfer argues that once existence and relatedness needs are met
they become less important, while meeting growth needs become increasing important
(Alderfer, 1989). Alderfer advances Maslow's theory by suggesting that following any
initial success in meeting growth needs, an individual is motivated to seek even more
growth, or higher levels of achievement (Longest, 1996). In effect, initial growth
experiences act as a kind of positive feedback, with each growth experience motivating
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the individual to seek the next growth opportunity. This suggests that physicians, by
virtue of the growth associated with becoming physicians, may be particularly inclined to
seek additional opportunities to grow and develop professionally.
Herzberg's Two-Factor Theory takes a somewhat different approach to
motivation. This theory argues there are satisfiers which motivate the individual, but that
there are also hygiene factors which act as de-motivators (Herzberg, 1987; Silver, 1987).
Satisfiers include such things as: achievement; recognition; the work itself; possibility for
growth; and responsibility. Hygiene factors include: interpersonal relationships; salary;
job security; working conditions; and status (Knoop, 1994). Satisfiers arise from: the
variety found in one's work; the ability to complete whole tasks; having work that is seen
as relevant; autonomy to carry out a task; and getting feedback on performance. The
implication for the health care system is that, at a time when changes in physician
behaviour and patterns of practice are being actively pursued, hygiene factors must be
addressed. However, in order to motivate physicians to actively pursue greater efficiency
and enhance the quality of care, satisfiers must also be present.
Process Theories: Vroom's value/expectancy theory is based on the following
propositions: 1) individuals assign value to outcomes and as a result have preferences
among outcomes; and 2) the extent to which they believe their own action will contribute
to the desired outcome is important (Vroom, 1964). That is to say, in determining what
action they will take, the more that individuals value a particular outcome and the more
they anticipate that the outcome depends on their actions, the more they will be motivated
to act (Troyer & Younts, 1997; Wong et aI, 1983).
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People are driven by their needs, but their choice over what they will and will not
do to fulfill their needs is based on: 1) the expectation that the desired change is
achievable (expectancy); 2) that the change will produced the desired effect
(instrumentality); and 3) the degree that the effect is valued by the individual (valence):
Motivation = Expectancy x Instrumentality x Valence
Put another way, expectancy theory hypothesizes that good performance is a
function of motivation and ability (Vroom, 1964). Motivation in tum is a function of
performance goals and the 'expectancy' that one's efforts will result in attainment of these
goals (Oliver, 1974). Therefore, to be motivated to change behaviour, the individual
must have the expectation that a change is possible and believe that a change will have
the predicted effect. In addition, the predicted effect must be valued by the individual.
One must consider the implications of expectancy theory for physicians.
Physicians have traditionally occupied a position of authority and trust within our society,
doing work seen to be important, and receiving a high level of financial rewards for that
work. Their desire and ability to maintain these outcomes represents a substantial
obstacle to meaningful health system reform. At the same time, the much needed
restructuring of health care and the redefining of roles diminishes the ability of physicians
to achieve their preferred goals and objectives, further de-motivating physicians to
participate actively in health reform. Health policy initiatives that do not meet, or which
ignore the expectations and preferences of physicians are more likely to be resisted or not
acted upon.
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2.3 Perceptions of Equity and the Work of Physicians
As an extension of expectancy theory, equity theory argues that individuals will
assess the equitable distribution of the desired outcomes, rather than seeking to maximize
their own beneficial outcomes, as espoused in expectancy theory. The extent to which
maximization strategies are employed will be based, in large measure, on the desire to
achieve a fair exchange. Equity theory recognizes that people are interested in
distributive justice, or getting what they believe they deserve for contributions that benefit
society, an organization, or another individual. The perceived link between the value of
their own performance and the rewards they receive is fundamental to their sense of
fairness (Longest, 1996).
The delivery and receiving of health care constitutes an important relationship in
which each party is expected to act in a reciprocal manner. This reciprocity is not limited
to economic considerations in exchange for services rendered, but can also include social
rewards such as appreciation, respect and acknowledgement of the value of the benefits
received by all those participating in the exchange (Ametz, 2001). Rooted in the
concepts of distributive justice and social exchange (Blau, 1994), equity theory offers a
strong theoretical basis from which to predict physician behaviour in the context of the
changing health care environment, and the effect of these changes on the contributions of
physicians and the benefits they receive. In this study, equity theory is used to assess the
importance of a fair exchange as a motivator for physicians to change the time they wish
to allocate to various professional activities, and to identify more precisely those factors
contributing to the perception of a fair exchange.
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2.4 The Underpinnings of Equity Theory
Equity theory is traced to the work of Adams in the early 1960s (Miles, 1987), as
well as work carried out by Homans (1961) on organizational behaviour, and Festinger's
theory of cognitive dissonance (1954). Equity theory as proposed by Adams (1963, 1965)
suggests that individuals and groups will only be satisfied with the distribution of rewards
(outcomes) if they are proportional to the contributions (inputs) of the individual or group
(Lane & Messe, 1972). In situations where an imbalance between inputs and outcomes is
perceived, the individual will experience inequity. Perceptions of inequity will lead, in
tum, to distress. The distressed individual is highly motivated to seek a method by which
to restore equity, and thus reduce distress (Witt & Nye, 1992).
Equity can be defined as that which is fair, impartial, or related to principles of
distributive justice. Equity can be further defined as either horizontal equity or vertical
equity. Horizontal equity can be described as the equal treatment of equals, and fairness
will only be perceived when individuals are treated equally regardless of their position
with respect to some other characteristic (Birch & Abelson, 1993).
In contemplating vertical equity, Irwin (1995) observed that financial rewards are
often structured to reflect economic and social obligations; that those with greater social
responsibility are frequently provided greater rewards for a comparable level of
productivity. Equity is preserved because those who do more for society also receive
more rewards. The lack of equality of benefit is accepted, in part, because this inequality
is perceived to be just, based on differing levels of contribution (Irwin, 1995). In this
study. equity is based on vertical equity (henceforth referred to as eguity).
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2.5 Inputs and Outcomes
In the end, the concept of equity cannot be defined in terms of a concrete truth
(Birch & Abelson, 1993). Equity theory operates from the premise that it is the
subjective rather than the objective evaluation of inputs and rewards that determines
whether one feels fairly or unfairly treated (Major and Testa; 1989).
However, from a policy perspective it is important to specify precisely the factors
required to secure equity in order to determine when it has been achieved. Key to
measuring and evaluating perceptions of equity is the identification of relevant inputs and
outcomes upon which individual judgements of equity are determined. However, it is
often difficult to determine which parts of the exchange will be viewed by the individual
as an input and which will be viewed as an outcome (Huseman et aI., 1987; Weick, 1966;
Pritchard, 1969).
A problem for early researchers was determining a priori whether a particular
characteristic should be viewed as an input or as an outcome (Lawler & O'Gara, 1967).
Tornow (1971) observed that individuals differed in their tendency to classify ambiguous
elements as either inputs or outcomes. Consequently, it is generally understood that
"equity is in the eye of the beholder", and as such, it is often not practical to objectively
measure the quantity of a given factor or to arbitrarily assign the factor as either an input
or an outcome (Huseman et aI., 1987).
Despite these difficulties, some factors have been identified as important
contributors to perceptions of equity, either as an input or as an outcome. Inputs
generally include such factors as technical skill, time, physical and mental effort, risk,
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dedication and judgement (Feldman et aI., 1994), while outcomes or rewards tend to
include factors such as the rate of pay, promotions, higher status, and increased self-
esteem (Longest, 1996).
The "perceptions of effort-reward fairness" scale developed by Van Yperen
(Jannsen, 2000) incorporated a number of input factors in a series of six items. These
included: 1) work in exchange for outcomes; 2) time in exchange for appreciation; 3)
commitment in exchange for rewards; 4) the proportionality of rewards; 5) effort (energy)
for outcomes; and 6) level of unfair treatment on the job. While producing high
reliability as a summative scale (Cronbach's alpha =0.90), the general nature of the
outcomes used by VanYperen makes it difficult to identify the relative importance of the
different types of rewards associated with the medical practice.
Inherent in the work of health care professionals are two types of rewards:
intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic rewards are intangible and relate to gratification and
security obtained through the application and advance of professional knowledge.
Extrinsic refers to rewards obtained from others as the result of professional activity.
Extrinsic rewards can be further classified by source (professional or community) and by
type (intangible and tangible). An example of an intangible extrinsic reward would be
prestige or status, while monetary remuneration is considered a tangible extrinsic reward
(Ben-Sira, 1986).
Tangible extrinsic rewards (such as money) maintain a key position in the
evaluation of equity. The level of pay received for services provided was the fundamental
relationship upon which equity theory was established, and the principal focus of early
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research (Clark, 1958; Adams, 1963; Patchen, 1961; Lawler & O'Gara, 1967; Andrews,
1967). In medicine, despite comparatively high levels of income, perceived inequities in
compensation do exist, particularly between cognitive and procedural specialties
(Katz et aI., 1997). While exacerbated by recent budgetary shortfalls, these economic
inequities are created and maintained in large part by the profession itself and its
procedural orientation toward health care. Provincial medical associations are largely
responsible for assigning reimbursement rates to the various services they provide, yet are
seemingly unable to effectively deal with the situation (Wright, 1996).
Lawler and O'Gara (1967) identified a number of non-monetary rewards
including: finding the work more interesting; more important; less complex; and less
challenging. The extent to which a task is interesting was found to moderate the degree
that individuals responded to a situation of monetary underpayment or overpayment
(Andrews, 1967). Interestingly, Lawler et aI. (1968) found that recognition by others was
a negative outcome among overpaid individuals.
While the literature identifies a number of factors that might be considered when
paying physicians (Feldham et aI., 1994; Hsiao et aI, 1988), what is less well known is the
relative importance of these factors among different physician groups and how these
factors might be related to perceptions of equity (Dobson & Lepnurm, 2000).
Walster and Walster (1975) suggested that individuals will often seek alternatives
to money in order to secure greater rewards, and that these choices may differ by gender.
In the past, men were seen to be more likely to view succeeding at a challenging task as
an important outcome, while women were more likely to view succeeding at affiliation
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goals as an important outcome. Nieva and Gutek (1981) found that women tended to
value pay and promotion less, placing more value on interpersonal relationships.
In a study of equity among primary physicians, Ben-Sira (1986) found that they
often had to deal with trivial activities. As a result, it was difficult to derive intrinsic
rewards from the work itself due to routine repetition of simple complaints offering no
real challenge. Ben-Sira (1986) also found that primary physicians were more likely to
experience feelings of professional stagnation, and that they often viewed their position as
inferior within the medical community. The result was a perceived lack of opportunity to
increase intangible rewards, both intrinsic and extrinsic.
A lack of opportunity to secure intangible rewards among general practitioners
suggests greater importance may be placed on tangible rewards (money), with less
consideration of the reallocation of time as a means by which to improve equity. Dobson
(1997) suggested that family physicians may differ from other specialties in their
perceptions of the equity of income as it relates to their willingness to change their
patterns of practice. Therefore, it is conceivable that the specific types of rewards sought
by physicians may vary across groups, and that rewards may be associated with specific
efforts, inputs and behaviours, thus affecting the mix of inputs provided.
2.6 The Nature of the Comparison Process
In developing equity theory, Adams (1965) proposed that the comparison of one's
own input/outcome ratios with other individuals is the principal mechanism by which
individuals detennine their level of equity. If these ratios are perceived to be different,
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the individual experiences inequity. Positive equity results when the person's ratio of
outcomes to inputs is perceived as better than those with whom the individual is making
comparison; negative equity occurs when the person's ratio is perceived as worse than the
other person(s).
Equity theorists such as Pritchard (1969) and Messe and Watts (1983) argued that
individuals make internal evaluations as well as comparisons with others. Weick and
Nesset (1968) found that inequity arose from a comparison of one's own input/outcome
ratio or from a comparison with the equity ratios of others, although individuals were
more bothered by inequitable comparisons with others than between their own inputs and
outcomes. Dornstein (1989) found that fairness judgements regarding remuneration were
based on one or more frames of references including: comparison of others, comparison
against prevalent norms of exchange, as well as based on need or individual contribution.
More recent equity theorists (Jasso, 1980, Markovsky, 1985; Molm et aI, 1993)
have moved away from an exchange framework based on individual comparison, toward
the concept of distributive justice. Molm et al (1993) argue that an allocative approach,
rather than the exchange approach, is more appropriate in situations where there is a
distribution of rewards or benefits across a number of individuals. In such situations,
perceptions of inequity increase as actual rewards depart from what is judged to be fair by
the affected individual in relation to the comparison "other" rather than those
participating directly in an exchange (Molm et aI, 1994).
In the current study, both exchange and allocation measures of equity were used,
and value affixed to both inputs and rewards was based on the perception of the
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physicians surveyed. While it might be argued that physicians are not necessarily
qualified to assess the value of their contributions, ignoring their perspective would make
the task of comparing inputs and outcomes extremely difficult, if not impossible.
Furthermore, physicians continue to have great influence over many components of the
health care system, and will continue to exercise significant influence for the foreseeable
future. Therefore, changes in the behaviour or activities of physicians due to perceived
inequities have the potential to adversely impact the health care system in a substantial
way. Essential to minimizing the potential for adverse consequences is determining the
importance of various inputs and outcomes based on the physicians' own perspective of
what is considered fair.
In addition to distributive equity and the comparison of inputs and outcomes, the
perception of equity is also affected by the manner in which the distribution of rewards is
determined (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Leventhal et al., 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). In
other words, how decisions are made rather than what is decided is also important
(Greenberg, 1990). Process equity is achieved when the methods used to assign rewards
are perceived to be open and objective, and are associated with the attitudes held by
individuals about relevant institutions or authorities.
The fairness of the process used to determine pay raises, for example, is seen to
contribute to factors such as organizational commitment and trust in supervision (Tyler et
aI., 1985). Process equity is not expected to relate directly to time allocation preferences,
which represent strategies designed to change outcomes (Tyler, 1990). However, due to
its potential contribution to distributive equity (Greenberg, 1990), process equity will be
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assessed concurrently, and questions relating to process equity are included in the study.
2.7 Distress: Responding to Perceptions of Inequity
In responding to inequity, Walster, Berscheid and Walster (1973) proposed four
interlocking propositions to explain behaviour relating to inputs and outcomes (Figure 3).
Based on these propositions, Hatfield (nee Walster) and Sprecher (1984) argued that
those experiencing inequity will experience distress and respond by either restoring actual
equity through behavioural change, or by restoring psychological equity through a change
in the value assigned to existing inputs and/or outcomes.
Proposition I: Individuals will try to maximize their outcomes
Proposition ITA: Groups will seek to maximize the collective reward by evolving
accepted systems for equitably apportioning resources among members.
Proposition lIB: Groups will generally reward members who treat others equitably
and punish those who don't.
Proposition ill: Individuals become distressed in inequitable situations
Proposition IV: Individuals in inequitable situations will attempt to restore equity.
The greater the inequity, the harder they will try to restore equity.
Figure 3: Equity Propositions (Source: Hatfield & Sprecher, 1984)
The distress associated with inequity is distinctly different from stress associated
with the medical practice, which has been studied extensively by various researchers
concerned with the physical and psychological well-being of physicians. While the
detrimental effects of external stressors on the health of physicians and other groups are
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important, they are not generally looked upon as a source of motivation. Indeed, it is the
unwillingness or inability to change the work environment that is often associated with
more harmful levels of stress (Karasek, 1979).
Distress on the other hand, is a manifestation of the individual's concern that the
current situation or exchange is inappropriate. Distress is linked to stress in that
unresolved distress due to an inability to restore equilibrium can serve as a source of
stress, leading to physician burnout (Bakker et aI., 2000). More importantly, at least in
the context of physicians and others exercising control over their working conditions and
levels of productivity, the distress that arises from perceptions of inequity serves to
motivate the individual to modify their behaviour as a way to reduce a perceived inequity
(Hatfield & Sprecher, 1984).
Clark (1965) showed that underpayment can lead to feelings of inequity among
workers resulting in reduced productivity (lower inputs). Lawler and O'Gara (1967)
found that individuals perceiving themselves to be underpaid attempted to restore equity
by increasing other types of outcomes. In this case, those perceiving a low piece-rate
tended to increase the number of units produced while reducing the effort and attention
expended on each unit. More recently, Perry (1992) found that workers who consider
themselves to be under-rewarded financially are more likely to strike, file grievances, or
withdraw from the workplace.
Over-rewarded individuals may also perceive a system to be unjust, but are
generally less likely to feel responsible for the injustice or attempt to change their inputs
and outputs to restore equity. If over-rewarded individuals do experience distress, they
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are more likely to adopt a psychological rather than a behavioural strategy to restore
balance in the exchange. As a result, perceptions of inequity due to being over-rewarded
are less likely to cause the individual to alter the actual components of the exchange.
Hatfield and Sprecher (1984) also suggested that equity theory provides a
framework for understanding business and social relationships in organizations. The level
of equity experienced by the individual has a significant impact on the person's
willingness to stay in a situation or organization. When pay is equitable, workers are
more likely to cooperate with one another for their mutual benefit. However, when pay is
perceived as inequitable, workers may choose not to cooperate and opt instead for
individually defined tasks, even if this results in reduced levels of financial compensation
for the individual.
While some financial penalty may be endured to secure equity, it should be
understood that there are limits to this strategy, and there will be a threshold income
perceived as the minimum. In this way, the necessity of a fair exchange is subordinate to
an acceptable level of rewards. This can be illustrated by the concepts of income
targeting and supplier-induced demand; concepts that are often attributed to physicians
when discussing remuneration issues (Mitchell et al., 2000; Chaix-Couturier et aI., 2000;
Bernstein, 1998; Rizzo & Blumenthal, 1994; Krasnik et aI., 1990, Rice & Labelle, 1989).
Provincial governments have often attempted to control medical costs by freezing
or reducing the amount of reimbursement provided for individual procedures. Physicians
have generally responded by increasing the number of procedures they perform or by
favouring procedures that provide greater reimbursement (Mitchell et aI., 2000; Chan et
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aI, 1998a; Barer et aI., 1988).
While some physicians pursue a strategy of income maximization, the majority
only expand their patient care activity to the extent required to achieve a particular
income level (Chan, 1998b; Krasnik et al., 1990). However, these "income neutral"
practices can result in a shift in the services offered that is independent of the medical
conditions presented to physicians by patients (Barer et aI., 1988). Therefore, strategies
used by physicians to restore or improve income have the potential to adversely affect
clinical practice, as well as the patient-physician relationship (Labelle et aI., 1994).
2.8 Inequity and Distress Among Physicians
Any objective assessment of the health care system reveals greater monetary
rewards for physicians compared to other health care providers. Indeed, physicians as a
group constitute one of the highest paid groups of workers in Canada (Colohan, 1996;
Iglehart, 1989). The issue to be addressed, however, is not one of equality, but rather of
relative fairness. Despite continued high status and high levels of income relative to the
general population, any decline in "rewards" without a corresponding decline in effort can
be expected to result in a sense of "relative deprivation" (Globerman, 1990).
Increasing emphasis on cost control (Wolfe, 1991), changing public expectations
and challenges to medical autonomy from other health care providers (Coburn et aI.,
1983), and the shifting in health policy toward health promotion (Williams et aI., 1995)
are changing the relationship between physicians and other health care stakeholders,
including: patients, nurses, allied health care professions, health care organizations, and
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third-party payers. In these evolving relationships, the activities expected from
physicians and the corresponding rewards received often contrast with physicians' own
perception of the content of their work and its inherent value.
In the past, the imbalance in the rewards given to physicians compared to other
groups was justified because it was perceived to be based on the higher levels of expertise
and social benefit provided by physicians (Irwin, 1995). Today, other health providers
and society in general are less inclined to accept the higher rewards received by
physicians as a fair reflection of their contribution. These changing perceptions represent
a source of conflict between physicians and other health care stakeholders. As a result,
physicians are likely to experience a shift in the balance between the efforts they expend
in the delivery of health care services and extrinsic rewards that they are being offered.
The decline in status and income associated with the increasing influence of other groups
can be expected to lead to perceptions of inequity among physicians (Maynard &
Williams, 1984).
Equity theory suggests that any perceived imbalance in an exchange relationship
will cause distress for one or more of those participating in the exchange (Austin, 1980;
Walster et aI., 1973), particularly for those experiencing a net loss of benefit (Figure 4).
To minimize distress, physicians may seek to restore equity by changing the value
attached to the exchange (psychological response) or by modifying the components of the
exchange (behavioural response) (Hatfield & Sprecher, 1984).
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Figure 4: Equity Response Pathway
Early empirical evidence suggested that within a piece-rate method of
remuneration (of which the medical fee-for-service method of payment is a particularly
lucrative example), workers who are underpaid will be inclined to produce more at lower
quality, and that those who are overpaid will produce less of higher quality (Pritchard,
1969). However, professional training and a sense of duty will serve to diminish the
inclination of physicians to adopt such strategies in pursuit of equity; therefore, they must
look for other ways to increase rewards or reduce input costs.
Bakker, Van Dierendonck and their associates found that feelings of inequity
regarding the nature of the patient-physician relationship led to increased distress and
greater emotional exhaustion among general practitioners (Bakker et aI., 2000; Van
Dieredonck et aI.,1996 & 1994). These authors argued that, due to their professional
obligations to their patients, physicians were limited in the strategies they could employ
to restore equity, and tended to adopt attitudinal changes, including callousness, cynicism
or impersonal attitudes towards their patients. Invariably, these attitudinal changes led to
a deterioration of the patient-physician relationship, eventually manifesting itself in even
higher levels of distress and burnout (Bakker et aI., 2000).
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The response of physicians to inequity in their relationship with other health care
stakeholders, however, is not expected to be the same as their response to inequity in their
relationship with patients. For example, health care organizations and physicians have a
relationship that is much more reflective of the traditional understanding of an exchange
relationship; in return for remuneration and other less tangible rewards the physician
agrees to provide specific, quantifiable services to the institution and its clients.
Although physicians tend to subscribe to the notion of being economically and
clinically independent practitioners, in many ways, their relationship with the health care
system is similar to an employer-employee relationship. As a result, a sense of obligation
on the part of the physician is more likely to be contingent on the quality of an
economically-based relationship. When the exchange is perceived as unequal, the
physician is less likely to continue due to a socially-derived sense of duty or obligation
(Grimes, 1992). When inequity is seen to exist, physicians can be expected to seek
restoration of equity through changes in income or workplace practices and conditions.
In an era of constrained health budgets and salary caps, the opportunity for physicians to
increase their economic benefits is somewhat limited; therefore, physicians may be more
inclined to reduce or withdraw specific services, reduce their total hours of work, or
otherwise change their patterns of practice.
2.9 Equity, Distress and the Wish to Reallocate Time
Physicians have considerable scope when determining their working hours and the
activities they carry out (Camasso & Camasso, 1994; Kristiansen & Mooney, 1993). The
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work of physicians is diverse, however, and includes various patient and non-patient
activities (Weisman & Teitelbaum, 1987, Morriosn, 2000). The very complexity of
medical work might make it difficult for a physician to accurately identify the time spent
on specific tasks, or to change time allocated to tasks in any directed manner. However,
research has demonstrated that physicians do have the capacity to accurately identify the
time they spend on various activities (Hsiao et aI., 1988), as well as mental effort and
judgment, technical skill and physical effort (Feldham et aI., 1994). Furthermore,
Feldham et ai. (1994) found that physicians could accurately identify the work
components such that there was 850/0 agreement with total physician work.
Physicians make conscious decisions on how they allocate their time between
caring for patients, keeping up with the literature, being involved in teaching and
research, participating in committees, and attending to the paperwork associated with
their practice. Therefore, adopting a strategy of time reallocation would appear to be
feasible for physicians seeking to restore equity, both from the point of view that they
possess the ability to change to content of their work and that they are aware of their
current practices. If rewards appear to be decreasing or practice demands and costs
increasing, physicians may seek to improve the balance by increasing intrinsic rewards
through the reallocation of their time between activities. In deciding how to allocate their
time, the physician will take into account the needs of their patients. The physician will
also consider personal interests in terms of income, leisure, workload and preferences for
other tasks (Wheeler et aI., 1990; Tait & Platt, 1995; Vinson et aI., 1996).
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The physician's decision to abandon or reduce a specific activity may be due to: a
poor rate of pay; poor working conditions; reduced opportunity to use diagnostic skills;
reduced patient contact; reduced clinical autonomy due to restrictive protocols; or the
tedium of a repetitive task (Grimes, 1992). For example, in examining the reason for the
declining interest in internal medicine over a two decade period, Rosman et al (1989)
found contributing factors to include an increased number of tests, consultations,
admissions and discharges, all leading to vast increases in clerical responsibilities and the
reduction of time available for patients.
Diminished autonomy and weaker physician-patient relationships due to greater
shared decision-making also contribute to the wish to reallocate time. Factors such as
long hours, uncertainty in decision-making, lack of support, and lower rates of pay are not
negligible, but they are less important if such factors have been long associated with an
activity in the past and remain relatively unchanged (Hardison, 1986).
It has been suggested that the activities carried out by physicians provide an
opportunity to contribute and perform well, to be rewarded and esteemed, and to belong
to a group (Peter & Siegrist, 1997). The benefits of any activity are contingent, however,
on reciprocity. A lack of reciprocity between costs and gains creates distress, with a
propensity to cause negative physical, psychological and emotional autonomic reactions.
Continued participation in an activity can occur in the face of poor or declining
rewards if the task is perceived as vital. Grimes (1992) uses the example of the older
clinician who continues to provide abortion services because of their awareness of the
morbidity and mortality suffered by women before abortion was legalized. Among
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younger physicians, a lack of awareness of these factors increases the likelihood that
negative incentives will cause them to abandon or avoid the procedure.
Avoidance or withdrawal behaviour also occurs with non-patient centred
activities. In an examination of the reasons why physicians failed to attend a course in
which they initially expressed interest, Pitts and Vincent (1994) concluded the reasons
were: the time required to attend the event; and existing family and medical practice
demands.
From a societal perspective, the ability of physicians to determine the nature and
intensity of their work is worrisome if the activities valued by the health care system are
seen by the physicians as over-burdensome, less important or unrewarding. While the
decision to reallocate time may be beneficial to the physician in terms of restored equity
and reduced distress, decisions to reallocate time may adversely impact on the utilization,
quality and cost of the health care system.
Many of the tasks performed by physicians require the skills of a qualified
medical practitioner, but a number of patient and non-patient centred procedures, tasks,
and activities can be delivered as effectively, and more efficiently by non-medical
providers (Rachlis, 1995). While important or even necessary from the perspective of the
physician, carrying out such tasks may represent the inappropriate utilization of a
valuable resource from the perspective of society or the health care system.
In reallocating time to restore equity, one must be concerned about the choices
physicians are likely to make, as well as their ability to initiate change. Lennon and
Rosenfield (1994) contend that the ability to abandon an existing exchange relationship
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for a more favourable exchange has the effect of raising expectations and the standard by
which the existing exchange of inputs and outcomes is judged to be fair. The mobility of
health professionals, particularly physicians, suggests that they will have less tolerance
for an objectively poorer exchange as compared to other, less mobile workers. Inability
to maintain or restore equity to an existing exchange is likely to increase the likelihood of
withdrawal from the exchange. To prevent this situation, physicians should be
encouraged through policy and managerial support to adopt appropriate models of care.
Such a transition would be beneficial for physicians and for the health care system.
In summary, physicians are aware of how they allocate their time, they know that
it is a precious resource, and that their time allocation decisions affect both health system
goals and their own professional and personal goals. By shifting time allotments between
activities it may be possible to improve the actual rewards received from the exchange
without diminishing the total value of the services provided to the health care system
(Dobson & Lepnurm, 2000; Linn et aI., 1985). However, if the strategies adopted to
reallocate time are not beneficial for society or the health care system, policy makers will
need to identify other means by which to maintain equity that support a more appropriate
allocation of the physician's time.
63
3 Practice Conditions and the Work of Physicians
Along with the recognition that the health care system and the physician's role are
in need of substantial reform, there is considerable evidence that the manner in which
most physicians organize their medical practice is not the best for ensuring the efficient
delivery of quality care (Manning, 1999; Felt-Lisk et al., 1999; Marriott & Mable, 1998;
Lepnurm, 1995; Angus & Manga, 1990; Shillington, 1983). Despite the benefits of an
integrated model of health care, most physicians continue to practice in physician-specific
or physician-dominated practice groups with remuneration based on fee-for-service
(Hutchison et al., 2001).
To this point, it has been argued that changes in society and in the health care
system are likely to affect physicians, both in terms of the demands placed on them and
the rewards they can expect to receive. However, health reform and other changes in the
health care environment have not fundamentally changed the manner in which physicians
work within the system, nor the manner in which they organize their practices
(Hutchinson et al., 2001). Most physicians work in solo practice or in practice groups
that focus on treating symptomatic patients, while largely ignoring more proactive
approaches to health care and more integrated models of health care delivery. At the
same time, the changing health care environment has meant that more effort is required
by physicians to access resources for their patients and to maintain their own incomes.
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Differences in the demands and rewards associated with a particular practice
setting can be expected to effect perceptions of equity. In tum, the distress associated
with inequity is expected to affect physician behaviour (the wish to reallocate their time).
The degree to which practice conditions affect the equity-distress-wish to reallocate time
pathway is the principal focus of this chapter. The extent to which relevant·practice
conditions are determined by the environment and by the preferences of individual
physicians will also be considered.
3.1 Practice Conditions: An Organizational Theory Perspective
Physicians playa central role within the Canadian health care system and for any
substantial change to occur in the system, or even to allow it to function more effectively
and efficiently, changes will have to occur to how physicians organize themselves and
carry out their duties. Organizational theories, such as: contingency (Donaldson, 1997),
resource-dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), institutional (Meyer & Rowan, 1977),
and strategic choice (Childs, 1997), suggest physicians will eventually adopt new
practices and behaviours to ensure quality care for their patients and to secure appropriate
rewards for themselves. In the meantime, as the push for system-wide reform increases,
delays in adopting appropriate organizational designs and practices are likely to result in
an increasingly inefficient and ineffective health care system, in which physicians
perceive greater inequity and experience greater distress as they struggle to maintain
quality care.
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Contingency theory asserts that there is a "best fit" between the organization and
the environment,·and that a proper fit will lead to improved performance and increased
organizational viability (Donaldson, 1987). Over time, the practice models which closely
fit their environmental constraints will thrive and less viable models will eventually
disappear. As a result, one is more likely to find a particular organizational design within
a specific type of practice environment (Miller, 1981). Where variance in organizational
design persists, it is explained by slack, or liberality, within the environment (Donaldson,
1987). Liberality refers to a lack of an imperative to perform in an efficient and effective
manner, and is most commonly attributed to a lack of competition or low performance
expectations within a particular environment.
Historically, the medical profession possessed a great deal of slack due to the
monopolistic control enjoyed by physicians and relatively unrestricted reimbursement
schemes. Due to their medical authority and clinical autonomy, medical practitioners
were able to ignore the effect of poor fit on performance. However, as health spending
becomes more constrained, and as physicians come under greater scrutiny from other
stakeholders such as patients and third-party payers, contingency theory would predict
that the ability of physicians and their practice groups to maintain or to adopt less
efficient and/or less effective practice models will decrease. Eventually, physicians will
be required to change how they organize themselves. Unfortunately, due to their current
ability to resist or delay these changes, the economic and emotional costs may be higher
and the transition to more appropriate practice models may take longer than would
otherwise be necessary.
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Resource dependence theory explains changes in organizational design and
practices as a function of dependence on others for resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
The ability of the physician or the medical practice group to determine its own
organizational structures and practices is constrained by the ability to influence the
environment in which the individual or group operates (Zakus, 1998).
While suggesting physicians, or at least the medical profession, have the capacity
to influence their environment, resource dependence theory ultimately expects
organizational structures and practices to reflect the expectations of those in control of
essential resources. As a result, individual physicians or their representative professional
bodies will seek to diminish the influence of other groups, allowing physicians to exercise
more control in support of their own objectives (Aldrich, 1976).
Evidence of this behaviour is seen in the almost daily warnings coming from the
medical profession about the state of health care; warnings that usually conclude that the
salvation of the system will only occur when control is rested from the bureaucrats and
administrators, and given back to patients and their advocate (the physician). Using such
tactics, the medical profession has been quite effective in maintaining the status quo.
For, despite overwhelming evidence of the need to change the system and how they
organize themselves, physicians have been able to resist or delay substantial changes
through their political and cultural influence.
Institutional theory, on the other hand, suggests the structure of an organization is
merely a reflection of the larger social institution in which the organization exists (Meyer
& Rowan, 1977; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Scott, 1987). The success and survival of the
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organization is linked to compliance with, and is a reflection of, the larger institution
rather than the performance of the organization (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
The imperative of the physician or physician organization, therefore, is to
successfully reflect the values and assumptions of the larger institution. Adherence to an
institutional orthodoxy is maintained even at the sacrifice of effectiveness or efficiency.
New practices are only adopted gradually, and stagnation or abandonment of an
innovative practice will occur if it cannot be accommodated within the existing
institutional framework (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). This perspective is somewhat more
benign than resource dependence theory in attributing importance to the actions of
physicians. Professional groups are portrayed as cautiously reacting to changes in the
institutional environment rather than actively seeking to bringing these changes about.
Deterministic organizational theories such as contingency theory, resource
dependence theory, and institutional theory provide varying perspectives on the
relationship between the practice environment and decisions made by those working in
that environment. However, each suggests that changes in practices, such as the
reallocating time among professional activities, if based on personal preferences, are
unsustainable if they fail to reflect the realities of the external environment. In predicting
the contribution of practice conditions to equity and the wish to reallocate time, each
theory suggests different degrees of association.
From a contingency theory perspective (Pugh et aI, 1969; Drazen & Van de Ven,
1985; Donaldson, 1987), environmental and organizational factors represent the practice
conditions under which the physician must function to achieve good performance
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(Donaldson, 1997). As requisites to the activities carried out by the physicians, some
practice conditions may be viewed as necessary for the exchange of services (inputs) and
benefits (outcomes), and should not substantially affect distributive equity perceptions.
The physician may not like the practice conditions, but accepts their necessity, given the
demands of the practice environment. Alternatively, practice conditions, especially
external environmental characteristics, may simply be seen as beyond the physician's
ability to control. As such, the physician may seek to change the value placed on these
factors (a psychological restoration of equity) in order to diminish the impact of
objectively unfair practice conditions on equity perceptions.
From a resource dependence perspective (Aldrich, 1976; Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978), the relationship between the medical practice and other organizations, vis a vis the
environment, is fundamentally based on an equitable exchange between these groups
(Van de Ven & Walker, 1984). Therefore, less acceptable dependency arrangements are
likely to be associated with perceptions of inequity. If a fair exchange does not exist,
physicians may attempt to influence the environment to diminish its impact on the
organization, thereby enhancing their own ability to pursue preferences. In applying
resource dependence theory to the equity-distress-wish to reallocate time pathway, one
would expect to see a significant relationship between the characteristics of the practice
environment, perceptions of equity, distress and the wish to reallocate time.
Institutional theory suggests environment and organizational variables represent
potential sources of inequity if conditions do not conform to broad institutional
orthodoxy. However, if conditions do conform to orthodoxy, their impact on equity
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should be relatively weak. Concurrently, sensitivity to the expectation of existing
institutional norms makes consideration of time reallocation based on personal
preferences a less likely response to practice conditions.
As a group, physicians have played a key role in creating the health care
institutions, and would be expected to support their underlying assumptions, values and
beliefs. Despite what is known about the determinants of health and more effective
methods of delivery, quality care is still widely perceived as direct patient care delivered
by a doctor in a medical group practice or hospital. These assumptions and beliefs about
the health care system are not easily changed, and strategies that do not reflect these
assumptions, such as reallocating time away from patient care and toward administrative
activities, are less likely to be considered.
Relatively weak associations can be expected between wish to reallocate time,
equity, and existing practice conditions. Unlike contingency theory, however,
organizational structures and processes are more likely to reflect institutional norms and
less likely to reflect practice models seen to promote more efficient and effective use of
the physician's time.
Strategic choice theory, on the other hand, takes a much different approach when
explaining the link between practice conditions and organizational behaviour (Child,
1972; Ranson, Hinings & Greenwood, 1980; Child 1997). Deterministic organizational
theories are seen as failing to adequately consider the effect of physician preferences on
practice patterns and organizational arrangements. While acknowledging the importance
of the environment and other external constraints, strategic choice theory places greater
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emphasis on the capacity of those within an organization to interpret the environment
and, based on these interpretations, decide the nature and extent of change (Child, 1997).
Decisions over how to design the organization are evolutionary, with new structures and
processes emerging as those within the organization gain experience with, and are
changed by, the existing organization and the external environment (Ranson et aI., 1980).
Based on strategic choice theory, physicians must first be aware of the adverse
impact of practice deficiencies on themselves and the health care system before change
can occur. Changes in how physicians choose to allocate their time will be in response to
their experience within the practice environment and what they perceive to be desirable.
The lack of managerial training, the use of what is fundamentally an apprenticeship
approach to skill development, and the economic signals created by fee-for-service,
therefore make physicians more susceptible to creating and maintaining inefficient and
ineffectual organizational structures and practices.
Strategic choice theory predicts a strong relationship between equity and
organizational characteristics, based on the argument put forth that organizational
characteristics, such as level of practice integration, practice demands and method of
remuneration, will influence the perceptions of the decision-makers (Child, 1997). A
general lack of managerial experience among physicians suggests the use of more
effective organizational structures and processes will not be widespread. Furthermore,
the wish to reallocate time in response to inequity is not expected to be greatly influenced
by practice characteristics. As a result, only very weak relationships are predicted with
the practice condition variables used in this study and the wish to reallocate time.
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3.2 Practice Conditions: Catalyst or Constraint?
Practice conditions are expected to play an important role in the equity-distress-
wish to reallocate time pathway in one of two ways. One way is to affect the perceived
value of inputs and outcomes associated with the equity exchange; thereby, indirectly
influencing the time allocated to various professional activities (the preference-oriented
approach). Alternatively, practice conditions may constrain the ability of the physician to
reallocate time as a strategy for restoring equity (the constraint-driven approach).
The preference-oriented approach, as exemplified by strategic choice theory,
suggests that differences in behaviour can be explained by differences in physician
preferences (Westert & Groenewegen, 1999). In effect, behaviour will be determined by:
the physician's awareness of alternative therapies and treatment strategies; a sense of duty
or obligation; the perception that the task is a fundamental aspect of the professional
identity; that the task represents an important source of prestige and/or income; or simply
finding the task to be enjoyable. Practice variation is explained by differences in
opportunities, incentives and -influences, causing physicians to differ in their patterns of
practice because they value tasks differently.
An alternative explanation is the constraint-driven approach (Lindenberg, 1990),
in which physician behaviour is not so much caused by differences in tastes or
preferences, as by differences in the characteristics of the social context or environmental
constraints. The social context creates specific opportunities and constraints that provide
incentives for certain options or restricts behavioural choices. Variations in practice
patterns are explained by differences in practice conditions, and the focus is on
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understanding the environmental conditions that influence or constrain behaviours.
For example, time allocation choices may vary by location and the type of practice
arrangement and, in attempting to restore equity, physicians may find themselves
constrained by these practice conditions. As a result, time reallocation might not be
perceived by the physician as a viable strategy for restoring equity. Instead, physicians
may be inclined to choose strategies such as emotional withdrawal (Koehler et aI., 1992;
Van Dierendonck et aI., 1994, 1996) or elect to pursue greater financial rewards, rather
than seeking changes to the level or mix of professional activities,
To determine the most appropriate theoretical perspective, and to establish the
relationship between practice conditions, equity, distress and the wish to reallocate time, a
number of practice condition variables were considered, including: 1) the objective
practice environment; 2) local health care conditions; 3) practice integration; 4) practice
demands; and 5) the method of remuneration (Westert & Groenewegen, 1999;
Kristiansen & Mooney, 1993; Groenewegen & Hutten, 1991; Lindenberg, 1990).
3.2.1 The Objective Practice Environment
Despite the fact that most physicians in Canada practice within a comprehensive,
publicly-funded health care system, they face a variety of environmental factors which
may affect or constrain the choices made by individual physicians within the medical
practice setting. Environmental factors include: the size of the community (Shimmura,
1988); the specialized training of the physicians (Groenewegen & Hutten, 1991); the size
of the practice group (Calnan & Butler, 1988; Branthwaite & Ross, 1988; Groenewegen
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& Hutten, 1991); the location of the medical practice (Lepnurm, 1996); and the type of
ownership or practice sponsorship (Hadley et aI., 1999).
The practice environment may constitute a source of inequity for the physician if
seen to apply disproportionately across physician groups. For example, urban-based
physicians and many specialists are often seen to have more interesting work and greater
prestige and status than general practitioners (Ben-Sira, 1986), and fee schedules are
generally seen to favour procedure-based specialties (Eisenberg, 1994).
Practice group size may be important because of its potential to affect workload
and the intensity of the on call schedule, as well as its ability to provide collegial support
(Jarrett et aI., 1989; Steinwald & Steinwald, 1975; Langwell et at., 1987). IT the practice
setting is perceived as unfair and resistant to change, the physician may look for a new
practice setting to restore equity (McKendry et aI., 1996). The alternative is for the
physician to remain in the current arrangement, experiencing inequity and its inevitable
consequences.
3.2.2 Local Health Care Conditions
Concerns about the access and the quality of the health care system are widely
held by many people, including physicians (Blendon et aI., 2001). Furthermore, the
perceived state of the local health care system can be strongly suggestive of the actual
state of the health care system and the practice conditions under which physicians are
asked to carrying out their responsibilities (Arnetz, 1999). Those perceiving themselves
to be working in a poorly managed system are more likely to be experiencing more
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difficult working conditions, compared to physicians satisfied with the state of the local
health care system (Arnetz, 1997).
The ability to access local health resources and the quality of those resources can
place additional demands on the medical practice. In rural and smaller urban centres,
access to health services may be adversely affected by the lack of some medical
specialties and support services (Godwin, 1996). In many larger centres, increased
queuing for surgery may affect access and the timely delivery of care to a greater degree
compared to smaller, under-utilized centres (Alter et aI., 1999; Cox et aI., 1996).
Concerns about access are compounded by quality issues such as: a large
proportion of procedures that are unnecessary (Epstein, 1991; Siu et at., 1986; Kemper,
1988); the over-use of medical services due to the incentives created by fee-for-service
(Hutchinson & Foley, 1999); and significant differences in the rates of delivery between
geographic areas despite similar populations (Wenneberg et aI, 1987). As with the
objective practice environment, the views of physicians on the state of local health care as
it relates to efficiency, access and quality may constitute a source of inequity if seen to be
occurring disproportionately among physicians.
In the past, concerns about the state of the health care system would most often be
associated with the state of the local acute care hospital. Today physicians are
increasingly called upon to work within a variety of practice setting. As a result, the state
of community-based and long-term care service are also likely to affect physician
perceptions about the quality and accessibility to local health care services.
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Power and dependency relationships among practitioners are also expected to
influence assessments of fairness (Stolte, 1983). Fewer resources and career options
associated with the practice environment may lower expectations, while greater resources
and options may raise expectations and the standard by which exchanges of inputs and
outcomes are judged to be fair (Lennon & Rosenfield, 1994). Therefore, a lack or even a
perceived lack of cooperation among practitioners or participation in policy and planning
by physicians may exacerbate perceived inequities or reduce the benefits associated with
time reallocation. As well, fewer opportunities to participate in the local planning
process, and a work environment marked by poor cooperation among health care
providers, may make it more difficult for physicians to control their own work
environment or to initiate change.
3.2.3 Practice Integration
As part of the health care reform process, much has been made of the need to
more fully integrate the health care system, including physician services (Sapsford, 1997).
A number of positive characteristics are ascribed to the integrated practice setting. These
include: a focus on community needs; a match between capacity to needs; information
systems that support continuity of care; and appropriate financial incentives and
organizational structure (Shortell et aI., 1996).
Within an integrated health care system, physicians playa key role, but one in
which authority is shared with non-physician administrators (Schulz et aI., 1997). To be
successful, an integrated system also requires physicians to move away from fee-for-
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service toward mixed funding formulas, to begin to share responsibility for patient care,
and to shift from solo practice toward multi-disciplinary team settings (Mullin, 1998;
Marriott & Mable, 1998).
Montague (1994) identified a number of reasons why a physician might prefer a
more integrated practice setting. Among these were the wish for less time on call,
flexible hours, and access to more support staff and equipment. Working with other
health care providers in an integrated practice setting provides more opportunities to
adopt alternative approaches to patient care. Furthermore, an integrated practice setting
can provide the physician greater flexibility in delegating certain, less desirable activities
(Woodward et aI., 1996; Breslau et aI., 1978). By making time reallocation more
feasible, it is anticipated that time reallocation strategies will be considered more often.
Integration can also impact negatively on perceptions of equity and the wish to
reallocate time. Seta and Seta (1992) suggest that practice conditions which restrict
clinical autonomy will also increase stress. Sondak and Neale (1995) argue that how
burdens are shared among practice group members can affect perceptions of equity, and
Agius et al. (1996) argue that discretion in decision-making is necessary to reduce
practice related stress.
In an integrated practice, choices may be constrained by the need for team
cohesion and consensus, possibly reducing the ability of the individual physician to
reduce practice-related inequities. Furthermore, some group members may still be able to
exercise control over the choice of activities performed, and the distribution of rewards
which accrue to them (Cott, 1997; Molm et aI., 1993). Physicians unable to exercise
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more choice over clinical cases than others are more likely to experience inequity, and the
distress that will occur as a result (Hatfield & Sprecher, 1984).
3.2.4 Practice Demands
In addition to the practice environment and the degree of integration, the practice
demands or workloads of the individual physician are also expected to affect perceptions
of equity, distress, and the wish to reallocate time. Almost half the variance in time spent
on patient activities, for example, can be explained by workload variables such as the list
size and the number of elderly patients in the practice (Groenewegen et aI., 1992).
Assuming responsibility for teaching undergraduates can increase the time allocated to
patient care without changing the number of patients being treated. As a result, the
physician will often work longer hours to maintain a particular level of productivity at the
loss of personal time (Vinson et aI., 1996).
Practice demands can be thought of as the characteristics of the job which require
the attention or resources of physicians, thereby constraining the ability to fulfill personal
goals or to address personal needs (Abramis, 1994). Practice demands can also be
thought of in terms of the time pressures experienced by the physician in providing
patient care (Elovainio & Kivimaki, 1988), and in carrying out other professional
activities (Vinson et aI, 1996).
Practice demands include: providing high patient quality care and performing
complex tasks under significant time constraints; having to deal with problems associated
with practice administration; meeting patient expectations; night call duties, long working
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hours, and frequent interruptions and emergencies (Mawardi, 1979; Porter et at., 1985;
Cooper et at., 1989; Howie et at., 1989; Leung & Becker, 1992; Rout & Rout, 1994;
Arnetz, 2001). Practice demands also include: establishing and maintaining clinical
competence and developing interpersonal relationships at work; coming to terms with the
reality of the medical practice; and dealing with difficult patients (Linn et aI., 1985).
Increased practice demands are expected to contribute to perceptions of inequity.
Van Yperen (1995) found that when the effort required to gain access to resources was
excessively cumbersome, negative attitudes often arose about the equity of the exchange
between physicians and other stakeholders.
Practice demands, even if the physician receives substantial financial rewards, can
be onerous if they exceed the capabilities of the physician or cause the physician to forego
other important goals and objectives. Coping strategies can include taking time for
oneself or engaging in an activity unrelated to medicine (Post, 1997). Sometimes
collegial support can help offset feelings of inequity; however, failure to address the
stress caused by excessive demands will eventually lead to burnout (VanYperen, 1995).
When routine coping strategies are insufficient, not used, or unavailable, the physician is
more likely to seek other ways to redress excessive practice demands.
In addition to their direct impact on time allocation, excessive practice demands
can result in higher levels of stress among physicians (Cohen, 1980). Cooper, Rout and
Faragher (1989) found that physicians' levels of stress were affected by: 1) demands of
the job such as visiting patients at home during inclement weather, increased demands by
patients for second opinions, adverse media publicity, lack of appreciation from patients,
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and worrying about patients' complaints; 2) interruptions to family life, emergency calls
during surgery hours, dealing with problem patients, and calls at odd hours; 3) conflicts
between work and home life; and 4) administration of the practice.
Cohen (1980) identified a lack of predictability, controllability and
comprehension about practice circumstances, as factors producing stress among
physicians. Post (1997) identified high workloads, third-party interference, and
demanding patients as contributing to a physician's level of stress. Agius et al ( 1996)
corroborate the findings of others in identifying work overload and unscheduled
interruptions as important work stressors.
3.2.5 The Method and Process of Remuneration
Physicians' overall practice satisfaction is presumed to be related to the
expectations they had when they began their medical career. Hadley et al. (1999) argue
that financial incentives designed to encourage physicians to practice in a manner
contrary to their training are likely to cause dissatisfaction. For example, physicians
given incentives to reduce patient care services are much more likely to say their career
expectations are not being met. Hadley et al. (1999) further suggest that physicians are
often required to participate in objectionable financial arrangements inconsistent with
their own practice philosophies because of market requirements.
The method of remuneration and the process used to determine financial rewards
are expected to impact on the value placed on various inputs and outcomes used to assess
equity. Katz et al. (1997) noted that the negotiation of fee schedules between physicians,
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and between physicians and the government are rife with conflict and suspicion. Because
people compare their actual rewards to the rewards they think they deserve, one can be
objectively under-rewarded and feel satisfied, or be objectively over-rewarded and be
dissatisfied (Lennon & Rosenfield, 1994); therefore, a method of payment perceived to be
fair is essential. The preferential remuneration of discrete technically-based procedurals
may also affect the extent to which physicians may wish to reallocate their time due to the
potential impact on their income levels.
3.3 The Characteristics of Individual Physicians
In addition to the characteristics of the medical practice, the personal
characteristics and social situation of the individual may influence how that physician
perceives the factors affecting equity, and the manner in which the physician ultimately
responds to any perceived inequity. Characteristics to be considered in this study include
gender, age, years of experience, marital status, and living arrangements.
3.3.1 Gender
Empirical evidence indicates female physicians work fewer hours than male
physicians (Sanmartin & Snidal, 1993), and historically, female physicians have worked
fewer weeks per year, shorter hours per week, and produce fewer units of patient services
(Weisman & Teitelbaum, 1987; Dedobbeleer et aI., 1995). There are two theoretical
perspectives explaining why gender differences are seen in the time allocated to
professional activities. The first is an economic theory of time allocation based on
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different family circumstances of men and women. The spouse with the higher income is
more likely to allocate more time toward professional activities in order to maximize
family utility (Weisman & Teitelbaum, 1987). High income women are also more likely
to have high income spouses, while high income males are more likely to have lower
income spouses. As a result, men are more likely to allocate more hours to work related
activities due to economic necessity.
The second theoretical perspective argues that personal tastes and social norms
influence allocation decisions (Geerken & Gove, 1983; Berk, 1985). Because of
traditional gender-role norms, men's work roles are permitted to intrude on their family
roles, but not the reverse, whereas women's family roles are permitted to intrude on their
work roles, but not the reverse (Weisman & Teitelbaum, 1987). Both perspectives
suggest that professional time reallocation decisions that are contingent on total work
time available are more likely to be constrained among female physicians.
Studies also suggest that female physicians are likely to spend more time with
their patients, and more likely to be in group practice (Frank et aI., 1997), but are equally
likely to rely on fee-for-service compared to their male counterparts (Woodward &
Hurley, 1995). Woodward and Hurley (1995) found that female physicians also tended to
see fewer patients within the same amount of time and to bill more per patient.
Supporting these findings was a study by Langwell (1992), which found evidence of a
compensatory strategy of higher billing rates among physicians seeing fewer patients.
Compared to female physicians, male physicians are particularly distressed by: the
impact of time pressures on family time; the uncertainty associated with being on call;
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paperwork; and telephone interruptions (Rout, 1996). Sources of stress among female
practitioners include: time away from family; fatigue due to long working hours; role
conflict; work overload (due in part to role conflict); and lack of support from colleagues.
Regardless of gender, physicians must find ways to deal with excessive demands
in a manner that relates to their background, personal qualities, and institutional
characteristics (Parkes, 1986). A common coping strategy among male physicians is
exercise, while female practitioners are more likely to discuss issues with their spouse as
a way to cope, or by separating work and home life (Rout, 1996).
In the past, women were more likely to view the rewards of affiliation as an
important outcome of their work (Walster & Walster, 1975). Women tended to value pay
and promotion less, placing more value on interpersonal relationships. More recent
research suggests that there are few differences between men and women (Nieva &
Gutek, 1981). Men and women are now more likely to pursue similar rewards for the
work· they do, with convergence between groups regarding the value of their work in
contributing to the delivery of quality health care.
3.3.2 Age and Years of Experience
Gender-based differences appear to be declining, particularly in younger cohorts.
One reason is that the number of hours worked by male physicians is also declining
(Freiman & Marder, 1984), possibly due to changes in lifestyle and increased competition
among physicians. As well, young women may be more career oriented or less
committed to traditional family roles than in the past (Weisman & Teitelbaum, 1987).
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McCullough et al (1999) observed that the expectations of physicians have
changed over the last twenty years. Younger physicians are more likely to bypass private
practice in favour of employment within a larger health care organization. The appeal
includes: being part of an integrated delivery system; more flexible work schedules; and
the ability to spend more time with family or to pursue leisure activities.
In their study of recruitment incentives, McCullough et al. (1999) also found that
male physicians with more than 6 years of practice, and those working in physician
managed groups placed greater importance on the reputation and earning potential of a
prospective practice group. They found that females physicians with less than five years
of experience were more likely to seek flexibility in hours, subsidized rents and loan
supports. Their conclusion was that different types of physicians were motivated by
different incentives.
In a study of new family physicians, Woodward et al. (1995) found generally
positive attitudes toward shifting resources to preventive care, and making greater use of
salaries as an alternative to fee-for-service. Age appeared to affect the preferences of
physicians toward types of patients, with older physicians more likely to prefer chronic
and older patients (Cohen et aI, 1996). Less experienced physicians are also more likely
to be attracted to guaranteed incomes and benefits, and being part of an integrated health
care organization.
3.3.3 Marital Status and Living Arrangements
Most physicians have some degree of conflict between meeting the needs of their
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patients and the responsibilities of their private lives. Family responsibilities are
expected to impact on the wish to reallocate time, and include: spouse working outside
the home; hours worked by the spouse; the number of children under eighteen years of
age; and the presence of preschool children (Weisman & Teitelbaum; 1987).
Woodward et aI. (1996) found that time spent on professional activities differed
between male and female physicians. More female physicians work part-time, and even
full-time female physicians tend to work fewer hours than their male counterparts. The
reasons suggested were marital status and parenthood, with women assuming greater
responsibility for housework and child-rearing than their male counterparts. However,
among family practitioners, there was very little difference in time spent on professional
activities between male and female physicians with school-aged children (Woodward et
aI., 1996). Female physicians were also less likely to curtail their professional time once
their children entered the educational system full-time.
Studies by Woodward, Williams and their colleagues (1996, 1995) show that
physicians with young children, particularly lone parents, have greater responsibilities at
home than those whose children are in school or college. Earlier studies suggested male
physicians with small children tended to increase their hours of professional activity
(Mitchell, 1984; Uhlenburg & Cooney, 1990).
3.4 Hypothesizing an Equity-Distress-Wish to Reallocate Time Model
This study hypothesizes the existence of a multi-stage pathway from practice
conditions to the wish to reallocate time. The premise to be addressed is that practice
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conditions contribute to perceptions of inequity and distress among physicians, resulting
in the wish to reallocate time. The hypotheses to be tested are illustrated in a
eguity-distress-time allocation model (Figure 5).
EQUITY
PRACTICE IL.-_C_O_N_D_IT_I_O_N_S_~----... ~__D_IS_T_RE_S_S__
WISH TO
REALLOCATE
TINIE
Figure 5: Hypothesized Model Pathways
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Hypothesis I: Controlling for immutable and mutable physician characteristics, there is no
significant association between practice conditions and perceptions of equity among
physicians. Practice conditions are defined as the practice environment, practice
integration, practice demands and remuneration:
Equity r= f(Practice Conditions, Control Variables)
Sub-hypothesis 1a:
Objective environmental factors are not significantly related to perceptions of equity
among actively practising physicians:
Equity r= f(community size; specialty designation; practice location; practice
ownership; group practice size; and control variables)
Sub-hypothesis 1b:
The state of the health system is not significantly related to perceptions of equity among
actively practising physicians:
Equity r= f(over-all quality; efficiency; access to community services; access to
hospital services; access to long-term care; level ofcooperation; level of
participation; quality ofcommunity services; quality ofhospital services;
quality of long-term care; and control variables)
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Sub-hypothesis 1c:
The level of practice integration is not significantly related to perceptions of equity
among actively practising physicians:
Equity # f(practice arrangement; appropriateness ofarrangement; ability to
change arrangement; share medical records; have group meetings; role of
nurse in practice; refer to allied professions; refer to health support
workers; and control variables)
Sub-hypothesis 1d:
The level of practice demands is not significantly related to perceptions of equity among
actively practising physicians:
Equity # f(work hours, time allotted to patient care; time allotted to teaching and
research; time allotted to continuing education; time allotted to
administration; and control variables)
Equity # f(weekdays on call; weekends on call; and control variables)
Equity # f( proportion ofpatient with complex clinical problems; proportion of
patients with low socioeconomic status; proportion ofpatients with
personal problems; and control variables)
Equity # f(coping with time demands; and control variables)
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Sub-hypothesis 1e:
Remuneration and remuneration issues are not significantly related to perceptions of
equity among actively practising physicians:
Equity ~ f(method of remuneration; appropriateness of the method of
remuneration; ability to change method ofremuneration; process used to
determine level of remuneration; and control variables)
Hypothesis II: Controlling for physician characteristics and practice conditions, there is
no significant association between distress and perceptions of equity among physicians:
Distress =f(Equity, Practice Conditions, Control Variables)
Sub-hypothesis 2a:
Objective environmental factors are not significantly related to distress among actively
practising physicians:
Distress ~ f(equity; community size; specialty designation; practice location;
practice ownership; group practice size; and control variables)
Sub-hypothesis 2b:
The state of the health system is not significantly related to distress among actively
practising physicians:
Distress ~ f(equity; over-all quality; efficiency; access to community services;
access to hospital services; access to long-term care; level ofcooperation;
89
level ofparticipation; quality ofcommunity services; quality ofhospital
services; quality of long-term care; and control variables)
Sub-hypothesis 2c:
The level of practice integration is not significantly related to distress among actively
practising physicians:
Distress ~ f(equity; practice arrangement; appropriateness ofarrangement;
ability to change arrangement; share medical records; have group
meetings; role ofnurse in practice; refer to allied professions; refer to
health support workers; and control variables)
Sub-hypothesis 2d:
The level of practice demands is not significantly related to distress among actively
practising physicians:
Distress ~ f(equity; work hours, time allotted to patient care; time allotted to
teaching and research; time allotted to continuing education; time allotted
to administration; and control variables)
Distress ~ f (equity; weekdays on call; weekends on call; and control variables)
Distress ~ f(equity; proportion ofpatient with complex clinical problems;
proportion ofpatients with low socioeconomic status; proportion of
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patients with personal problems; and control variables)
Distress ;t: f(equity; coping with time demands; and control variables)
Sub-hypothesis 2e:
Remuneration and remuneration issues are not significantly related to distress among
actively practising physicians:
Distress ;t: f(equity; method ofremuneration; appropriateness of the method of
remuneration; ability to change method of remuneration; process used to
determine level of remuneration; and control variables)
Hypothesis III: Controlling for immutable and mutable physician characteristics, practice
conditions, and perceptions of equity, there is no significant association between distress
and the wish to reallocate time (WRT) among physicians:
WRT =f(Distress, Equity, Practice Conditions, Control Variables)
Sub-hypothesis 3a:
Objective environmental factors are not significantly related to the wish to reallocate time
among actively practising physicians:
WRT ;t: f(distress; equity; community size; specialty designation; practice
location; practice ownership; group practice size; and control variables)
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Sub-hypothesis 3b:
The state of the health system is not significantly related to the wish to reallocate time
among actively practising physicians:
WRT :;I: f(distress; equity; over-all quality; efficiency; access to community
services; access to hospital services; access to long-term care; level of
cooperation; level ofparticipation; quality ofcommunity services; quality of
hospital services; quality of long-term care; and control variables)
Sub-hypothesis 3c:
The level of practice integration is not significantly related to the wish to reallocate time
among actively practising physicians:
WRT :;I: f(distress; equity; practice arrangement; appropriateness of
arrangement; ability to change arrangement; share medical records; have
group meetings; role ofnurse in practice; refer to allied professions; refer
to health support workers; and control variables)
Sub-hypothesis 3d:
The level of practice demands is not significantly related to the wish to reallocate time
among actively practising physicians:
WRT :;I: f(distress; equity; work hours, time allotted to patient care; time allotted
to teaching and research; time allotted to continuing education; time
allotted to administration; and control variables)
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WRT ¢ f (distress; equity; weekdays on call; weekends on call; and control
variables)
WRT ¢ f(distress; equity; proportion ofpatient with complex clinical problems;
proportion ofpatients with low socioeconomic status; proportion of
patients with personal problems; and control variables)
WRT ¢ f(distress; equity; coping with time demands; and control variables)
Sub-hypothesis 3e:
Remuneration and remuneration issues are not significantly related to wish to reallocate
time among actively practising physicians:
WRT ¢ f(distress; equity; method ofremuneration; appropriateness of the
method of remuneration; ability to change method of remuneration;
process used to determine level of remuneration; and control variables)\
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4.0 Methods
4.1 Study Design
"Physician Equity and the Wish to Reallocate Time" was a two wave modified
panel study consisting of baseline and follow-up at one year. The study design raised the
possibility of demonstrating causality through repeated measures identifying changes
occurring over time. However, the objectives of the study were, in part, to develop and
test new scales. This caused a number of items to be modified, added, or deleted between
baseline and follow-up. Temporal comparisons were not considered feasible, but will be
pursued in future research. As well, the use of a single group at baseline and followup
introduced a number of potential threats to internal validity (Cook & Campbell, 1979).
As an observational design, a cross sectional study is limited in its ability to
demonstrate causality, however, it does allow significant relationships between the
variables under investigation to be established while controlling for other explanatory
factors (Hennekens & Buring, 1987; Cook & Campbell, 1979).
Data were collected on two occasions (one year apart) to allow for the
development and testing of the original instrument. Baseline data were collected in
December 1998/January 1999 using a questionnaire booklet mailed to a stratified random
sample of 840 physicians in Saskatchewan and British Columbia, with the follow-up data
collected between February and April 2000.
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4.2 Study Population
Physicians actively practising in Saskatchewan and British Columbia in 1998
were chosen as the study population. The randomly selected baseline study sample
included 240 Saskatchewan physicians and 600 British Columbia physicians
(Table 4.2.1). To support comparison between gender and specialty groups, a
disproportional stratified sampling frame was used (Weisman & Teitelbaum, 1987).
(EI· ·bl )r Fa e . . ampJlng rame 19l e
Region Saskatchewan BC (Vancouver & BC Interior
the Lower Mainland)
Total Sample 240 313 287
Female GP 60 75 75
Male GP 60 75 75
Female Specialist 60 88 62
Male Specialist 60 75 75
T bl 421 S
The Saskatchewan sample consisted of 120 females physicians (60 general
practitioners and 60 specialists) and 120 male physicians (60 general practitioners and 60
specialists). For the British Columbia sample, a similar stratification strategy was
employed resulting in the random selection of 300 female and 300 male physicians,
equally divided into general practitioners and specialists. The British Columbia sample
was further stratified by regions: 313 from Vancouver Island, Vancouver and the Lower
Mainland, and 287 from the British Columba Interior. The number of female specialists
was slightly skewed, with a larger portion of the sample coming from the Lower
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Mainland and Vancouver Island.
A total of 384 physicians responded to the baseline survey for a unadjusted
response rate of 45.7%. Fourteen questionnaires were returned because the physician had
retired or was no longer at that address, including seven from Saskatchewan and seven
from British Columbia. The fourteen physicians were subsequently excluded from the
study resulting in a study sample of 826 and an adjusted response rate of 46.5%. The
response rate at baseline was similar to that reported by other researchers using mail-out
surveys to Canadian physicians (Sullivan & Buske, 1998)
Table 4.2.2 Comparin ~ Responders and Non-responders - Baseline Questionnaire
Category Responder N Non-responder N Sig
(%) (%) (Likelihood Ratio)
BC (Van & L Main) 136 (43.9) 174 (56.1) 0.474
BC Interior 138 (48.8) 145 (51.2)
Saskatchewan 110 (47.2) 123 (52.8)
Female 188 (45.7) 223 (54.3) 0.668
Male 196 (47.2) 219 (52.8)
General Practitioner 179 (43.3) 234 (56.7) 0.070
Specialist 205 (49.6) 208 (50.4)
Total 384 (46.5) 442 (54.3) -
Analysis using Crosstabs and the Likelihood Ratio statistic showed no significant
differences between respondents and non-respondents based on gender, specialty or
geographic region (Table 4.2.2), although specialists were somewhat more inclined to
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respond to the survey (49.6% vs 43.3%). The borderline significant difference in
response rate between general practitioners and specialists was subjected to further
analysis to determine its potential as a source of bias. No significant differences were
found among general practitioners based on gender (p =0.955) or region (p =0.781).
Among specialists, neither gender (p =0.588) nor region (p =0.324) were found to be
significant.
The follow-up survey sample was the 384 physicians responding to the baseline
questionnaire (110 from Saskatchewan and 274 from British Columbia). Thirteen
followup questionnaires were deemed ineligible or returned "not completed" due to
retirement, or because the physician had moved during the previous year. A total of 240
usable questionnaires were returned from the remaining 371 eligible respondents for a
response rate of 64.7% (72 from Saskatchewan and 168 from British Columbia). No
response bias was found based on gender, specialty or region (Table 4.2.3).
Table 4.2.3 Comparin ~ Responders and Non-responders - Followup Questionnaire
Category Responder N Non-responder N Sig
(%) (%) (Likelihood Ratio)
British Columbia 168 (63.2) 98 (36.8) 0.323
Saskatchewan 72 (68.6) 33 (31.4)
Female 118 (64.8) 64 (35.2) 0.954
Male 122 (64.6) 67 (35.4)
General Practitioner 111 (63.4) 64 (36.6) 0.631
Specialist 129 (65.8) 67 (34.2)
Total 240 (64.7) 131 (35.3) -
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4.3 Wish to Reallocate Time-Equity Models
Three main hypotheses were to be tested. The principal domains and relationships
to be tested have been summarized in Table 4.3.1. The first hypothesis to be tested was
with regard to the strength of the relationship between practice conditions and the
physicians' perceptions of equity:
Equity :;!: f(Practice Conditions, Control Variables)
The second hypothesis to be tested was with regard to the strength of the relationships
between practice conditions, equity and distress among physicians:
Distress:;!: f(Equity, Practice Conditions, Control Variable)
The third hypothesis to be tested was with regard to the contribution of practice
conditions, equity, and distress to the wish to reallocate time (WRT):
WRT :;!: f(Distress, Equity, Practice Conditions, Control Variables
Table 4.3.1 The Domains and Models to be Tested
Hypothesis Dependent Variables Independent Variables Control Variables
1 Equity Practice Conditions Gender
Age
2 Distress Equity Marital Status
Practice Conditions
Number of
3 Wish to Reallocate Time Distress Children
Equity
Years of PracticePractice Conditions
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4.4 Defining The Measures
4.4.1 Equity (Distributive and Process)
At baseline, perceptions of equity were measured using 20 items drawn from
studies by: Linn et al. (1985); Stevenson, Williams & Vayda (1988), Koehler et al.
(1992); Van Dierendonck et al. (1994); and Burke (1996). Items were measured using
five point Likert scales with a neutral midpoint (Appendix 1). Three types of metrics
were used to quantify the items (very high to very low; very often to very rarely; and
strongly agree to strongly disagree).
Follow-up: In addition to the global measure: In general, the rewards (tangible
and intangible) for the work you do are:, fifteen items were used to capture opinions
about aspects of equity (Appendix 2). Items included questions regarding specific inputs
and outcomes and the quality of the physician's exchange relationships based on their
own internal standard, as well as in relation to other physicians.
Two items, level of influence and remuneration fairly reflects geographic
location, were dropped from the follow-up questionnaire. The item, share ofdifficult
patients, was deemed too ambiguous, as treating a difficult patient might be assessed as
an input (effort) or outcome (interesting) depending on the equity sensitivity of the
physician (Huseman et al, 1987).
4.4.2 Distress (and Coping with Practice Conditions)
At baseline, the physician's distress was captured using items drawn from the
Maslach Burnout survey (Maslach & Jackson, 1981), the Bortner'sType A survey
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(Bortner, 1969), and a measure of physician mental workload by Bertram et al. (1990).
Six items were measured using a five point Likert scale anchored with very often-very
rarely (Appendix 1). One item was anchored with very high-very low. Items seen to
measure distress and thus capture the physician's response to inequity were: get tasks
done without feeling rushed, experience conflict between work andfamily, experience
fatigue, and level ofstress. Items measuring the physician's ability to cope were: have
time to keep up, regularly interacting with colleagues, and get enough sleep.
At follow-up, a more thorough distinction was drawn between the distress
experienced by physicians and the physician's capacity to cope. The number of items
was expanded to ten to increase the number of items associated with each concept
(Appendix 2). Items added to expand distress included: experience frustration in gaining
access to resources for your patients and experience frustration in dealing with
demanding patients. Take time to pursue special interests was added to coping.
4.4.3 Wish to Reallocate Time
At baseline: Physicians were asked to respond to questions representing the four
main components of duties performed by physicians, and the hours dedicated to these
activities. These components are regularly surveyed by the Canadian Medical
Association, and include: A) patient care, B) teaching & research, C) maintaining
knowledge, and D) administration. Eighteen items using a three point scale (more, no
change, less) were used to capture physician preferences regarding reallocation of time.
Six items were used to capture time allocated to patient care, with four items each used to
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capture teaching and research, maintaining knowledge and administrative duties
(Appendix 1).
Based on the content validity of the measures, five time allocation scales were
identified from the 18 survey items. One for each functional area and a summary scale of
all 18 items. More or less activity were scored as one (1) and no change as zero (0).
Patient Care ranged from zero (no change in time allocated to patient activities) to six
(change time allocated to all six care activities). Teaching and Research, Maintaining
Knowledge Base, and Management Functions scales each produced values that ranged
from zero to four.
Atfollow-up: A number of physicians appeared to struggle with the fonnat used in
this section of the baseline survey and it proved to be the least completed portion of the
questionnaire. Physicians had difficulty estimating time allotted to all the activities listed
and the number of items was reduced to ten (Appendix 2). This was achieved by
collapsing conceptually related items and expanding the metric to provide greater
sensitivity. Four questions subsequently represented tasks associated with direct patient
care, and two questions each represented teaching and research, maintaining knowledge
and management functions. Each question was measured using a five-point Likert scale
of: Much More, More, No Change, Less, Much Less.
Changes were also made to simplify the collection of data regarding total hours
worked and the percent of time allocated to each of the four functional areas. This
revised wish to reallocate time section of the questionnaire was completed at a rate
similar to the other sections of the follow-up survey. The revised measures also allowed
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the present time allocation of the physician to be quantified, both in terms of the percent
of total time, and the actual hours dedicated to each functional area.
Based on the 5-point time preference scales, a truncated scale was created to allow
for time preference constructs. First, a value of zero was assigned to no change, a value
of one for more and less, and a value of two for much more and much less to produce a
three point scale measuring the degree of absolute change preference for each item. As
with the baseline data, the purpose of the trinomial time scales was to prevent more and
less responses from cancelling each other out when combined into a larger composite
scale. In multiple item scaling, time tradeoff between items would result in construct
scales with a bias toward no change. Trichotomizing provided the opportunity to create
multi-item scales measuring the absolute degree to which the physician wished to
reallocate time within the four functional areas of a medical practice.
A weighted WRT scale was also created based on wish to reallocate time and time
currently allocated to each of the four functional areas. A base value of one plus the
portion of total activity was used as the multiplier to ensure that an expressed desire to
begin a new activity was captured. For example, if the total unweighted direct patient
care scale value was 4 and patient care represented 70% of the physician's time, the
weight-adjusted score would be 6.8 (4 x 1.70). Using percent of total time only was
rejected as the multiplier; activities in which the physician was not presently engaged
would have resulted in a multiplier of zero and a weighted value of zero (no change) for
any new activities the physician may have wanted to initiated.
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4.4.4 Practice Conditions
4.4.4.1 Practice Environment
At baseline, the practice environment measures consisted of a number of items
drawn from surveys by the Canadian Medical Association, the Canadian College of
Family Practitioners and the typologies of Williams, et aI., (1990). Environmental
variables included community size, location of the primary office, sponsorship, speciality,
and group size (number of physicians in the practice group), (Appendix 1). Community
size was measured as a eight point ordinal scale ranging from communities of less that
five thousand to communities of over one million. Location of the medical practice was
measured using a nominal scale of possible primary office locations, including
residential, commercial and hospital. Physician sponsorship was captured in a nominal
scale. Categories included physician, university, hospital, local community group, and
health district. Specialty was categorized as family practitioner or specialists, with
specialty further segmented by cognitiveI , procedural2 or technical3 specialist. Group size
was measured as a continuous variable.
Ten questions were also asked regarding the physician's perception of the state of
the local health care system. Three questions asked physicians to rate the quality of
community-based, hospital-based and long term care services in their community using
1 Dermatologists, internists (including physiatrists), neurologists, pediatricians (including
medical geneticists) and psychiatrists
2 Obstetricians and gynaecologists, otolaryngologists, ophthalmologists and surgeons
(including general, thoracic, orthopedic, plastic & reconstructive, neurological and urological).
3 Anaesthetists, pathologists and radiologists (including diagnostic and therapeutic).
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11 point scales ranging from zero (the worst) to 100 (the best). A global question
regarding quality was measured using a five point Likert (Very good to very poor). Three
questions rating access to community-based, hospital and long-term care services were
posed using 5 point Likerts (Excellent to Very Poor). Physicians were also asked to rate
the efficiency of the local system, as well as cooperation among health professionals and
participation by physicians in policy and planning (Very High to Very Low).
Atfollow-up, Group size was determined more precisely with physicians asked to
specify the total number of physicians in the practice group including themselves
(Appendix 2). Due to a lack of space, location and sponsorship were not asked on the
follow-up questionnaire. It was felt that few changes would occur between the
questionnaires and these changes would be captured by changes in address.
4.4.4.2 Practice Integration
At Baseline: Variables measured in the baseline questionnaire included
organizational arrangement and the sharing of medical records. Organizational
arrangements were measured on a five point ordinal scale designed to capture
interdependency. The scale included: individual/solo practice; share office expenses;
share office and clinical staff expenses; share revenues and expenses; and other (primarily
hospital, academic, community clinic based practices). Sharing medical records was a
simple yes or no to the question of, Does your group share medical records?
At Follow-up: A number of questions were added to evaluate the level of
integration. In addition to questions about organizational arrangement, questions were
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added about the appropriateness of the present organizational arrangement and the ability
to change these arrangements, as well as the interdisciplinary nature of the practice.
Appropriateness was measured using a five-point Likert scales ranging from strongly
agree to strongly disagree. Flexibility was measured using a six-point Likert scale
ranging from very easy to very difficult. The interdisciplinary nature of the practice was
captured with two questions about the use of referrals to allied health professions and
other support groups.
4.4.4.3 Practice Demands
At baseline, the physician's time demands were measured using total hours
worked, the proportion of time currently allocated to each activity, and the physician's on
call commitments. These questions were not fully completed by a large number of
physicians and a substantial revision and re-conceptualizing of this portion of the
questionnaire became necessary.
Atfollow-up, hours of work, the proportion of time devoted to various activities
and time on call were modified. Although some detail was lost, the simpler format
improved physician response regarding current workloads. Time demands were also
captured in the stress portion of the questionnaire at both baseline and follow-up. The
item share ofdifficult patients, originally included as an equity measure, was seen to have
value as a practice demand measure and for the follow-up questionnaire, the concept was
expanded into three questions regarding the proportion of patients with: complex clinical
problems; economic status; and personal/family problems.
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Time Distress Equity Practice Conditions Control
Preference Variables
Overall Distress Overall Environment Integration
Gender
Community Arrangement
Patient Care Extrinsic Group Size Appropriate &
Tangible Flexible
Specialty Age
Teaching & Intrinsic Location Share Records
Research
Sponsor Referral Types
& Rates Marital
Local Health Status
Maintaining Extrinsic Care System
Knowledge Intangible
Demands Remuneration
Hours Worked Method Number of
Management Children
Functions Coping Patient Mix
with the Appropriate &
practice* Time Now Flexible
Allotted
Years of
Time On Call Practice
* Measured in the distress portion of questionnaire. Coping with practice demands mcluded as a
component of practice demands under practice conditions. To be tested in all three stages of the model: the
wish to reallocate time, distress, and equity.
4.4.4.4 Remuneration
Method of payment was measured using a scale designed to capture the proportion
of income derived from fee-for-service, salary, capitation, and sessional remuneration. A
dichotomous method of payment variable was created using more than 80% fee-for-
service as the cut-off (Woodward et al., 1996).
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Atfollow-up, appropriateness and flexibility were captured by two questions about
the method of remuneration. Appropriateness was measured using a 5-point Likert scale
ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Flexibility was measured using a six-
point Likert scale ranging from very easy to very difficult.
4.4.6 Control Variables
At baseline, demographic data were collected on both immutable and mutable
control variables (Appendix 1). Immutable variables included age, gender, marital
status, and the number and age of dependents. The mutable variables included years of
practice (total years), and previous work experience (positions held and number of years).
Age was evaluated both as a continuous.variable as well as an ordinal scale with defined
groups (young:< 35, prime:35-50, and senior:>55), as proposed by Dedobbeleer et al
(1995). At follow-up, the same data were collected with the modification that work
experience prior to entering medical school was not to include summer jobs.
4.5 Data Collection Methods
Baseline Survey: To ensure an adequate response rate to the baseline
questionnaire, each physician was designated to receive two questionnaires mailed
approximately six weeks apart. This was to be followed by a reminder card three weeks
after the second mail-out. A letter of introduction and letters of support from the
Canadian Medical Association and their own provincial association (BCMA and SMA)
were enclosed with each survey. A prepaid, self-addressed envelop was also included to
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encourage physicians to participate.
In November and December, 1998 and January, 1999, surveys designed to
measure perceptions of equity, distress, wish to reallocate time, and practice conditions
were sent out to 240 physicians in Saskatchewan and 600 physicians in British Columbia.
The response rate from two mail-outs and a reminder card was 46%. Preliminary analysis
based on gender, specialty and province indicated that there was no significant non-
response bias. A total of 385 physician questionnaires were received and deemed usable.
Follow-up: The first mail-out of the revised questionnaire occurred in February
2000 and was sent to all 385 physicians who had responded to the baseline questionnaire.
Each physician received a report on the data collected in the baseline survey that was not
repeated in the follow-up questionnaire. This report was a fulfilment of a promise to the
participating physicians that they would receive annual bulletins on the project and its
findings in exchange for their ongoing participation. The report along with a letter from
the Principal Investigator were seen as important for ensuring ongoing participation by
the physicians. A second mail out to physicians occurred in mid-March, 2000.
4.6 Establishing Valid and Reliable Measures
Prior to model testing, composite scales representing wish to reallocate time,
distress, coping and equity were developed and tested using factor analysis and inter-item
correlation matrices. Preliminary inclusion of items in the baseline questionnaire and the
addition of new items to the followup questionnaire were based on content validity as
derived from a review of the relevant literature. Factor analysis was then used to identify
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and summarize correlated variables for the purpose of developing the main pathway
variables: eguity,distress, wish to reallocate time.
Exploratory factor analysis is the appropriate technique for determining which
items represent a critical attribute of each construct (Brink and Wood, 1989). Factor
analysis is used to form coherent and distinct measures or scales from a larger set of
variables. Interpreting and naming factors, however, depends on the meaning of the
particular combination of variables. Once this has been established, construct validity
can be established by demonstrating covariance between the construct and other variables
as predicted by theory (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).
Limitations of factor analysis include the fact that there is no criterion variable
against which to test the solution and that, after extracting, there are an infinite number of
rotations available. As a result there is a level of ambiguity associated with the technique.
Ultimately, decisions about the number of factors and rotational schemes will be based
more on pragmatic considerations than theoretical criteria (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).
While factor analysis may support the inclusion of a number of items into a
particular construct and can be used to support construct validity (the scale measures what
it purports to measure), the reliability and parsimony of the construct must also be
established. Reliability testing was carried out to determine the composite scales'
Cronbach's alphas, inter-item correlations, and total inter-item correlations. An alpha
greater than 0.70 is generally considered acceptable (Cortina, 1993). Due to a limited
number of items, however, some of the sub-scales produced internal consistencies within
the range of 0.50 to 0.70 (coping 0.64; patient care 0.58, external intangible equity 0.56).
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Although relatively weak, these scales were retained to provide more complete
representation of the conceptual framework.
To ensure that alpha scores are not due to redundancy among the items, items
producing inter-item correlations greater than 0.70 were excluded. As well, construct
parsimony (only items contributing significantly to the scale) was maintained by
removing items with total inter-item correlations less than 0.30 from composite scales.
4.6.1 Equity
Factor analysis uses principal component analysis to establish the maximum
amount of variance that can be explained with the fewest possible factors. While
principal component analysis can establish parsimony and the relative independence of
the factors, the factors must be rotated to ensure the factors are conceptually meaningful.
There are two methods of rotating the factors; orthogonal and oblique. Factors resulting
from orthogonal rotation remain statistically unrelated, whereas factors resulting from
oblique rotation are usually correlated to some extent. Statistically uncorrelated factors
are preferred because they can represent a more complex set of arrangements. However,
orthogonal rotation may not result in finding the best set of rotated factors, and oblique
rotation can often result in more interpretable factors. Both methods of factor rotation
were carried out in this study (Kleinbaum et aI., 1988).
Correlation coefficients tend to be less reliable when estimated from small
sample; therefore, as a general rule of thumb it is recommended to have at least 300 cases
for factor analysis, with less required if there are several high loading marker variables
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(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Because the loading values were unknown and the total
sample was 384 at baseline and 240 at follow-up, missing data were replaced with value
means to provide the largest possible sample. Due to the possibility that missing data
were not randomly dispersed, factor analysis was also carried out using only complete
cases to confirm the initial findings.
Baseline: Twelve survey items representing various aspects of extrinsic (tangible
and intangible) and intrinsic equity were subjected to factor analysis. No differences
were found between rotational methods (orthogonal vs. oblique) or data inclusion criteria.
The principal components and rotated matrices presented here are based on orthogonal
rotation (Varimax) and the complete data set (missing data replaced with value means).
Table 4.6.1.1 Final List of E oit Items Total Variance Ex lained
Initial Eigenvalues
Component
1
2
3
11
Total
3.624
1.512
1.431
0.359
% of Variance
32.948
13.743
11.04
3.266
Cumulative %
32.948
46.692
57.731
100
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
Principal component analysis resulted in three components with an eigenvalue
great than one, that explained more than 570/0 of variance (Table 4.6.1.1). Four of the
items: pay reflects stress, pay reflects experience, equity of rewards and work to hardfor
rewards received, loaded into a construct (Cronbach's alpha = 0.79) designated
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"tangibles" (Table 4.6.1.2). Fours items: interesting work, sense ofaccomplishment,
patients are appreciative and extra effort worth the effort, formed a second construct
(Cronbach's alpha =0.67) designated "intangibles I". Finally, three items, all dealing
with respect from others, loaded into a construct designated "intangibles 2" (Cronbach's
alpha = 0.58). One item measuring the amount of trivial work was not found to
contribute significantly to any of the constructs nor contribute to explained total variance.
Table 4.6.1.2 Final List of Equity Items - Rotated Component Matrix
Component
Item
Extrinsic
Tangible
Intrinsic Extrinsic
Intangible
Cronbach
Alpha
Pay Reflects Work Stress
Pay Reflects Experience
Equity of Rewards
Work Too Hard
0.828
0.828
0.667
0.665
0.79
Interesting Work
Sense of Accomplishment
Patients Are Appreciative
Extra Effort 0.426
Respect by Nurses
Respect by Patients
Respect by Administrators
RotatIOn Method: Vanmax wIth Kaiser Normalization
0.807
0.767
0.517
0.486
0.861
0.687
0.601
0.67
0.58
An overall equity scale was created based on the 11 items identified in the three
equity components. Of these, the three "respect" items were not found to contribute
significantly to the construct. The final eight item equity construct (Table 4.6.1.3) had a
reliability of 0.80 (Cronbach's alpha).
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Table 4.6.1.3 Reliability - Overall Equity Construct (8 items)
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha
if Item if Item Total Multiple if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Delete
IWORK 23.2228 19.6206 .3800 .3076 .7984
APPRPT 22.7270 19.0258 .4220 .2114 .7934
ACCOMP 22.9499 18.9472 .4921 .3806 .7845
EXEFF 22.7047 18.1305 .4939 .2567 .7836
EXPERIENCE 22.4457 17.2030 .5417 .4159 .7765
WORKHARD 21.9916 17.5334 .5600 .3559 .7734
STRESS 21.9554 17.0706 .5672 .4541 .7721
REWARDS 22.1309 16.6169 .6466 .4319 .7580
Alpha = 0.80
Standardized item alpha = 0.80
Equity Followup: From the follow-up data, the twelve items used at baseline to
measure extrinsic (tangible and intangible) and intrinsic equity were once again subjected
to factor analysis. As with the baseline data, no differences were found between
rotational methods or inclusion criteria. The principal components and rotated matrices
presented here are based on orthogonal rotation (Varimax) and all sample cases.
Table 4.6.1.4 E uit Items: Total Variance Ex lained
Initial Eigenvalues
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative 0/0
1 3.784 31533 31.533
2 1.552 12.935 44.468
3 1.423 11.862 56.33
12 0.334 2.787 100
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
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Principal component analysis again resulted in three components with an
eigenvalue great than one, explaining more than 56% of variance (Table 4.6.1.4). Fours
items: pay reflects stress, pay reflects experience, equity of rewards and work too hard
for rewards received, loaded into a reliable construct (Cronbach's alpha = 0.78)
designated "extrinsic tangibles" (Table 4.6.1.5). Fours items: interesting work, sense of
accomplishment, extra effort worth the effort, and trivial activity, formed a second
reliable construct (Cronbach's alpha =0.70) designated "intrinsic intangible". The final
four items, three dealing with respect from others and appreciation of patients, loaded
into a construct designated "extrinsic intangibles".
Table 4.6.1.5 EquIty Items - Rotated Component MatrIX
Item
Component
Extrinsic Intrinsic Extrinsic
Tangible Intangible
Cronbach
Alpha
Compensation fairly reflects experience
Compensation fairly reflects stress
Work too hard for the rewards received
In general the rewards for the work you do
Sense of accomplishment
Amount of interesting work
Amount of trivial work
Extra effort is worth the rewards received
Respect from nurses
Respect from administrators
Respect from patients
Appreciation from patients
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization
0.841
0.837
0.671
0.635
0.421
0.434
0.787
0.744
0.647
0.560
0.771
0.726
0.588
0.527
0.78
0.70
0.58
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A global equity scale was created based on the 12 items used to create the three
equity constructs. Of these, the three respect items and the amount of trivial work item
were not found to contribute significantly to the construct.4 The final eight item equity
construct, Overall Equity (Table 4.6.1.6) had a reliability of 0.81. The same eight items
loaded in both the baseline and followup equity construct, and produced almost identical
results.
Table 4.6.1.6 Reliability - Overall Equity Construct (8 items)
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha
if Item if Item Total Multiple if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted
WRKlNTER 22.6739 20.1334 .3561 .2813 0.8118
PTAPPREC 22.1913 19.0637 .4413 .2423 0.8024
ACCOMPL 22.4783 19.1414 .4820 .3901 0.7976
EXPERIEN 21.7478 17.3772 .5068 .4372 0.7955
WRLTOHRD 21.5174 17.9276 .5414 .3530 0.7888
EXTRAEFF 22.2652 17.4621 .5866 .3867 0.7820
STRESSES 21.3826 16.4556 .6219 .5027 0.7760
REWARDS 22.6913 16.4676 .6800 .4849 0.7664
Alpha =0.81
Standardized item Alpha =0.81
4The respect/appreciation construct was significantly correlated to the first two equity
constructs and the distress scale (see Table 6.4.1, p. 189). Given its conceptual representation of
external intangible equity, it was analysed as a separate component of equity using multiple
regression analysis and the results are reported in Chapter 6: Follow-up Results. The construct
was also included as part of the latent variable, distributive equity, in structural equation
modelling phase of the analysis.
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4.6.2 Distress and Coping
Baseline: Seven items were included in the baseline questionnaire to measure
distress and the ability of the physician to cope with time demands. No differences were
found between rotational methods (orthogonal vs. oblique) or inclusion criteria (all cases
vs. complete cases). The principal components and rotated matrices presented here are
based on orthogonal rotation (Varimax) and all sample cases.
Principal component analysis resulted in two components with an eigenvalue
great than one, that explained more than 53% of variance (Table 4.6.2.1). Component 1
(Distress) had a reliability of 0.74 and consisted of five items: fatigued during the day,
level ofstress, feel rushed, get enough sleep and conflict between home and work
(Table 4.6.2.2). Component 2 (Coping) contained two items: ability to keep up with
specialty and ability to interact with colleagues. Due to low level of reliability (less than
50%), these items were tested as separate scales.
Table 4.6.2.1 Distress Measures· Total Variance Ex lained
Initial Eigenvalues
Component
1
2
7
Total
2.59
1.143
0.476
% of Variance
36.993
16.325
6.797
Cumulative %
36.993
53.318
100
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
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Item Component Cronbach
n=374 Distress Coping Alpha
Conflict: Work and Personal 0.717 0.74
Level of Stress 0.714
Fatigued during the day 0.684
Feel Rushed 0.674
Get Enough Sleep 0.656
Keep Current with Specialty 0.786 0.43
Interact with Colleagues 0.784
T bl 4622 D· t
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization
Followup: The number of items associated with distress and coping was expanded
to ten. New items included: frustration dealing with demanding patients; frustration with
level ofaccess to services; and take time to pursue special interest or hobby. As with the
baseline data, no differences were found between rotational methods or inclusion criteria.
The principal components and rotated matrices presented here are based on orthogonal
rotation (Varimax) and all sample cases.
Table 4.6.2.3 Distress Measures - Total Variance Ex lained
Initial Eigenvalues
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1
2
9
3.192
1.481
0.396
35.468
16.454
4.395
35.463
51.917
100
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
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Principal component analysis resulted in two components with an eigenvalue
great than one, that explained 52% of variance (Table 4.6.2.3). Five items were found to
be related to distress (Cronbach's alpha = 0.74) and four items related to time demands
(Cronbach's alpha = 0.64)(Table 4.6.2.4). Ability to interact with colleagues had initially
loaded within the Coping construct. However, reliability testing indicated that it was not
contributing significantly to the construct and it was therefore excluded.
Table 4.6.2.4. Distress Measures· Rotated Component Matrix
Component
Item
n=240
Frustration dealing with demanding patients
Feel fatigued during the day
Frustrated with level of access to services
Level of stress
Conflict between work and personal
Take time to pursue special interest or hobby
Time to keep up with clinical specialty
Complete tasks without feeling rushed
Get full night's sleep
RotatIOn Method: Vanmax WIth KaIser Normalization
4.6.3 Wish to Reallocate Time
Distress
0.787
0.715
0.677
0.634
0.516
Coping
0.481
0.731
0.729
0.618
0.556
Cronbach
Alpha
0.74
0.64
Physicians have the ability to accurately identify the content of their work
(Feldham et aI., 1994; Camasso & Camasso, 1994), and Canadian Medical Association
(CMA, 1997) routinely asks its members to indicate the time spent on various activities.
Therefore, it was deemed feasible to ask physicians participating in this study to indicate
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the extent to which they would wish to reallocate their time.
Baseline: Eighteen survey items relating to the four functional areas of medical
practice were selected. Each item was coded zero (no change) or one (do more, do less)
prior to factor analysis. Principal component analysis resulted in six components with an
eigenvalue great than one, explaining more than 64% of variance (Table 4.6.3.1).
Table 4.6.3.1 Wish to Reallocate Time: Total Variance Ex lained
Initial Eigenvalues
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 4.926 27.367 27.367
2 1.805 10.030 37.397
3 1.459 8.104 45.501
4 1.351 7.507 53.008
5 1.092 6.067 59.074
6 1.022 5.681 64.755
18 0.264 1.465 100
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation using Varimax with Kaiser Normalization loaded all 18 items into 6
distinct components (Table 4.6.3.2). The first three components consisted of four items
each and produced good reliability scores, with Cronbach alphas in the 0.70 to 0.80 range.
Component 1 contained the four items associated with teaching and research.
Component 2 contained the four items associated with maintaining knowledge, and
Component 3 contained the four items associated with Administration. The six items
associated with patient care broke out into three scales of two items each. Component 4
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related to communication with patients. Component 5 captured the items relating to
teamwork. Component 6 captured items associated with providing care alone and in
communicating with other health care providers.
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Component
Item Cronbach
n=358 1 2 3 4 5 6 Alpha
DEMONSTR 0.858 0.79
WORKSHP 0.785
SUPERVIS 0.719
RESRTEAC 0.647
PATNTCON 0.765 0.75
CMECRED 0.72
READJOUR 0.682
CLINICMT 0.639
REPORTS 0.742 0.72
PAPERYOU 0.7
PAPERGRP 0.673
COMWORK 0.66
INSTRUCT 0.764 0.79
COUNSEL 0.764
TEAMLEAD 0.82 0.62
TEAMASST 0.809
ALONE 0.748 0.34
COMMPLAN 0.658
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
A number of items within each component were highly correlated, introducing the
possibility of reducing the items to improve parsimony. To reduce inter-items
correlations and to create a more comprehensive measure of wish to reallocate time, item
pairs that were related conceptually and statistically were combined to create 9 time
preference couplets: 3 for patient care (solo patient care, team patient care, patient
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counselling); 2 for teaching and research (teach, research); 2 for maintaining knowledge
(solo education, group education); and 2 for administration (own practice, programs).
Using factor analysis with Eigenvalue extraction and Varimax rotation, two
components were produced that explained 49% of variance (Table 4.6.3.3). Seven items
loaded into Component 1, and resulted in a Cronbach's alpha of 0.74 (Table 4.6.3.4).
Teaching, research and teamwork did not load into the first component. Teaching and
research loaded separately (Cronbach's alpha =0.66). Teamwork was not seen to
contribute significantly to explained variance.
Combining all nine items into a single construct (Table 4.6.3.5) resulted in a good
reliability score of 0.78. All nine items were found to contribute and none of the inter-
item correlations were unusually high (ranged between 0.3 to 0.5). It was concluded that
there were three viable time preference constructs at baseline: Component One (Typical
Practice); Component Two (Research and Teaching); and the construct created from all
nine wish to reallocate time couplets (Overall Time Preference).
Table 4.6.3.3 Wish to Reallocate Time Coo lets: Total Variance Ex lained
Initial Eigenvalues
Component
1
2
9
Total
3.316
1.135
0.350
% of Variance
36.846
12.606
3.890
Cumulative %
36.846
49.452
100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
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Component
Component Cronbach
1 2 Alpha
SOLOED 0.726 0.74
PREVTIME 0.700
GROUPED 0.666
PAPERWK 0.616
SOLOTIME 0.596
ADMIN 0.496 0.402
TEACH 0.886 0.66
RESEARCH 0.827
TEAMTIME -
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RotatIon Method: Varlmax with Kaiser Normalization.
Table 4.6.3.5 Reliability • Overall Wish to Reallocate Time Construct (9 Coupletst
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha
if Item if Item Total Multiple if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted
TEAMTIME 3.5251 12.1604 0.3144 0.1325 0.7802
SOLOTIME 3.2542 11.4170 0.3741 0.1700 0.7745
TEACH 3.3603 11.1275 0.4230 0.3789 0.7682
ADMIN 3.3352 10.8901 0.4893 0.3680 0.7591
RESEARCH 3.3827 10.9932 0.4994 0.4074 0.7581
PAPERWK 3.2737 10.8380 0.5148 0.3812 0.7557
SOLOED 2.8911 9.7668 0.5280 0.3925 0.7548
PREVTIME 3.2989 10.4174 0.5309 0.3247 0.7524
GROUPED 3.2430 10.4702 0.5367 0.3494 0.7517
Alpha = 0.78
Standardized item alpha = 0.78
Follow-up: Although the baseline data had resulted in the creation of distinct
components that were linked conceptually to the basic activities of physicians, this
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section of the questionnaire had been quite complex. A number of physicians had
difficulty completing the section compared to other portions of the questionnaire, and it
was concluded that the section would have to be revised prior to the follow-up survey.
Based on the 18 baseline items, ten items relating to the four functional areas of
medical practice were developed. The reduced number of items was designed to improve
completion of this selection of the questionnaire. To improve sensitivity and to
compensate for the smaller number of items, the scale was expanded from three points to
five points (Do much more, do more, no change, do less and do much less). Prior to
analysis, each item was re-coded as either: zero (no change); one (do more, do less); or
two (do much more, do much less).
Factor analysis was carried out on a total of ten items relating to: patient care (6);
teaching and research (2); continuing education (2); and administration (2). As with the
baseline data, no differences were found between rotational methods or inclusion criteria.
Principal component analysis resulted in four components with an eigenvalue great than
one, explaining more than 67% of variance (Table 4.6.3.6).
Cumulative %TotalComponent
Table 4.6.3.6 Wish to Reallocate Time (Initial): Total Variance Ex lained
Initial Eigenvalues
% of Variance
1
2
3
4
10
2.723
1.500
1.291
1.235
0.322
27.225
15.003
12.911
12.347
3.219
27.225
42.228
55.139
67.486
100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
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Table 4.6.3.7 Wish to Reallocate Time (Initial): Rotated Component Matrix
Item Component Cronbach
Alpha
RESERCH1
TEACHl
ALONE1
0.866
0.838
0.558
0.68
READCME1
ROUNDS 1
0.883
0.881
0.78
MEETING1
PAPRWRK1
0.887
0.872
0.78
COMMUNI
TEAM 1
COUNSELl
0.765
0.740
0.543
0.53
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
The four components that were found from the analysis were slightly different
from what was expected, based on a priori classification and factor analysis of the 18
baseline items. Three items (research, teaching, providing patient care alone) loaded into
Component One (the scholarly practitioner) with a reliability of 0.68 (Table 4.6.3.7).
Component 2 (the knowledge seeker) consisted of two items (reading journal, clinical
rounds). Component 3 (the practice manager) also consisted of 2 items (completing
paperwork, meetings and reports). Both Component 2 and Component 3 produced
reliability of 0.78. The three remaining items (teamwork. communicating. counseling)
made up Component Four (the health team member) with a reliability of 0.53.
Unfortunately, combining the ten individual items were not sufficient to create a single
wish to reallocate time construct of acceptable reliability. However, the four factors were
retained for analysis using structural equation modeling as this would allow inclusion of
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these factors into a single latent variable.
To support analysis using multiple linear regression, it was necessary to the
development of a reliable wish to reallocate time construct. To do this, the four patient
care items were combined to create two patient care couplets. Treating patients alone
and counseling were combined into a new five point scale, Alone2. Similarly, working as
part ofa team, and communicating treatment plans were combined into the five-point
scale, Team2. The couplets were then re-coded into two, three point scales designed to
match the scaling of the other wish to reallocate time items.
All eight items were re-analysed using factor analysis. Principal component
analysis of the reduced number of items (8) resulted in four conceptually strong
components with an eigenvalue greater than one, explaining more than 78% of variance
(Table 4.6.3.8). Each component contained two items, corresponding to the four
functional areas of the physician's practice (Table 4.6.3.9). Reliability was high for three
of the four components. Patient care reliability remained low at 0.56.
Table 4.6.3.8 Wish to Reallocate Time (Finalized): Total Variance Explained
Initial Eigenvalues
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 2.57 32.130 32.130
2 1.425 17.807 49.938
3 1.236 15.450 65.388
4 1.044 13.047 78.435
8 0.324 4.053 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
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Item Component Cronbach
1 2 3 4 Alpha
READCMEI 0.889 0.78
ROUNDS 1 0.888
RESERCHI 0.892 0.77
TEACH 1 0.879
MEETING 1 0.892 0.78
PAPRWRKI 0.879
TEAM2 0.856 0.56
ALONE2 0.775
T bl 4 6 3 9 W· h t R II t T· (F. r d) R tat d C
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Nonnalization.
Combining the eight items into a single construct (Table 4.6.3.10) resulted in a
reliability score of 0.70. All eight items were found to contribute, resulting in a viable
overall wish to reallocate time scale suitable for analysis.
Table 4.6.3.10 Reliability - Overall "Wish to Reallocate Time" Construct
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha
if Item if Item Total Multiple if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted
MEETING1 14.5375 8.7434 0.3313 0.3832 0.6677
TEAM2 13.6042 8.1397 0.3422 0.1735 0.6707
RESERCHI 14.9500 8.8678 0.3830 0.4076 0.6565
PAPRWRKI 14.5500 8.7423 0.3842 0.3893 0.6556
TEACH 1 14.9458 8.8966 0.3936 0.4143 0.6548
READCMEI 14.5458 8.9100 0.3936 0.4244 0.6549
ROUNDS 1 14.6833 8.7445 0.4048 0.4286 0.6517
ALONE2 13.4792 7.8155 0.4274 0.2275 0.6545
Alpha = 0.69
Standardized item Alpha = 0.70
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4.7 Analysis
4.7.1 Selecting an Appropriate Multivariate Technique
In selecting the analytical technique to be used to test the models and relationships
hypothesized, a number of multivariate statistical techniques were considered, including:
canonical correlation, multi-way frequency analysis, analysis of covariance (ANCOVA),
multivariate analysis of variance, logistic regression, multiple linear regression (MLR),
and structural equation modelling (SEM)
Canonical correlation is designed to analyse the relationship between two sets of
variables, one on either side of the equation. The variables on one side are combined to
produce a predictive value that produces the highest correlation with the combined
variables on the other side of the equation. Canonical correlation is best described as a
descriptive or screening technique, rather than a hypothesis testing procedure (Tabachnick
& Fidell, 1996). As such, canonical correlation was suitable for this study.
Multi-way frequency analysis is a multivariate technique that is used to analyse
the relationships between three or more discrete variables. An extension of multi-way
frequency analysis is called log-linear analysis. As a non-parametric statistical technique
there are few limitations and no assumptions regarding population distribution. The
technique can be applied almost universally, including continuous variables (Tabachnick
& Fidell, 1996). However, testing the strength of associations is unavailable from most
statistical programs. Given the continuous nature of the main variables in this study and
the intention to test hypotheses, this technique was not deemed appropriate.
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Analysis of covariance CANCOVA) is used to determine whether the differences
in the value of a dependent variable is significant between groups. ANCOVA is an
extension of analysis of variance (ANOVA) and is used for two major purposes. First, to
increase sensitivity of the test of the main effects and interactions between categorical
variables by reducing the error term. Second, to adjust the mean of the dependent
variable to what it would be if all subjects scored equally on a covariate. As a rule, a
small number of covariates are used, with a tradeoff being made between maximum
adjustment of the mean of the dependent variable, and the loss of degrees of freedom.
While ANCOVA can show overall strength of association (r-squared), its main purpose is
to establish differences between groups rather than the predictive ability or contribution
of independent variables (Tabachnick &.Fidell, 1996). Since the main effects of interest
are between continuous variables and the categorical variables can be accommodated
using dummy variables, this technique was not the most suitable for this project.
Logistic regression is a method of analysis that allows for the prediction of a
discrete outcome. Related to discriminant, multi-way frequency, and multiple regression
analysis for a dichotomous dependent variable, logistic regression is much more flexible.
Logistic regression evaluates the predictability of a particular outcome and does not
require a dichotomous or sequential dependent variable. Particularly useful when the
distribution of the dependent variable is expected to be non-linear, logistic regression is
capable of analysing a variety of independent variables including: continuous, sequential,
categorical and dichotomous variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Given the linear
relationship between the dependent variable(s) and the independent variables (established
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using curve estimation) and the nonnal distribution of the variables, logistic regression,
although attractive, was not suitable.
Multiple linear regression (MLR) analysis is a set of techniques that allow one to
assess the relationship between a single dependent variable and two or more independent
variables. MLR is particularly useful in addressing real world and complex problems not
amenable to the laboratory setting. Regression techniques include standard, sequential
(Hierarchical) and statistical (Step-wise) regression, depending on the manner in which
variables are entered into the equation. Regression allows for the uses of both continuous
and dichotomous variables. Discrete or categorical variables can be used, provided they
are first converted to a series of dichotomous (dummy) variables. The limitations of
regression are that it cannot imply causality; which is established by logic and
experimentation, rather than statistical association. Another concern is that appropriate
selection of variables requires a strong theoretical foundation (Tabachnick & Fidell,
1996). In this study, multiple regression was used to establish a foundation from which to
apply carry out more sophisticated analysis using structural equation modelling.
Structural equation modelling (SEM) allows for the examination of a set of
relationships between one or more independent variables and one or more dependent
variables. and may be thought of as a combination of exploratory factor analysis and
multiple regression (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). The variables may be continuous,
ordinal or categorical and may be either factors or measured variables. The advantages
offered by SEM include: 1) examined relationships are based on common variance and
are free from error; 2) reliability is accounted for explicitly due to the removal of error;
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and 3) it is the only form of analysis that allows complete and simultaneous testing of all
the relevant relationships.
4.7.2 Testing Wish to Reallocate Time-Distress-Equity Models
Multiple linear regression (MLR) and structural equation modelling (SEM) were
selected to examine the relationship between the variables in this study. MLR is
appropriate for examining the relationship between a single dependent variable and two
or more independent and control variables (Dejong & Branch, 1982). Classical multiple
regression requires all independent variables to be continuous. In practical terms,
however, any type can be used (Kleinbaum et al., 1987). Discrete dichotomous variables
can be used as reported. Discrete variables with three or more categories can be
converted to a series of dummy variables. Ordinal data can be treated as continuous data
provided the distribution of responses follows a normal distribution. Where necessary,
recoding may be used to ensure normal distribution (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).
The analytical plan used to evaluate the hypotheses was as follows:
I. Descriptive statistics for individual items and constructs. Statistics were reported for
both baseline and follow-up and included: mean, median, standard deviation, minimum
and maximum value, skewing and kurtosis value and error. Dummy variables were
created for categorical variables to be analysed using linear regression and structural
equation modelling. This was done by changing multiple-level categorical variables into a
series of two-level variables. Reclassification of categorical data was considered in order
to maintain cell sizes adequate for analysis. Recoding of skewed ordinal data will be
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carried out to better reflect underlying normal distribution curves;
2. Zero-order correlation matrices to identify important relationships (p<O.05) between
each dependent variable and individual independent and control variables were conducted
at baseline and at follow-up;
3. Simple linear regression to establish the significance of the relationships between the
dependent variable and all important independent and control variables; and hierarchical
(forced entry) regression to evaluation the nature of the relationship between variables at
each stage of the hypothesized model. Forced entry allowed loading of all immutable
control variables and significant mutable control variables into the three stages of the
model prior to entering significant independent variables;
4. SEM was used to develop a comprehensive model ofthe pathways suggested by
multiple linear regression models and was carried out on the follow-up data only. The
baseline data were essential to the development of valid and reliable measures, and while
pathways could be hypothesized and examined from both baseline and follow-up data, the
follow-up data represented an advance in conceptual development. The resulting changes
in the survey instrument allowed for a more comprehensive examination of these
concepts using SEM.
In applying SEM, the specification of the proposed multistage model was
followed by model estimation, evaluation of fit and possible modification to improve fit.
A model was judged adequate if it produced parameter estimates that were close to the
sample covariance matrix. Closeness-of-fit was evaluated primarily by chi-square tests
and fit indices (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). As suggested by Arbuckle & Wothke (1999),
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a variety of fit indices (both sample-dependent and independent of sample size) were used
to establish the adequacy of the proposed model.
Also reported were the Normed Fit Index (NFl); the Incremental Fit Index (IFI);
the Parsimony Ratio; the Population Discrepancy Function (FO Statistics); the Root Mean
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA Statistics), P for Test for Close Fit; and the
Hoelter 0.05 Index. Good fit is indicated when the reported value approaches one for the
NFl, the IFI, and P for Test for Close Fit. The Parsimony Ratio is a relative value with
parsimony seen to be improving as the value moves from one to zero. However, no
absolute cut-off value is suggested. The Fo statistic indicates a better fit closer to zero.
The RMSEA and the SRMR are acceptable if less than 0.05. The Hoelter 0.05 Index
indicate the total number of cases required to find a significant p-value for chi-square
(Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999; Kline, 1998; Maruyama, 1998).
4.7.3 Calculating Minimum Sample Size in Multiple Linear Regression
The minimum sample recommended for structural equation modelling is 200 and
both the baseline and followup samples were sufficient for analysis. The appropriate
sample size (N) for multiple regression depends on the necessary power required (level of
Type IT error), specified alpha (Type I error), the number of predictors (m) and the
expected effect size (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).
N ~ 50 + 8m (multiple predictors)
N ~ 104 + m (individual predictors)
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Assuming a medium multiple effect size between the dependent and the
independent variables, an alpha of 0.05, and power (1- p) of 0.80, and 6 predictors (m).
N 2 50+8(6) = 98
N 2 104+6 = 110
A higher number of cases will be required if the dependent variable is skewed, a
smaller effect size is anticipated, or substantial measurement error is expected from
unreliable variables. Initial evaluation of the constructs indicated no significant skewing
and reliability was found to be good. Therefore, it is expected that a larger sample may
be required only if the strength of the relationship is less than medium.
Green (1991) offers a method for calculating a range of effects:
N 2 (8/f) + (m-1)
To determine the range required to ensure the findings are meaningful, sample
size calculations were made for correlations (R) of 0.10, 0.20 and 0.30 (Table 4.7). Based
on these calculations, the number of cases available were sufficient to capture small
effects likely to contribute to the models being tested.
I S' C I I fsa e . ample lze a ell a IOns
R 0.1 0.2 0.3
R2 0.01 0.04 0.09
f2 0.01 0.04 0.1
m 6 6 6
N2 805 205 85
T bl 47
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4.7.4 Missing Data
The number of data points missing from the follow-up data used in regression
analysis and model construction was relatively small, and the sample relatively large
(n =385 at baseline and n =240 at followup), suggesting cases with missing data could
be excluded from the analysis. Due to the large number of variables being tested, the
presence of even a few missing data randomly dispersed among the respondents could
substantially affect the size of the sample available for analysis.
One option was to substitute the overall item mean for missing data to allow
analysis of the entire sample. However, the pattern of missing data is even more
important than the amount missing (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). To determine if the
missing data was of a random nature, analysis was carried out for each dependent variable
comparing cases of responders to non-responders. No significant differences were
observed for variables significantly correlated with the main pathway variables: equity,
distress and wish to reallocate time. The preliminary stepwise analysis was carried out,
using the "replace missing data" command to allow all cases to be included. In the forced
regression stage of analysis, only complete cases were used and reported in the results.
A somewhat different approach was taken with structural equation modelling
(SEM). Because the number of cases must be at least 200, all cases (240) were included
in the analysis, with the SEM program configured to calculate for missing data points
(Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999).
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4.8 Limitations
To ensure an adequate rate of response, the length of the survey instrument and
the detail of the survey questions were limited. The length of the baseline questionnaire
was a concern, but pre-testing indicated that it could be completed comfortably in 15
minutes and was not perceived as too onerous. Although less than half of the physicians
surveyed returned a completed baseline questionnaire, the response rate (46%) was
similar to that achieved by the CMA, SMA and the BCMA. Response bias was not
evident based on gender, speciality or provincial jurisdiction.
While model pathways using baseline data might be established and compared
with the follow-up data using the analysis proposed, substantive changes made to wish to
reallocate time in the follow-up questio~naire make it difficult to compare the baseline
and follow-up data with any degree of certainty. Although relationships established with
the baseline data appeared to be replicated by the revised follow-up measures, any
changes found in wish to reallocate time between baseline and follow-up might easily be
the result of changes in scaling and only represent a statistical artifact rather than a change
in the wish to reallocate time.
4.9 Ethics Approval and Participation
The approval of the survey instrument and its use in collecting information from
the selected Saskatchewan and British Columbia physicians was received from the
University of Saskatchewan Advisory Committee on Ethics in Behavioural Sciences.
Participants were assured that the information they were providing would be held in
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strictest confidence and the data would not be presented in a manner that would allow the
identification of individual physicians. The physicians were also assured that their
participation was completely voluntary and that they could withdraw at anytime without
penalty.
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5.0 Baseline Results
The findings were divided into baseline and follow-up results, with the emphasis
on follow-up results, since these were supported by refined measures. The baseline
results report descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations only.
5.1 Descriptive Statistics at Baseline
Descriptive statistics were run for all selected variables. Statistics collected for
continuous and ordinal scales included: item mean, standard deviation, sample size,
minimum and maximum scale values, and measures of skewness and kurtosis to assess
normal distribution of data. For categorical data, descriptive statistics reported the
percentage of total response attributed to each category heading. Data were reported for
the dependent variable constructs: wish to reallocate time, distress and equity, the
independent practice condition variables, and the control variables.
5.1.1 Wish to Reallocate Time, Distress, and Equity at Baseline
Among the dependent variables (Table 5.1.1), slight skewing was observed in two
of the wish to reallocate time measures: the 6 item scale, with an activity focus on patient
care, maintaining knowledge, and administration; and the 9 item scale (adding teaching,
research and team-based activities). More significant skewing was observed with the 2
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item scale (teaching and research) and the litem scale (teamwork). This made it
necessary to rescale the 2 item and 1 item scales to create dichotomous measures. All
four wish to reallocate time measures showed a tendency by physicians to indicate no
change in the wish to reallocate their professional time. The distress construct produced
a very acceptable distribution curve with minimal skewing or kurtosis. All four equity
constructs produced normal distribution curves.
Table 5.1.1 Descnptlon of Wish to Reallocate Time, Distress and Equity (Baseline)
Constructs Values and variable distributions Percent
Wish to Reallocate Time
9 item Scale Mean = 3.70 Min = 0 Skewness = 0.998
(n=358) SD= 3.66 Max =18 Kurtosis = 0.667
6 item Scale Mean = 2.88 Min = 0 Skewness = 0.857
(n=358) SD = 2.88 Max =12 Kurtosis =-0.001
2 item Scale 1= No Change Allocation 68.2
(n=358) 2= Change in Allocation 31.8
1 item Scale 1= No Change in Allocation 87.2
(n=358) 2= Change in Allocation 12.8
Distress
Distress Mean = 16.87 Min = 7 Skewness = -0.009
(n=372) SD= 3.00 Max =25 Kurtosis = 0.245
Equity
Extrinsic Tangible Mean = 14.40 Min = 4 Skewness = -0.305
(n=375) SD = 3.15 Max =22 Kurtosis = -0.113
Intrinsic Intangible Mean = 11.30 Min = 4 Skewness = 0.043
(n=358) SD = 2.36 Max = 19 Kurtosis = 0.313
Extrinsic Intangible Mean = 9.33 Min = 4 Skewness = 0.001
(n=366) SD = 1.65 Max = 14 Kurtosis = 0.393
Equity Mean = 25.73 Min = 12 Skewness = -0.236
(n=357) SD = 4.79 Max = 38 Kurtosis = -0.170
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5.1.2 Practice Conditions at Baseline
In general, the physicians in this study came from relatively large communities,
with 53.5 percent coming from communities with populations of more than 100,000
(Table 5.1.2.1). Just under 18 percent came from very large centres (500,000 or more)
and approximately 20 percent came from communities of less than 25,000.
Practice groups of one or two physicians constituted the largest single group,
representing 41.8 percent of physicians, with groups of more than eight physicians
representing the second largest (23.4 percent). At baseline, the distribution of specialty
reflected the original sampling frame with a fairly even split between general practitioners
and specialists, although there were somewhat fewer general practitioners.
Table 5.1.2.1
Description
Description of Practice Environment Variables (Baseline)
Values and variable distributions Percent
Community Size
(n=377)
Size of Practice Group
(n=377)
Specialty Area
(n=385)
Location of Office
(n=375)
Sponsorship
(n=356)
1 = less than 25,000
2 = 25,000 to 99,999
3 = 100,000 to 499,999
4 = 500,000+
1 = 1 or 2 physicians
2 = 3 or 4 physicians
3 =5 to 7 physicians
4 =8 or more physicians
1 = Family Practice/General Medicine
2 =Cognitive (pediatrics, internal medicine, psychiatry,
ophthalmology and otolaryngology)
3 =Procedural (surgery, Ob. & Gyn., etc)
4 = Technical (radiology, anaesthesia, pathology)
1 = Community
2 = Hospital
1 = Physician
2 =Other
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19.6
26.8
35.8
17.7
41.8
17.3
17.5
23.4
47.3
24.4
12.2
16.1
71.2
28.8
51.4
48.6
The vast majority of physicians (71.2 percent) indicated that their primary office
was located in the community, with 28.8 percent indicating the hospital as the location of
the principal office. Practice sponsorship was fairly evenly divided between those
sponsored by physicians (48.6 percent) and those sponsored by a third party, such as a
health district, community clinic, or hospital.
Table 5.1.2.2 Descri tion of Local Health Care S stem Variables (Baseline)
Description Values and variable distributions
Quality of Health Care Mean = 2.39 Min. value = 1 Skewness = 0.303
(n = 383) SD= 0.67 Max value = 4 Kurtosis = -0.034
Efficiency of Health Care Mean = 3.07 Min. value = 1 Skewness = 0.215
(n = 380) SD= 0.74 Max value = 5 Kurtosis = 0.712
Access to Community Mean = 2.76 Min. value = 1 Skewness =-0.004
Services (n = 382) SO: 0.73 Max value = 5 Kurtosis = 0.216
Access to Hospital Mean = 2.89 Min. value = 1 Skewness = 0.233
Services (n = 382) SD= 0.86 Max value = 5 Kurtosis = 0.158
Access to Long Term Mean = 3.43 Min. value = 1 Skewness = 0.078
Services (n = 381) SD= 0.90 Max value=5 Kurtosis =-0.645
Cooperation Among Mean = 2.53 Min. value = 1 Skewness =-0.015
Health Providers (n = 380) SD= 0.75 Max value = 5 Kurtosis = 0.275
Participation in Policy and Mean = 3.51 Min. value = 1 Skewness = 0.014
Planning (n = 382) SD= 0.85 Max value = 5 Kurtosis =-0.226
Quality of Community Mean = 2.45 Min. value = 1 Skewness = 0.580
Services (n = 384) SD= 0.78 Max value = 5 Kurtosis = 0.603
Quality of Hospital Mean = 2.37 Min. value = 1 Skewness = 0.685
Services (n = 384) SD= 0.88 Max value = Kurtosis = 0.532
Quality of Long Term Mean = 2.69 Min. value = 1 Skewness = 0.420
Services (n = 383) SD= 0.94 Max value = 5 Kurtosis =-0.201
In assessing the state of their local health care system (Table 5.1.2.2), physicians
tended to rate the overall quality of their system as fair to good (mean =2.40), while
140
rating the efficiency of the system somewhat lower (mean =3.01). In specific service
areas, physicians rated access to community and hospital services at a similar level
(means of 2.76 and 2.89 respectively), while access term care was rated between fair and
poor (mean of 3.43). No such discrepancy was evident with the quality of care measures.
On average, the quality of all three service areas (community-based, hospital, long term)
were rated between fair and good. With regard to cooperation and participation,
physicians tended to indicate fair to good co-operation between health care providers, but
only poor to fair levels of participation by physicians in local policy and planning
activities. The ten health system scales produced only minor skewing or kurtosis.
When asked to comment on the organization of their practice, a large percent of
physicians (43.5 percent) indicated some form of cost sharing arrangement
(Table 5.1.2.3). Revenue sharing or some other type of revenue pooling accounted for
30.1 percent of physicians, while solo or individual practice accounted for 26.4 percent of
physicians. Two-thirds of physicians indicated that they shared medical records.
Table 5.1.2.3 Description of Practice Integration Variables (Baseline)
Description Values and variable distributions Percent
Arrangement
(n=375)
Share Records
(n=348)
1 = solo/individual practice
2 = share practice expense
3 =revenue sharing/other
1 = Yes
2=No
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26.4
43.5
30.1
66.1
33.9
On average, physicians indicated that they worked just under 50 hours per week
(excluding on call), ranging from 5 to 95 hours (Table 5.1.2.4). Physicians also indicated
their share ofdifficult patients compared to other physicians to be between high and
moderate (mean =2.69). Keep current with specialty and interact with colleagues
indicated normal distribution with minimal skewing or kurtosis.
Table 5.1.2.4 Descri tion of Practice Demands Variables (Baseline)
Description Values and variable distributions
Hours Worked Mean =49.5 Min. value = 5 Skewness = -0.131
(n = 273) SD=13.7 Max value = 98 Kurtosis = 0.775
Difficult Patients Mean = 2.69 Min. value = 1 Skewness = -0.070
(n = 363) SD = 0.84 Max value = 5 Kurtosis = 0.170
Keep current with specialty Mean = 2.94 Min. value = 1 Skewness = 0.014
(n =377) SD =0."80 Max value = 5 Kurtosis = 0.105
Interact with colleagues Mean = 2.85 Min. value = 1 Skewness = 0.331
(n =377) SD = 0.93 Max value = 5 Kurtosis = -0.306
Physicians were asked to indicate the amount of reimbursement that came from
fee-for-service, salary, capitated payments, sessional contract, or other. Just over 70%
indicated that fee-for-service made up more than 80% of their income (Table 5.1.2.5).
Table 5.1.2.5 Description of Remuneration Variables (Baseline)
Description
Method of Pay
(n=383)
Values and variable distributions
1 = Greater than 80% FFS
2 = Up to 80% FFS
Percent
71.0
29.0
Process* Mean = 1.95
(n = 375) SD = 0.73
* Re-scaled due to skewing
Min value = 1
Max value = 3
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Skewness = 0.075
Kurtosis = -1.133
The original measure of process used to determine remuneration fairly reflects all
areas ofspecialization was a five point Likert scale (strongly agree to strongly disagree),
but the results were too skewed to be properly analysed. The item was re-scaled as a 3
point scale to reduce skewing and renamed PROCESS (Table 5.1.2.5).
5.1.3 Control Variables at Baseline
The distribution of respondents reflected the original sampling frame with a fairly
even split based on gender, although there were somewhat fewer female physicians
(Table 5.1.3). Female physicians made up 48.8 percent of the sample and general
practitioners accounted for 47.3 percent of respondents. Physicians ranged in age
between 29 and 69 years with an average age of 45 years. The vast majority of physicians
(84.9 percent) indicated that they were married or living in a common law relationship.
Nearly 40 percent of physicians indicated that there were no children living at home. The
average number of years in practice was 16 years with a range of 1 to 45 years.
Table 5.1.3 Descri tion of Control Variables (Baseline)
Description
Gender
(n=385)
Values and variable distributions
1 = female
2 = male
%
48.8
51.2
Age (years)
(n=377)
Mean =45.0
SD = 8.9
Min. value = 29
Max value = 69
Skew = 0.269
Kurtosis = -0.700
Spouse/partner
(n=382)
Children in the home
(Less than 18 yoa.)
(n=381)
1 =no
2 =yes
1 = none
2 = one to two
3 = three or more
14.3
84.9
39.9
39.1
21.0
Years of Practice
(n=376)
Mean = 15.9
SD=9.9
Min. value = 1
Max value = 45
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Skew = 0.429
Kurtosis = -0.656
5.2 Zero-order correlations at Baseline
5.2.1 Dependent Variables at Baseline
Significant correlations were found between two of the wish to reallocate time
(WRT) scales (9 item and 6 item), and the equity and distress measures (Table 5.2.1).
The highest correlations were between: the nine item WRT scale and distress (R = 0.281);
the six item WRT scale and distress (R =0.296); and between distress and equity
(R =0.407). Strong correlations were also observed between distress and equity
(overall), extrinsic-tangible equity and intrinsic equity. A significant but somewhat
weaker correlation was observed between distress and extrinsic-intangible equity. No
significant correlations were found between distress or equity and the dichotomized
WRT scales (teaching and research or teamwork). Given the lack of a significant
relation with neither distress nor equity, these two time allocation scales were dropped
from further analysis.
Table 5.2.1 Correlations Between De endent Variables (Baseline)
Variable Distress Extrinsic Intrinsic Extrinsic Equity
Tangible Intangible (Overall)
Wish to Reallocate Time 0.281 *** 0.168** NS 0.113* 0.162**
(9 items)
Wish to Reallocate Time 0.296*** 0.207*** 0.122* 0.112* 0.202***
(6 items)
Wish to Reallocate Time NS NS NS NS NS
(R&T)
Wish to Reallocate Time NS NS NS NS NS
(Teamwork)
Distress 0.372*** 0.330*** 0.150** 0.407***
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** P < 0.001
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5.2.2 Dependent and Practice Condition Variables at Baseline
Wish to Reallocate Time (6 item scale): Variables relating to the practice
environment correlated significantly with the wish to reallocate time (Table 5.2.2).
Physicians with offices located in the community, practices sponsored by physicians, and
physicians practising in very large groups indicated a greater desire to reallocate their
time (p < 0.05). Practice groups of 5 to 7 physicians were more likely to indicate less
desire to reallocate their time compared to other physicians (p < 0.05). Cognitive
specialists were more likely to indicate a preference to reallocate time (p < 0.05), while
technical specialists were less likely compared to other groups of physicians (p < 0.01).
Physicians working in practices with cost sharing arrangements were more likely
to indicate a greater wish to reallocate time than other physicians. Physicians working in
a revenue sharing or some other type of revenue pooling arrangement, on the other hand,
tended to report less of a wish to reallocate time. Those physicians reporting more
difficult patients compared to their colleagues, those unable to keep current with their
specialty, and those finding the process used to determine income to be unfair also tended
to indicate a greater wish to reallocate their time.
Wish to Reallocate Time (9 item scale): Including teaching, research and
teamwork items in the wish to reallocate time construct produced correlations that were
similar to the six item scale. Physicians practising in very large groups indicated a
greater desire to reallocate their time, while practice groups of 5 to 7 physicians were
more likely to indicate less desire to reallocate their time compared to other physicians.
Like the 6 item scale, cognitive specialists were more likely to indicate a wish to
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reallocate time, while technical specialists were less likely compared to other groups of
physicians. Unlike the 6 item scale, no significant correlations were observed between
wish to reallocate time (9 items) and office location, or between wish to reallocate time
and practice sponsorship.
Physicians working in practices with cost sharing arrangements were more likely
to indicate a greater wish to reallocate time than other physicians. No significant
correlations were seen for physicians working in a revenue sharing or some other type of
revenue pooling arrangement. Those physicians working longer hours (excluding on
call), reporting more difficult patients compared to their colleagues, those unable to keep
current with their specialty, and those finding the process used to determine income to be
unfair, also tended to indicate a greater wish to reallocate their time.
Distress: Variables relating to the practice environment did not correlate
significantly with distress. Physicians working in practices with cost sharing
arrangements and paid primarily by fee-for-service experienced greater distress than other
physicians. Physicians working in solo or individual practice on the other hand, tended to
report lower levels of distress. Those physicians reporting more difficult patients
compared to their colleagues, those unable to keep current, those not interacting with
colleagues, and those finding the process used to determine income to be unfair, also
tended to experience more distress.
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C d"dPdDBI .d CZea e ro-or er orre atlons etween epen ent an ractlce on Itlons
Practice Variable WRT6 WRT9 Distress Extrinsic Intrinsic Extrinsic Equity
Tangible Intangible
Practice Environment
Community Size
> 500,000 - - - - -0.125* - -
Office Location -0.118* - - -0.105* - - -
Sponsorship -0.139* -
-
-0.105* - - -
Specialty
Cognitive 0.126* 0.157**
- - - -
-
Technical -0.176** -0.186** - - - - -
Size of Group
lor 2 MDs
- - - 0.121* - - -
3 to 4 MDs
- - - - - 0.121* -
5 to 7 MDs 0.190** 0.197***
- - - -
-
> 7MDs -0.122* -0.126*
- -0.129* - - -
Practice Integration
Arrangement
IndividuaVSolo - - -0.1l4* - - - -
Share Costs 0.140** 00.145** 0.131* 0.127* - - 0.133*
Revenue/Other -0.1l0*
- -
-0.199***
- -
-0.182**
Share Records - - - 0.150** - - -
Practice Demands
Reg. Work Hours - 0.122* - - - 0.145* -
Difficult Patients -0.199*** -0.204*** -0.229*** -0.203*** - - -0.144**
Keep Current 0.192*** 0.136* 0.218*** 0.120* 0.219*** - 0.194***
Interacting - - 0.190*** - 0.195*** - 0.168**
Remuneration
Method of Pay - - -0.130* -0.162** - - -0.141**
Process 0.150** 0.149** 0.236*** 0.373*** 0.210*** 0.202*** 0.362***
T bI 522
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001
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Extrinsic Tangible Equity: Having the office located in a hospital, non-physician
sponsorship, and being part of a large practice group (more than 7 physicians) were
associated higher levels of extrinsic tangible equity, while groups of 1 or 2 physicians
tended to perceive less equity than other groups. Those physicians working in practices
with cost sharing arrangements perceived less equity, while those participating in revenue
sharing and other forms of revenue pooling perceived higher levels of equity. Physicians
sharing medical records also reported higher levels of extrinsic tangible equity (i.e. level
of income was perceived as fair).
Those physicians reporting fewer difficult patients compared to their colleagues
and those able to keep current with specialty also tended to report a higher level of
extrinsic tangible equity. Those physicians paid by salary or mix method (up to 80% fee-
for-service), and those finding the process used to determine income to be fair, also
tended to report a higher level of extrinsic tangible equity.
Intrinsic Intangible Equity: Physician working in very large communities also
tended to experience greater intrinsic equity. Physicians able to keep current, those
interacting with colleagues, and those who found the process used to determine income to
be fair also tended to report a higher level of intrinsic equity.
Extrinsic Intangible Equity: Physician working in groups of 3 to 4 physicians
tended to experience less extrinsic intangible equity. Physician working fewer hours and
those finding the process used to determine income to be fair indicated greater extrinsic
intangible equity.
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Equity (Overall): Variables relating to the practice environment (excluding the
local health system items) did not correlate significantly with the overall equity construct.
Those physicians working in practices with cost sharing arrangements perceived less
equity, while those participating in revenue sharing and other forms of revenue pooling
perceived higher levels of equity. Those physicians reporting fewer difficult patients
compared to their colleagues, those able to keep current, and those able to interact with
colleagues, tended to report a higher level of extrinsic tangible equity. Those paid by
salary or mixed method (up to 80% FFS), and those finding the process used to determine
income to be fair reported higher levels of extrinsic tangible equity (i.e. level of income
was perceived as fair).
5.2.3 Dependent and Local Health System Variables at Baseline
Few significant correlations were found between the wish to reallocate time and
the local health care system variables, or between the distress and the local health care
system variables (Table 5.2.3). By contrast, significant correlations were almost
universally seen between the four equity constructs and the health system variables.
Access to community services, access to long term care services, and the quality
of community services correlated weakly with the wish to reallocate time (6 item scale),
and only one variable, quality of community services, correlated with the wish to
reallocate time (9 item scale). Distress was significantly but weakly correlated with
access to community services and access to long term care services.
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With the exception of cooperation and extrinsic-tangible equity, all correlations
between equity and health variables were significant (p < 0.05) and a substantial number
were highly significant (p < 0.000; r> 0.200). Among the more substantial correlations
were: extrinsic tangible and access to long term care; intrinsic equity and efficiency,
access to community services, cooperation, and quality of community services; extrinsic
intangible equity and cooperation; and equity (overall) and efficiency, access to
community and long term services, and quality of community services.
Table 5.2.3 Zero-order Correlations Between De endent and Health S stem Variables
Practice Variable WRT6 WRT9 Distress Extrinsic Intrinsic Extrinsic Equity
Tangible Intang.
Quality of System 0.129* 0.151** 0.119* 0.155**
Efficiency of System 0.188** 0.209*** 0.135** 0.221 ***
Access to Community 0.128* 0.119* 0.171 ** 0.201 *** 0.127** 0.211 ***
Services
Access to Hospital 0.167** 0.138** 0.127* 0.182**
Services
Access to Long Term 0.123* 0.162** 0.246*** 0.196*** 0.179** 0.250***
Services
Cooperation Among 0.253*** 0.258*** 0.182**
Health Providers
Participation in 0.134* 0.187*** 0.126* 0.195***
Policy and Planning
Quality of 0.129* 0.125* 0.158** 0.231 *** 0.161** 0.217***
Community Services
Quality of Hospital 0.116* 0.146** 0.150** 0.154**
Services
Quality of Long Term 0.167** 0.173** 0.145** 0.193***
Services
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001
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5.2.4 Dependent and Control Variables at Baseline
A number of significant correlations were found between the wish to reallocate
time and the control variables (Table 5.2.4.). The age of the physician and years of
practice were inversely correlated with both wish to reallocate time constructs, indicating
a greater wish to reallocate time among younger and less experienced physicians.
Physicians did not differ in their wish to reallocate time based on gender, marital status,
or having children at home.
Table 5.2.4 Si nificant Correlations Between De endent and Control Variables
Practice WRT6 WRT9 Distress Extrinsic Intrinsic Extrinsic Equity
Variable Tangible Intangible
Gender -0.177** -0.112*
Age (years) -0.200*** -0.232*** -0.216***
Spouse/partner
Children at
Home
1 = None -0.187*** 0.116*
1 = lor2 0.151**
1 =2 or More -0.140**
Years of -0.159** -0.232*** -0.198***
Practice
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** P < 0.001
Distress (the 5 item construct) was significantly correlated with a number of
control variables. Female physicians, younger physicians, those physicians with one or
two children at home, and those with fewer years of practice reported greater levels of
distress compared to male physicians, older physicians, those with no children living at
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home and those physicians with more years of practice.
Few significant correlations were found between the equity scales and the control
variables. Physicians with no children tended to report somewhat less intrinsic equity
than those physicians with children at home. The number of children at home was also
related to intangible extrinsic equity, with physicians having more than two children at
home reporting greater equity. Male physicians were also more likely to report greater
intangible extrinsic equity than their female counterparts. No significant correlations
were seen between the control variables and extrinsic tangible equity, or between the
control variables and overall equity.
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6.0 Follow-up Results
The follow-up results included descriptive statistics, zero-order correlations,
multiple linear regression (MLR), and structural equation modelling (SEM). Descriptive
statistics were generated to assess the quality of the data and the distribution patterns of
constructs and individual survey items. Zero-order correlations were run to identify
significant relationships between variables, including the constructs measuring: wish to
reallocate time; distress; and equity, as well as practice condition variables and control
variables. Regression analysis was used to establish simple linear models of the factors
contributing to equity, distress and the wish to reallocate time, to create the basis for
constructing a multistage model. Based on significant relationships established by linear
regression and the constructs identified by factor analysis as reported in Chapter 4, SEM
was used to build and test a hypothesized multistage model (recall Figure 5, page 86).
6.1 Descriptive Statistics at Follow-up
Descriptive statistics reported for continuous and ordinal scales included: item
mean, standard deviation, sample size, minimum and maximum scale values, and
measures of skewness and kurtosis to assess normal distribution of data. For categorical
data, descriptive statistics reported the percentage of total response attributed to each
category heading. Statistics were reported for the dependent variables (equity, distress,
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wish to reallocate time), independent variables (practice conditions) and control
variables.
6.1.1 Wish-to-Reallocate-Time, Distress and Equity at Follow-up
Among the dependent variables (Table 6.1.1), slight skewing was observed in
wish-to-reallocate-time (unweighted). Weighting the responses based on the proportion
of time spent on the four main professional activities: patient care, teaching & teaching,
maintaining knowledge and administration, resulted in a measure with an improved
distribution curve. Although reliability was somewhat reduced compared to the base-line
construct (Cronbach's alpha of 0.78 vs. 0.70), the wish-to-reallocate-time (WRT)
measures at follow-up displayed a much better distribution of responses.
The additional items added to the distress measure did not affect skewness or
kurtosis. The new construct consisted of five items measuring: frustration with patients;
frustration with access; fatigue during the day; stress; and time conflicts. The scale
produced a very acceptable distribution curve with minimal skewing or kurtosis.
Three of the four equity constructs at follow-up produced normal distribution
curves with a centring around the median and only slight skewing and kurtosis. Only
extrinsic-intangible equity displayed some kurtosis, with responses tending to cluster
around the mean. The aggregate equity scale drew on items from all three sub-scales: all 4
items from tangible-extrinsic equity scale, 3 of 4 items from the intrinsic equity scale, and
1 of 4 items from the extrinsic-intangible equity scale.
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Table 6.1.1 Description of Wish-to-Reallocate-Time, Distress and Equity Measures
Description Values and variable distributions
Wish-to-Reallocate-Time
Activities Unweighted Mean = 16.47 Min = 10 Skewness = 0.458
(n=240) SD= 3.28 Max = 30 Kurtosis = 0.681
Activities Weighted Mean = 18.15 Min = 10 Skewness = 0.139
(n=238) SD= 4.06 Max = 30 Kurtosis = -0.238
Distress
Distress Mean = 17.92 Min = 8 Skewness = -0.170
(n=237) SD= 3.13 Max=25 Kurtosis = 0.132
Equity
Extrinsic Tangible Mean = 13.75 Min = 6 Skewness = -0.207
(n=237) SD= 3.13 Max = 20 Kurtosis = -0.501
Intrinsic Intangible Mean = 11.49 Min = 6 Skewness = 0.173
(n=237) SD= 2.36 Max = 19 Kurtosis = 0.030
Extrinsic Intangible Mean = 12.30 Min = 6 Skewness = 0.113
(n=235) SD= 2.07 Max = 20 Kurtosis = 0.747
Equity Mean = 25.29 Min = 12 Skewness = -0.089
(n=235) SD= 4.76 Max = 39 Kurtosis = -0.069
6.1.2 Practice Conditions at Follow-up
In general, the physicians responding to the survey practised in relatively large
communities, with 54 percent coming from communities with populations of more than
100,000 (Table 6.1.2.1a). Just over 18 percent came from a very large centre
(Vancouver), and approximately 19 percent came from communities of less than 25,000.
The vast majority of physicians (70.4 percent) indicated that their primary office was
located in the community-at-Iarge, with 29.6 percent indicating the hospital as the
location of the principal office.
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Table 6.1.2.1a Descri tion of Practice Environment Variables (Follow-u )
Description
Community Size
(n=235)
Location of Office
(n=236)
Sponsorship
(n=221)
Specialty
(n=239)
Size of Practice Group
(n=236)
Values and variable distributions
1 = less than 25,000
2 = 25,000 to 99,999
3 = 100,000 to 499,999
4 = 500,000+
1 = Community
2 = Hospital
1= Physician
2 = Other
1 = Family Practice/General Medicine
2 = Cognitive (pediatrics, internal medicine, psychiatry,
ophthalmology and otolaryngology)
3 = Procedural (surgery, Ob. & Gyn., etc)
4 = Technical (radiology, anaesthesia, pathology)
1 = 1 or 2 physicians
2 = 3 or 4 physicians
3 = 5 to 7 physicians
4 = 8 or more physicians
%
18.7
27.2
35.7
18.3
71.8
28.2
51.6
48.4
44.6
23.0
14.2
17.2
30.1
23.3
20.3
26.3
Practice sponsorship was fairly evenly divided between those sponsored by
physicians (51.6 percent) and those sponsored by a third party, such as a health district,
community clinic, or hospital. At follow-up, the distribution of respondents based on
specialty reflected the baseline sampling frame with a fairly even split, although there
were somewhat fewer general practitioners (44.6 percent of respondents).
Practice groups of one or two physicians constituted the largest single group,
representing 30.1 percent of physicians. Groups of 3 to 4 physician (23.3%), groups of 5
to 7 (20.3%), and groups of 8 or more (26.3%) held similar shares of the survey
respondents. The shift in group size distribution from that reported at baseline was seen
to be due to a change in the nature of the question in the follow-up survey which was
reconfigured to produce a more precise response.
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In assessing the state of their local health care system (Table 6.1.2.1b), physicians
rated the overall quality of their system as fair to good (mean =2.61), while rating the
efficiency of the system somewhat lower (mean =3.14). In specific areas of health
services, physicians rated access to community and hospital services at a similar level
(means of 2.94 and 3.16 respectively), while access to long term care was rated somewhat
lower, between fair and poor (mean = 3.72).
Table 6.1.2.1 b Descri tion of Local Health Care S stem Variables (Follow-u )
Description Values and variable distributions
Quality of Health Care Mean = 2.61 Min. value = 1 Skewness = 0.241
(n = 238) SO=0.80 Max value = 5 Kurtosis = 0.150
Efficiency of Health Care Mean = 3.14 Min. value = 1 Skewness = 0.093
(n = 237) SO= 0.74 Max value = 5 Kurtosis = 0.171
Access to Community Mean = 2.94 Min. value = 1 Skewness = 0.102
Services (n = 221) SO= 0.74 Max value = 5 Kurtosis =-0.061
Access to Hospital Mean = 3.16 Min. value = 1 Skewness = -0.289
Services SO=0.90 Max value =5 Kurtosis = 0.078
(n = 236)
Access to Long Term Mean = 3.72 Min. value = 1 Skewness =-0.626
Services (n = 214) SO=0.82 Max value = 5 Kurtosis = 0.521
Cooperation Among Mean = 2.55 Min. value = 1 Skewness =-0.032
Health Providers (n = 237) SO= 0.68 Max value = 5 Kurtosis = -0.199
Participation in Policy and Mean = 3.53 Min. value = 1 Skewness = -0.084
Planning (n = 223) SO= 0.84 Max value = 5 Kurtosis = -0.123
Quality of Community Mean = 2.60 Min. value = 1 Skewness = 0.717
Services (n = 238) SO=0.86 Max value = 5 Kurtosis = 0.382
Quality of Hospital Mean = 2.50 Min. value = 1 Skewness = 0.335
Services(n = 238) SO=0.94 Max value = 5 Kurtosis = -0.341
Quality of Long Term Mean = 2.93 Min. value = 1 Skewness = 0.268
Services (n = 383) SO= 1.01 Max value = 5 Kurtosis =-0.535
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Unlike the baseline results, differences were evident in the quality of the three
service areas at follow-up. Physicians rated quality of community services at a similar
level (fair to good), while long term care was rated fair. With regard to cooperation and
participation, physicians tended to indicate fair to good co-operation between health care
providers, but only poor to fair levels of participation by physicians in local policy and
planning activities. This was consistent with baseline assessments. The ten health
system items produced only minor skewing or kurtosis and recoding was not necessary.
A substantial portion of the respondents (43.5 percent) indicated some form of
cost sharing arrangement in their practice setting (Table 6.1.2.2). Revenue sharing or
some other type of revenue pooling accounted for 33 percent of physicians, while solo or
individual practice accounted for 23 percent of physicians. When assessing the
appropriateness of the current practice setting, physicians were somewhat equivocal,
neither agreeing or disagreeing, on average, with the appropriateness of their current
practice arrangement. At the same time they tended to think that it would be somewhat
difficult to change the practice arrangement. Two-thirds of physicians indicated that they
shared medical records with other physicians.
The majority of physicians tended to meet as a practice group at least monthly,
with a third of the groups meeting at least weekly. In delegating activities to nursing,
approximately 30 percent used nurses to perform delegated clinical activities, while
another 30 percent reported no role for a nurse in the practice. Approximately two-thirds
of the physicians reported referring patients to allied health care providers at least weekly,
while 20 percent indicated that they did not refer patients to allied health care providers.
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By comparison, less than half of physicians (49.2%) referred patients to health
support workers at least weekly, with 27.5 percent indicating that they had not referred
any patients in the past year. Technical specialists l were least likely to refer patients to an
allied or health support worker, while general practitioners were more likely to refer
patients. Cognitive and procedural specialists were less likely to refer to allied providers
than general practitioners, but indicated similar rates of referral to health support workers.
Table 6.1.2.2 Descri tion of Practice Inte ration Variables (Follow-u )
Description Values and variable distributions %
Arrangement
(n=237)
1 = solo/individual practice
2 = share practice expense
3 = revenue sharing/other
23.2
43.5
33.3
Current Arrangement Mean = 2.00 Min. value = 1 Skew = -0.005
Appropriate* (n=236) SO =0.67 Max value = 3 Kurtosis = -0.786
Ability to Change Current Mean = 3.82 Min. value = 1 Skew = -0.086
Arrangement (n=231) SO = 1.32 Max value = 6 Kurtosis = -0.642
Share Records 1 = Yes 67.1
(n=216) 2=No 33.9
Frequency of Practice Group Mean = 1.94 Min Value = 1 Skew = 0.108
Meetings* (n=234) SO = 0.76 Max Value = 3 Kurtosis = -1.250
Maximum Role of Nursing* Mean = 2.03 Min Value = 1 Skew = -0.044
(n=235) SO = 0.77 Max Value = 3 Kurtosis = -1.321
Referrals to Allied Health Mean = 1.92 Min Value = 1 Skew = 0.101
Providers* (n=237) SO =0.69 Max Value = 3 Kurtosis = -0.893
Referrals in Health Support Mean = 2.20 Min Value = 1 Skew= 0.049
Workers* (n=236) SO=0.55 Max Value = 3 Kurtosis = -0.170
* re-coded do to excessive skewing
Physicians indicated that they worked an average of 46.6 hours per week
(excluding on call), ranging from five to 85 hours (Table 6.1.2.3). In addition to using the
1 Recall definitions of cognitive, procedural and technical specialists in Methods, page 103.
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raw score of percent of time allocated to the four main professional activities, the data
were re-coded to create three distinct groups of physicians: those spending much less than
the average percent of time on an activity; those spending the average portion of time;
and those spending much more time than average.
Table 6.1.2.3 Descri tion of Practice Demand Variables (Follow-u )
Description Values and variable distributions Percent (%)
Hours Worked per Week
Excluding On Call (n=207)
Time spent providing patient
care* (n=238)
Time spent on teaching and
research* (n=238)
Time spent maintaining
knowledge* (n=238)
Time spent on admin.
duties* (n=238)
Weekdays On Call
per Month
(n=238)
Mean =46.6 Min Value = 5
SD = 12.94 Max Value = 85
Mean = 2.02 Min Value = 1
SD=0.67 Max Value = 3
Mean = 2.04 Min Value = 1
SD=0.16 Max Value = 3
Mean = 2.44 Min Value = 1
SD=0.89 Max Value =4
Mean = 2.11 Min Value = 1
SD=0.66 Max Value = 3
None
1 to 4 Evenings
5 to 8 Evenings
9 to 16 Evenings
More than 16 Weekday Evenings per Month
Skewness = -0.359
Kurtosis = 0.654
Skewness = -0.024
Kurtosis = -0.765
Skewness = -0.062
Kurtosis = -1.231
Skewness = 0.083
Kurtosis = -0.707
Skewness = -0.113
Kurtosis = -0.687
13.0
37.8
27.7
12.6
8.8
Weekends On Call
per Month (n=237)
Mean = 1.25
SD=0.84
Min Value = 0
Max Value = 4.5
Skewness = 1.358
Kurtosis = 2.792
Patients With Complicated
Clinical Problems* (236)
1 = High to Very High
2 = Low to Moderate
46.6
53.4
Patients with Low Economic
Status* (n=229)
Mean = 1.98
SD = 0.70
Min Value = 1
Max Value = 3
Skewness = 0.024
Kurtosis = -0.949
Patients with Personal or
Family Problems* (n=212)
1 = High to Very High
2 = Very Low to Moderate
47.4
52.6
Coping with Time Demands Mean = 11.76
(n=238) SD = 2.44
* re-coded do to excessive skewing
Min Value = 5
Max Value = 19
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Skewness = -0.049
Kurtosis = 0.366
The majority of physicians (65.5%) took a weekday evening on call once or twice
during the average month. Physicians, on average, worked approximately one weekend
on call per month. Physicians indicating no weekday on call made up 13 percent of
respondents, and approximately 10 percent indicated no weekend on call.
Patients with complicated clinical conditions were dichotomized as either high to
very high (46.6%), or as low to moderate (53.4%). None of the respondents indicated a
very low proportion of complicated patients. On average, physicians perceived their
share of socioeconomically disadvantaged patients to be moderate. The portion of
patients with personal or family problems was evenly split between high to very high
(47.40/0) and very low to moderate (52.65). The Coping with Time Demands construct
produced a normal distribution curve with no skewing and only slight kurtosis.
Table 6.1.2.4 Descri tion of Remuneration Variables (Follow-u )
Description
Method of Pay
(n=236)
Current Method of
Payment Appropriate
(n=237)
Ability to Change Method
of Payment* (n=234)
Process for Determining
Level of Remuneration*
(n=235)
Values and variable distributions
1 = Greater than 80% FFS
2 = Up to 80% FFS
Mean = 2.37 Min. value = I Skew = 0.416
SD=0.99 Max value = 5 Kurtosis = -0.515
Mean = 2.11 Min. value = I Skew = -0.099
SD=0.63 Max value = 3 Kurtosis = -0.539
Mean = 2.05 Min Value = I Skews = -0.083
SD=0.79 Max Value = 3 Kurtosis = -1.373
%
71.3
28.7
* re-coded do to excessive skewing
More than 70 percent of physicians indicated that fee-for-service made up more
than 80% of their income (Table 6.1.2.4). Physicians tended to be somewhat supportive
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of their current method of payment, but equivocated about their ability to change their
method of payment. The original item, process used to determine remuneration fairly
reflects all areas ofspecialization, was judged too skewed to be properly analysed. The
item was re-coded as a 3 point scale and produced a mean of 2.05.
6.1.3 Control Variables at Follow-up
At follow-up, the distribution of respondents reflected the baseline sampling
frame with a fairly even split between genders (Table 6.1.3). Physicians ranged in age
from 30 to 69 years, with an average age of 46 years. The vast majority of physicians
(82.8 percent) again indicated that they were married or living in a common law
relationship, with 40 percent of physicians indicating there were no children living at
home. On average, the number of years in practice was 17 with a range of 1 to 45 years.
Table 6.1.3 Description of Control Variables (Followup)
Description Codes, values and variable distributions %
Gender 1 = female 49.8
(n=239) 2 = male 50.2
Age (years) Mean =46.0 Min. value = 30 Skew = 0.217
(n=239) SD = 8.76 Max value = 69 Kurtosis = -0.815
Spouse/partner 1 =no 17.2
(n=239) 2 =yes 82.8
Children in the home 1 = None 39.7
(Less than 18 yoa.) 2 = 1 or 2 39.3
(n=239) 3 = 3 or More 20.9
Years of Practice Mean = 17.0 Min. value = 1 Skew = 0.306
(n=237) SD = 9.5 Max value = 42 Kurtosis = -0.836
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6.2 Zero-order Correlations at Follow-up
To simplify the model building process, zero-order correlations were used first to
identify important relationships between the dependent (equity, distress and wish to
reallocate time), independent (practice conditions) and control variables.
6.2.1 Dependent Variables at Follow-up
Significant correlations were found between all dependent variables (Table 6.2.1).
The highest correlations were between unweighted wish to reallocate time and distress
(R = 0.489), between weighted wish to reallocate time and distress (R = 0.493), and
between equity and distress (R = 0.449). Strong correlations were also observed between
distress and extrinsic-tangible equity, intrinsic equity, and extrinsic-intangible equity.
The weakest correlations were between wish to reallocate time and the equity measures.
Table 6.2.1 Correlations Between Wish-to-Reallocate-Time, Distress and E uit
Variable Distress Extrinsic Intrinsic Extrinsic Equity
Tangible Intangible
Wish-to-Reallocate- 0.489*** 0.235*** 0.283*** 0.217** 0.292***
Time (Unweighted)
Wish to Reallocate 0.493*** 0.245*** 0.301 *** 0.208** 0.301 ***
Time (Weighted)
Distress 0.388*** 0.405*** 0.342*** 0.449***
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** P < 0.001
The correlations between the dependent variables were very encouraging, in that
they indicated strong relationships between the measures representing the main stages of
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the hypothesized model of equity, distress and the wish to reallocate time. The relative
strength of the relationships also supported the hypothesized pathway sequence, with
distress acting as an intervening variable between equity and the wish to reallocate time.
Relatively strong associations were found between distress and equity and between
distress and wish to reallocate time, while somewhat weaker relationships were seen
between equity and the wish to reallocate time measures.
6.2.2 Dependent and Practice Condition Variables at Follow-up
6.2.2.1 Practice Environment
Wish-to-Reallocate-Time: Unlike the baseline measures, no significant
correlations were seen with objective practice environment variables for either the
weighted or the unweighted time reallocate measures (Table 6.2.2.1 a). Among the local
health care system variables (Table 6.2.2.1 b), only 'quality oflong tenn services' was
found to correlate significantly to wish-to-reallocate-time (p < 0.05).
Distress: Among the objective environmental variables, working in a physician
sponsored practice was related significantly to greater distress. Technical specialty was
significantly associated with less distress. Distress was also significantly (p < 0.05), but
weakly correlated with access to community services, access to hospital services, and
quality of community, hospital and long term care services.
Equity: Doctors working in physician sponsored practices reported less overall
equity than physicians in other sponsorship arrangements (p < 0.05). Cognitive
specialists perceived greater overall equity compared to general practitioners, procedural
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specialists or technical specialists. Specialty also correlated very significantly with
extrinsic equity. Cognitive specialists perceived greater intrinsic equity (p < 0.01) and
general practitioners perceived less intrinsic equity (p < 0.000) compared to other
specialties. Those physicians working in very large communities (> 500,000), and those
working in groups of 5 to 7 physicians, also reported greater intrinsic equity (p < 0.05).
Physicians in groups of 3 to 4 physicians reported less intrinsic equity than other groups
(p < 0.01). In effect, the intrinsic rewards perceived by these physicians for the work they
do are somewhat less than those perceived by practice groups of other sizes.
Table 6.2.2.1 a Correlations Between De endent and Db'ective Environmental Variables
Variable WRT WRT Distress Extrinsic Intrinsic Extrinsic Equity
(Unwght) (Weight) Tangible Intangible
Community
Size
> 500,000 -0.152*
Specialty
Gen. Pract. 0.259***
Cognitive -0.220** -0.167*
Technical -0.215**
Office Location
Sponsorship -0.154* -0.142* -0.142*
Size of Group
3 or4 MDs 0.191**
5 to 7 MDs -0.144*
* P < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** P < 0.001
The correlations between the dependent variables and objective environmental
variables indicated a stronger relationship with perceptions of equity compared to either
distress or wish to reallocate time. In particular, characteristics of the practice such as
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community size, specialty, location, sponsorship and group size were not found to have
any significant relationship with the physician's wish to reallocate their time.
Among the equity scales, zero order correlation analysis indicated objective
environmental variables were significantly associated with intrinsic equity, while
demonstrating little or no association with either extrinsic tangible or extrinsic intangible
equity. At baseline, analysis had indicated weak but significant relationships between the
objective practice environment and extrinsic intangible equity, and no relationship with
intrinsic equity. The inconsistency in the results may be explained by the modification
occurring with these two equity scales between the baseline and follow up stages of data
collection. Patient appreciation was assigned to extrinsic intangible equity at follow-up
and trivial activity added to intrinsic equity. The follow-up scales are conceptually
stronger, providing greater support for the validity of the follow-up findings.
Subjective measures of the practice environment (e.g. quality and access) were
also primarily associated with the equity scales, with some significantly associated with
distress and even fewer significant associations between the subjective environment and
the physician's wish to reallocate time (Table 6.2.2.1b). With the exception of access to
long term care and cooperation with extrinsic-tangible equity, and the quality of the
system and access to community services with extrinsic intangible equity, all correlations
between equity and the health variables were significant (p < 0.05) and a substantial
number were highly significant (p < 0.000).
Although somewhat evident from the objective measures of the environment,
differences in the reported state of the local health care system, especially the quality of
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the system, were strongly associated with equity. Among the more substantial
correlations were: extrinsic tangible equity and the quality of community services
(R =0.308); intrinsic equity and quality of community services (R =0.278); and equity
(overall) and the quality of community services (R =0.331), and equity (overall) and the
quality of long term care services (R = 0.303). Both equity and assessment of the local
health care system were based on the subjective assessment of the physicians, and the
perception of one may very well be influencing the perception of the other. At this time,
however, it would be premature to suggest the direction of the relationship.
Table 6.2.2.1 b Correlations Between De endent and Health S stem Variables
Variable WRT WRT Distress Extrinsic Intrinsic Extrinsic Equity
(Unwght) (Weight) Tangible Intangible
Quality of System 0.159* 0.154* 0.170**
Efficiency of System 0.202** 0.176** 0.171 * 0.171**
Access to Community 0.139* 0.236*** 0.171* 0.236***
Services
Access to Hospital 0.]37* 0.]72** 0.143* 0.145* 0.189**
Services
Access to Long Term 0.145* 0.]98** O. ]52*
Services
Cooperation Among O. ]63* 0.293*** 0.210**
Providers
Participation in Policy 0.181 ** 0.231 ** 0.185** 0.251 ***
and Planning
Quality of Community 0.145* 0.308*** 0.278*** 0.142* 0.331 ***
Services
Quality of Hospital 0.128* 0.190** 0.210** 0.176** 0.220**
Services
Quality of Long Term 0.156* 0.155* 0.137* 0.275*** 0.233*** 0.279*** 0.303***
Services
* p < 0.05 ** P < 0.01 *** P < 0.001
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6.2.2.2 Practice Integration
Unlike the objective and subjective practice environment variables previously
reported, a number of significant relationships were seen between the practice integration
variables and all the dependent variables: equity, distress, and wish to reallocate time.
The practice integration variables represent aspects of the physician's working conditions
and the ability of the physician to change these conditions. As measures of how
physicians organize their work and the perceived constraints within the practice setting,
the results indicate a relationship between the internal conditions of the medical practice
and the wish to reallocate time. Practice integration variables were also associated with
factors hypothesized to motivate the physician to reallocate time: equity and distress.
Wish-to-Reallocate-Time: The ability to change the organizational arrangement
was significantly correlated to the unweighted measure of wish to reallocate time
(Table 6.2.2.2), indicating that those perceiving an ability to change were less likely to
express a preference for change in their present circumstances (p < 0.05). The weighted
wish to reallocate time measure was significantly related to the ability to change practice
arrangement, with physicians in revenue sharing and other forms of income pooling
arrangements indicating less preference to reallocate time (p < 0.05). In addition,
significant correlations (p < 0.05) were found between the weighted measure and the
frequency of referral to allied health care professionals and to health support workers.
Those indicating a greater wish to reallocate their time were less likely to refer their
patients to either an allied professional or to a health support worker.
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Distress: Physicians working in practices with cost sharing arrangements
experienced greater distress than other physicians. Similar to the wish to reallocate time
measures, the ability to change organizational arrangements was significantly correlated
to distress. Physicians inclined to refer their patients to allied health care providers and
health support workers indicated less distress than other groups of physicians.
Table 6.2.2.2 Correlations Between De endent and Practice Inte ration Variables
Variable WRT WRT Distress Extrinsic Intrinsic Extrinsic Equity
(Unwght) (Weight) Tangible Intangible
Arrangement
Individual -0.136*
Share Cost 0.241 *** 0.236*** 0.153* 0.223**
Revenue -0.132* -0.134* -0.209** -0.179**
Arrangement
Appropriate
Ability to 0.159* 0.141* 0.144* 0.168* 0.146*
Change Org.
Share Records 0.182** 0.161*
Practice Group
Meetings
Role of Nursing
in Practice
Refer to Allied -0.159* -0.177** -0.145*
Health Provider
Refer to Health -0.163* -0.227*** -0.170**
Support Worker
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** P < 0.001
Equity: A number of significant correlations were seen between the overall equity
measure and practice integration variables including: practice arrangement,
appropriateness of the practice arrangement, ability to change the arrangement, and the
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practice of sharing medical records. Those physicians working in revenue sharing and
other income pooling arrangements, sharing medical records, and possessing the ability to
change the practice arrangement, expressed a greater overall perception of equity.
Among the equity sub-scales, those physicians working in practices with cost
sharing arrangements perceived less extrinsic tangible equity, while those participating in
revenue sharing and other forms of revenue pooling perceived higher levels of equity.
Those sharing medical records reported higher levels of tangible equity. This is
consistent with baseline results.
A significant correlation (p<O.05) was also found between intrinsic equity and the
ability to change the organizational arrangement. Physicians perceiving the ability to
change also perceived greater intrinsic equity. Significant correlations were also found
with referring to allied health professional and referring to health support workers.
Physicians not routinely referring patients to other health care providers indicated less
intrinsic equity in their work. Few significant relations, however, were seen between
extrinsic intangible equity and the variables relating to practice integration. Physicians in
cost sharing arrangements tended to perceive less equity.
6.2.2.3 Practice Demands
Wish-to-Reallocate-Time: Significant correlations with the unweighted time
reallocation measure included: regular working hours, percent of time spent on patient
care, time spent on teaching and research, time spent on administrative duties, proportion
of patients with personal or family problems, and the physician's ability to cope with time
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demands (Table 6.2.2.3). Physicians working longer regular hours, spending a lesser
proportion of their time on patient care and more time on teaching, research and
administration, those with a higher proportion of patients with personal problems and
those having difficulty coping with their time demands were more likely to indicate a
greater preference to reallocate their time. Similar correlations were found with the
weighted time reallocation measure.
Table 6.2.2.3 Correlations Between Dependent and Practice Demand Variables
Variable WRT WRT Distress Extrinsic Intrinsic Extrinsic Equity
(Unwght) (Weight) Tangible Intangible
Work Hours 0.179** 0.151 * 0.139* 0.146*
(not On Call)
Patient care -0.171 ** -0.167**
Teach & 0.155* 0.159*
Research
CME -0.140* -0.154*
Admin 0.217** 0.190**
Weekdays
On Call
Weekends
On Call
Clinical
Problems
Socioeconomic
Status
Personal -0.167* -0.163* -0.209** -0.166* -0.168*
Problems
Coping with 0.356*** 0.329*** 0.395*** 0.198** 0.312*** 0.143* 0.280***
Time Demands
* p < 0.05 ** P < 0.01 *** P < 0.001
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Distress: Physicians working fewer hours, those reporting a smaller proportion of
patients with personal problems, and those able to cope with time demands indicated less
distress than other groups of physicians. As with the wish to reallocate time measures, a
strong correlation was seen with the coping construct (p < 0.000; r = 0.395), indicating
those able to cope with practice demands were less likely to report distress.
Equity: Significant correlations with overall equity were limited to the percent of
time spent on maintaining knowledge and coping with time demands. Less equity was
associated with less time available for maintaining knowledge and not being able to cope
with current time demands. Coping with time demands was highly significant (p<O.OOO).
Among the equity sub-scales, the percent of time spent on maintaining knowledge
and coping with time demands were significantly related to extrinsic tangible equity.
Inequity was associated with less time available for maintaining knowledge and not being
able to cope with current time demands. For intrinsic equity, significant correlations
were found with the proportion of patients with personal problems and coping with time
demands. Physicians having a large number of patients with personal problems, and
physicians having trouble coping indicated less intrinsic equity in their work.
The strongest correlation was between intrinsic equity and coping with time
demands (p<O.OOO; r =0.312). Significant relations were also seen between extrinsic
intangible equity and the variables relating to: total regular working hours per week;
proportion of patients with personal problems; and coping with time demands. However,
none of the correlations with extrinsic intangible equity were particular strong; ranging
between 0.14 and 0.170 (p < 0.05).
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On the whole, measures of workload and time presently spent on various activities
were associated with the wish to reallocate time, indicating some concern with workload
and the current distribution of time. At this point, the proportion of patients with
personal problems (p < 0.01) and the ability of the physician to cope with time demands
(p < 0.001) were the practice demand variables most strongly associated with reported
levels of distress among physicians. While longer hours were associated with distress,
the time presently allotted to these activities was not a significant source of either distress
or inequity. An apparent lack of association may mean that, for the most part, physicians
seek to reallocate time when the workload is too demanding or when certain activities are
monopolizing their time, but the amount of work they are required to take on is not itself
strongly associated with inequity or distress.
6.2.2.4 Remuneration
Wish-to-Reallocate-Time: No significant correlations were seen between the
remuneration variables and the unweighted time reallocation measure, or the weighted
measure of wish to reallocate time (Table 6.2.2.4). Neither the method of pay, the ability
to change the method of pay, nor the process used to determine the level of remuneration
appear to be associated with the wish to reallocate time.
Distress: Physicians perceiving the process by which remuneration among
specialties was determined to be fair, indicated less distress than other groups of
physicians. As a measure of process equity, the strong association with distress gave
support for the hypothesized link between equity and distress. No significant
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correlations were observed between distress and the other remuneration variables.
Equity: Significant correlations were seen between the overall equity measure and
the method of payment, as well as the appropriateness and ability to change the method of
payment. Those physicians paid by salary or mixed method (up to 80% FFS), perceiving
their method as appropriate, yet flexible to change, also expressed greater overall
perceptions of equity. A highly significant correlation (p < 0.000) was also seen with the
perceived fairness of the process used to determine remuneration, with less overall equity
associated with a perception that the process was unfair.
Table 6.2.2.4 Correlations Between De endent and Remuneration Variables
Variable WRT WRT Distress Extrinsic Intrinsic Extrinsic Equity
(Unwght) (Weight) Tangible Intangible
Method of
-0.137* -0.138*- -0.133*
PayFFS>80%
Appropriate 0.173* 0.189**
Method of Pay
Ability to 0.149* 0.134*
Change Pay
Remuneration 0.196** 0.370*** 0.147* 0.327***
Process
* p < 0.05 ** P < 0.01 *** P < 0.001
Among the equity sub-scales, those paid by salary or mixed method (up to 80%
FFS) reported higher levels of extrinsic tangible equity. The appropriateness of the
payment method was also significantly correlated with extrinsic-tangible equity, and the
remuneration process, in particular, was strongly correlated with extrinsic intangible
equity (p < 0.000; r =0.370). A significant correlation (p<0.05) was found between
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intrinsic equity and the ability to change the method of payment, with physicians
perceiving the ability to change their method of pay reporting greater intrinsic equity.
Physicians paid primarily by fee-for-service tended to perceive less extrinsic intangible
equity (p < 0.05), and a significant relationship was also seen between extrinsic intangible
equity and the remuneration determination process (p < 0.05).
6.2.3 Dependent and Control Variables
None of the control variables correlated significantly with wish to reallocate time
or distress (Table 6.2.3). Among the equity measures, extrinsic intangible equity
correlated significantly with the number of children living at home.
Table 6.2.3 Correlations Between E uit and Control Variables
Variable
Gender
Age (years)
Spouse/partner
Children at home
1 = More than 2
Years of Practice
WRT
(Unwght)
WRT
(Weight)
Distress Extrinsic Intrinsic
Tangible
Extrinsic
Intangible
-0.192**
Equity
*p < 0.05
6.2.4 Summary of Correlation Results
** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001
Although analysis based on zero-order correlations is limited by its inability to
control for interaction and confounding by other variables, it is a useful technique for
identifying potentially important relationships. In carrying out this analysis, strong
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relationships were found between the variables representing the three main stages of the
hypothesized model (equity, distress and wish-to-reallocate time). Among the practice
condition variables, however, the strongest and largest number of relationships were seen
with the equity measures, with fewer significant relationships between the practice
variables and either distress or wish to reallocate time.
6.3 Preliminary Model Building Using Linear Regression
Following the analysis of the data using zero-order correlation, the next step was
to establish the contribution of significant variables to equity, distress and wish to
reallocate time using multiple linear regression (MLR). Regression analysis was carried
out in three stages: Stage One with equity as the dependent variable (distress and wish to
reallocate time excluded from the model); Stage Two with distress as the dependent
variable and wish to reallocate time excluded from the model; and Stage Three with wish
to reallocate time as the dependent variables and no significant or borderline significant
variables excluded from the model. Building simple linear regression models focussing
on the relationships between a number of independent and control variables and a single
dependent variable was carried out as a preliminary step to the construction of more
complex multistage models.
6.3.1 Stage One: Equity
Stage One consisted of testing the four equity scales. Each equity scale, in turn,
was used as the dependent variable with the right hand side of the model comprised of
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significant and borderline practice condition variables, significant and borderline mutable
control variables and the immutable control variables:
Equity = f(Practice Conditions, Control Variables).
Equity (overall) is a construct of eight items, including: work too hardfor
rewards received; financial compensation reflects experience; financial compensation
reflects stresses; in general the rewards for the work you do; interesting work; sense of
accomplishment; making the extra effort is worth it; and patients are appreciative. This
scale replicated the aggregate scale developed from the baseline data and proved to be
very reliable with a Cronbach's alpha ofO.8!. Together, these 8 items represented the
three facets of distributive equity, but primarily reflected the tangible extrinsic rewards
(4) and the intrinsic rewards (3) associated with perceptions of equity; only patients are
appreciative reflected intangible extrinsic rewards.
Community size and specialty were found to be significantly associated with
overall equity (Table 6.3.1). Cognitive specialists, procedural specialists, and those living
in very large communities (> 500,000) perceived greater equity than other physician
groups. Community-based and long term care services rated to be of higher quality were
also associated with greater overall equity.
The practice arrangement (p < 0.01) and the sharing of medical records (p < 0.05)
were significantly associated with overall equity. Those working in practices that did not
use a cost sharing arrangement and those sharing medical records perceived greater equity
than other physician groups. The ability to cope with time demands and the fairness of
the process used to determine remuneration were also associated with greater equity.
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Table 6 3 1 Hierarchical RegressIon: EqUIty Constructs
Dependent Variables
R
R2
Adjusted R2
n
Equity
0.662
00439
00400
204
Extrinsic
Tangible
0.556
0.321
0.293
227
Intrinsic
0.638
00407
0.366
202
Extrinsic
Intangible
00452
0.205
0.171
195
Model
Gender
Age
Living with a partner
Number of children < 18 years
Community Size => 500,000
Specialty = GP
Specialty =Cognitive
Specialty = Procedural
Group Size = 3 to 4 Doctors
Cooperation
Participation in PolicylPlanning
-0.132*
-0.227***
-0.202**
Standardized Beta Coefficients
0.147*
-0.126*
0.264***
0.187**
0.165*
0.194**
Quality Community Services
Quality Long Term Care
Arrangement =Cost Sharing
Share Medical Records
Pt: Complicated Conditions
Pt: Low socioeconomic status
Pt: PersonaUfamily problems
Coping
Method of Pay
Current method appropriate
Process Rep. Specialties
0.191**
0.173*
0.182**
0.151 *
0.265***
0.287***
* p < 0.05
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0.254***
0.163**
0.187**
0.169**
0.312***
** p < 0.01
0.230***
0.136*
-0.163**
0.290***
0.132*
0.249***
-0.172*
0.188**
*** p < 0.001
No significant contributions were made to overall equity by any of the control
variables. The physician's gender, age, marital status and number of children living at
home were not significantly associated with equity (overall).
Hierarchical regression incorporating immutable control variables and significant
practice condition variables resulted in a model with an adjusted R-squared of 0.400 .
The final model indicated that the practice environment (objective and subjective), the
level of practice integration, the remuneration process and the ability to cope, together
explained a substantial portion of the variance seen with overall equity.
Extrinsic Tangible Equity was a construct of the four items: work too hardfor
rewards received; financial compensation reflects experience; financial compensation
reflects stresses; and in general the rewards for the work you do, and replicated the scale
established at baseline.
Among practice environment variables, the quality of community services was
significantly associated with extrinsic-tangible equity (p < 0.001). Of the practice
integration variables, practice arrangement was found to make a significant contribution
(p < 0.01) with physicians in cost sharing arrangements perceiving less extrinsic-tangible
equity. Although coping with time demands was the only significant practice demand
variable, it was highly significant (p < 0.001). The remuneration variables,
appropriateness of the method of payment and the fairness of the process used to
determine remuneration were significant, with an inappropriate method of pay (p < 0.01)
and less fairness in the remuneration process (p < 0.001) strongly associated with less
extrinsic-tangible equity.
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Among the immutable control variables only gender was found to be significantly
associated with extrinsic tangible equity. Males physicians tended to perceive slightly
less extrinsic-tangible equity as compared to their female counterparts. The physician's
age, marital status or number of children living at home were not significantly associated
with extrinsic-tangible equity.
Hierarchical regression incorporating immutable control variables and significant
practice condition variables resulted in a model with an adjusted R-squared of 0.293 .
The explained variance of the final model was less than that reported for overall equity,
and contributing variables were limited to the subjective practice environment,
remuneration, the ability to cope, and gender. In particular, perceptions of tangible-
extrinsic inequity (i.e. under paid) were ·most strongly associated with the remuneration
process. Physicians perceiving the process used to establish remuneration levels as unfair
were more likely to report their own level of tangible extrinsic rewards to be inadequate
(R = 0.312; p < 0.001).
Intrinsic Equity is a construct of four items: the amount of interesting work; a
sense ofaccomplishment; making the extra effort is worth it; and the amount of trivial
work. This scale was slightly modified from baseline, appreciation ofpatients being
replaced by amount of trivial work. However, the reliability of the scale was relatively
unchanged and actually improved slightly (Cronbach' s alpha rose from 0.67 to 0.70).
A number of practice environment variables were found to be significant,
including: community size; specialty; group size; participation by physicians in local
policy and planning; and the quality community-based services. General practitioners
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(p < 0.001) and physicians in groups of 3 or 4 physicians (p < 0.01) were less likely to
perceive intrinsic equity, while those in the largest communities were more likely to
report greater intrinsic equity (p < 0.05). Greater participation (p < 0.01) and higher
quality community-based services ( p < 0.001) were also associated with higher intrinsic
equity. The strongest associations with greater intrinsic equity were seen with a specialty
designation (not a general practitioner) and a higher assessment of the quality of
community-based services.
Among practice demand and remuneration variables, the proportion of patients
with complicated clinical problems, the proportion of patients with low socioeconomic
status, the physician's ability to cope with time demands, and the fairness of the process
used to determine remuneration were all significantly related to intrinsic equity. A
greater share of clinically complicated patients (p < 0.05), a lower proportion of socially
disadvantaged patients (p < 0.01), the ability to cope (p < 0.001), and a remuneration
process perceived as fair (p < 0.05) were all associated with greater intrinsic equity.
Particularly strong was coping with time demands (p < 0.001). Among immutable
control variables, no significant relationships were observed with intrinsic equity.
Hierarchical regression resulted in a model explaining approximately 37% of
variance (adjusted R2 =0.366). The distribution of contributing variables in the intrinsic
equity model was similar to that reported for the overall equity scale, with contributions
from practice environment (objective and subjective), practice demands, and
remuneration. The one exception was practice integration where none of the items made
a significant contribution to the model.
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Extrinsic Intangible Equity is also a construct of four items: level of respect from
patients; level of respect from nurses; level of respect from administrators; and patients
are appreciative. The addition of appreciation ofpatients did not substantially improve
the reliability of the measure (Cronbach's alpha =0.58).
Among practice environment variables, significant associations were seen with
the quality of long term care services and the level of cooperation among health care
providers (Table 6.3.1). No significant associations were found between the practice
integration variables and extrinsic intangible equity. Among the practice demand
variables, only the proportion of patients with personal or family problems made a
significant contribution to extrinsic intangible equity.
The method of pay was the one remuneration variable found to make a significant
contribution. Physicians reporting more patients with personal problems, or indicating a
greater reliance on fee-for-service (more than 80 percent) as their method of payment,
were more likely to report lower extrinsic-intangible equity. Among immutable control
variables no significant relationships were with extrinsic intangible equity.
Hierarchical regression resulted in an adjusted R-squared of 0.171. The only
variables making a substantial contribution to extrinsic-intangible equity was quality of
long-term care (p < 0.001) and method of payment (p < 0.01). As such, the practice
conditions of the physician appear to have little to do in determining the perceived value
to the intangible rewards provided by patients and colleagues.
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6.3.2 Stage Two: Distress
Stage Two tested the distress scale with the right hand side of the model
comprised of the equity scales, significant and borderline practice condition variables,
significant and borderline mutable control variables and the immutable control variables:
Distress = f(Equity, Practice Conditions, Control Variables).
Distress at follow-up was a construct of five items, including: experience conflict
between home and work; experience fatigue during the day; the physician 's self-rated
level ofstress; frustration dealing with demanding patients; and feel fatigued during the
day. 2 The distress measure at follow-up was modified from baseline with feel rushed
and get enough sleep replaced by two items measuring frustration with patients and
frustration with access to services. The items removed from the baseline distress scale
eventually were incorporated in a new coping scale.
With the exception of specialty, no significant associations were found among
practice environment variables (Table 6.3.2). Technical specialists were much less likely
to experience distress compared to other specialties (p < 0.000; r =-0.260). No
significant contributions were made by the practice integration variables.
Lower levels of distress were associated with treating a greater proportion of
patients with complicated conditions (p < 0.01) and the ability to cope with time demands
(p < 0.000). No other significant associations were seen with the remuneration variables.
Significant relationships were seen between each of the three equity sub-scales and
2The four item coping scale (time to pursue hobby, time to keep up with specialty, complete work without
feeling rushed and get a full night's sleep) was entered separately as an independent variable.
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distress, with perceptions of inequity associated with greater levels of distress.
h' I Ra e .. lerarc Ica egressIon: Distress Construct
Dependent Variable Distress
R 0.649
R2 0.421
Adjusted R2 0.394
n 221
Model Standardized Beta
Coefficients
Gender
-
Age -0.112*
Living with a partner
-
Number of children < 18 years -
Specialty = Technical -0.260***
Pt: Complicated Conditions -0.144**
Coping with Time Demands 0.298***
Extrinsic Tangible 0.169**
Intrinsic 0.166**
Extrinsic Intangible 0.225***
T bl 632 H'
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001
Among control variables, a significant relationship was observed with age. Older
physicians were less likely to be distressed compared to younger physicians. Gender,
marital status and number of children were not significantly associated with distress.
Hierarchical regression resulted in an adjusted R-squared of 0.394, or explained
almost 40% of variance associated with reported levels of distress. Although a number of
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practice items had been found to be significantly associated with distress, after
controlling for perceptions of equity, most of these items disappeared from the model.
While practice conditions may affect perceptions of equity, they may only indirectly
affect the physician's level of distress. The main exception was coping with time
demands (R =0.298; p < 0.00l), which was also an important component in the equity
models (Stage One).
6.3.3 Stage Three: Wish to Reallocate Time
Stage Three consisted of testing the wish to reallocate time (WRT) scales
(unweighted and weighted). Each WRT scale was used as the dependent variable, with
the right hand side of the model containing distress, equity and significant and borderline
practice condition variables, significant and borderline mutable control variables and the
immutable control variables:
WRT = f(Distress, Equity, Practice Conditions, Control Variables)
Wish to Reallocate Time (Unweighted) was an eight item construct: solo
assessment and treatment; team-based assessment and treatment; research; teaching;
solo continuing education; group education; administration ofown practice; and
program-based administration. Based on the baseline items, the scale created from the
items used in the follow-up survey used fewer items with a wider range of responses per
item. Combined, the 8 items in this scale represented the wish to reallocate time across
four principal activities: patient care, teaching and research, continuing education and
administration. Reliability was acceptable at 0.70 (Cronbach' s alpha).
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No significant relationships were found among the practice environment or
practice integration variables (Table 6.3.3). Among the practice demand variables, the
portion of time currently spent on teaching and research (p < 0.05), the portion of time
currently spent on administration (p < 0.01), and the physician's ability to cope with time
demands (p < 0.01) were significantly related to the unweighted wish to reallocate time.
A higher portion of time spent in teaching and research or on administration, and the
inability to cope with time demands were associated with a greater wish to reallocate
time. Particularly significant was the association between distress and unweighted wish
to reallocate time (p < 0.001). Increasing distress was associated with an increasing wish
to reallocate time.
There were no significant immutable control variables indicating that the
physician's gender, age, marital status, and number of children at home were not
significantly related to the wish to reallocate time.
Hierarchical regression incorporating immutable and significant mutable control
variables, practice conditions, equity and distress resulted in an adjusted R-squared of
0.293. The explained variance was due almost entirely to distress, with additional
variance explained by coping and current time allocations. What is most noteworthy was
the total subsuming of the equity constructs, despite substantial correlations between WRT
and equity, supporting the role of distress as an intervening variable.
Wish to Reallocate Time (Weighted) consisted of four, two-item constructs
representing patient care, teaching and research, maintaining knowledge, and
administration adjusted to reflect the relative amount of time currently devoted to each
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activity. The objective was to give greater weight to the wish to reallocate time to those
areas constituting the larger portion of the physician's time.
(WRT)W' h R 11h' I Ra e .. Ierarc Ica egresSIon: IS to ea ocate Ime
Dependent Variables WRT WRT
(unweighted) (weighted)
R 0.563 0.582
R2 0.317 0.339
Adjusted R2 0.293 0.304
n 235 202
Model Standardized Beta Coefficients
Gender
- -
Age
- -
Living with a partner - -
Number of children < 18 years - -
Specialty =Procedural - -0.197**
Revenue Sharing/Other - -0.177**
Arrangement is Appropriate - -0.183**
Hours Worked per Week - 0.195**
Portion of Time TeachinglResearch 0.111 * -
Portion of Time Administration 0.180** -
Coping 0.161* -
Distress 0.397*** 0.395***
T bl 633 H'
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001
Among the practice environment variables, a very significant relationship was
seen with specialty (p < 0.01), with procedural specialists indicating a greater wish to
reallocate their time. Among the practice integration variables, very significant
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contributions to the model were associated with the practice arrangement and
appropriateness of the practice arrangement (p < 0.01). Those working in a practice with
revenue sharing or some other form of income pooling arrangement, and those perceiving
the current practice arrangement to be inappropriate, indicated a greater wish to reallocate
their time. Finally, higher levels of distress were associated with a greater wish to
reallocate time. As with the unweighted time measure, a very significant relationship was
seen with distress (p<O.OO1).
Among the immutable control variables no significant relationships were seen
with the weighted wish to reallocate time measure. The physician's gender, age, marital
status, and number of children at home were not significantly associated.
Hierarchical regression resulted in a slightly higher adjusted R-squared of 0.304
compared to the unweighted wish to reallocate time measure. More importantly,
weighting the scale caused different practice condition variables to become significant.
However, the relative contribution of distress remained virtually the same and equity still
did not contribute to the explained variance.
6.3.4 Summary of Preliminary Model Building Using Linear Regression
The relationships established by simple linear regression support the multistage
model presented in Figure 6. The simple regression models found that practice
conditions, such as environment, level of integration and remuneration were primarily
associated with equity. Equity was also associated with the physician's ability to cope
with time demands. Distress was explained primarily by equity and coping. In turn,
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wish-to-reallocate time was associated with distress and coping. Although preliminary
analysis showed a relationship between equity and the wish to reallocate time, once
distress and coping were introduced into the model, the relationship was no longer
significant.
Environment
(Subjective)
Environment
(Objective)
Practice
Integration
Distress
Wish to
Reallocate
Time
Remuneration
Process is Fair
Coping With
Time Demands
Time Currently
Allotted
to Admin
Figure 6: Model Suggested By Simple Linear Regression
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While the simple regression models pointed toward a multi-stage model, more
complex, sequential relationships could not be tested using simple linear regression.
However, the results of the regression analyses, and the constructs on which the
dependent variables were based, could be used as the basis for building a multi-stage
model to be tested using structural equation modelling (SEM).
6.4 Modelling the Equity-Distress-Wish to Reallocate Time Pathway
Multiple linear regression supported the proposed model when the hypothesized
stages of the model were being considered individually. Now that the entire model was
being considered, structural equation modelling (SEM) was the next logical step in the
model building process. Essentially a combining of regression and factor analysis
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996), SEM allowed for the simultaneous consideration of all the
model stages and pathways.3
SEM also allows the construction of latent variables which can potentially capture
more of the variance found in the model (Kline, 1998; Maruyama, 1998). To better
capture the contribution of individual items and sub-scales, latent variables (as opposed to
the constructs used in earlier analysis) were created for: distributive equity; wish to
reallocate time; local health care system; wish to reallocate professional time; and wish
to reallocate administrative time (these variables will be described in more detail as they
are introduced into the model).
3 Factor analysis has already been used to create valid and reliable measures and multiple linear regression
identified statistically significant and parsimonious models for each stage in the hypothesized model.
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Initially, SEM was used to construct a model of the main pathway between equity,
distress and the wish to reallocate time (the main pathway). It was critical to establish the
strength of this hypothesized pathway (a priori) before any subsequent analysis would be
possible.4 Based on the strength of the main pathway relationships, a more complex
model involving practice conditions variables was carried out in three stages: distributive
equity as the dependent variable (Stage 1); distress as the dependent variable (Stage 2);
and wish to reallocate time as the dependent variable (Stage 3).
SEM is used primarily to confirm hypothesized pathways, but can also be used for
exploratory analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Although guided by a conceptual
model and relationships established by linear regressions, SEM was used both as a
confirmatory and as an exploratory method of analysis in this study.
6.4.1 The Main Pathway Model
Prior to constructing the SEM model, the relationships between the main pathway
constructs were exampled using a correlation matrix (Table 6.4.1.1). Good correlations
were seen between the three equity constructs, and between the four wish to reallocate
time constructs. Strong correlations were also seen between the equity constructs and
distress, and between the wish to reallocate time and distress. Relatively weaker, and in
4 Unlike the earlier regression analysis, which used only complete cases, SEM will include cases with
missing data. This presents the possibility of introducing bias if missing data was not randomly dispersed. To
determine the significance of this threat to the validity of the SEM analysis, a model of all significant pathways
identified in linear regression was constructed using SEM. With the exception of an insignificant relationship
between the distress construct and age of the physician (p = 0.069), all relationships established by regression
analysis continued to be significant under SEM using all 240 available cases (Appendix 3). The persistence of these
significant relationships in the analysis supports the position that the missing data were randomly dispersed and will
not produce systematic bias in subsequent SEM analysis.
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some cases insignificant, correlations were observed between equity and wish to
reallocate time. Taken together, these correlations supported creating two latent variables
(Distributive Equity and Wish-to-Reallocate-Time) and the creation of a multi-stage
model of the equity to distress to wish to reallocate time pathway.
varIa es use In maIn pat way constructs n=
Distributive Equity Wish to Reallocate Time
Constructs Extrinsic Intrinsic Extrinsic Distress SP HTL KS PM
Tangible Intangible
Extrinsic Tangible (0.78)
Intrinsic Equity 0.429*** (0.70)
Extrinsic Intangible 0.347*** 0.284*** (0.58)
Distress 0.388*** 0.397*** 0.330*** (0.74)
Scholarly Practitioner 0.103 0.081 0.184** 0.245*** (0.68)
Health Team Member 0.135* 0.227*** 0.053 0.308*** 0.230*** (0.53)
Knowledge Seeker 0.139* 0.191** 0.177** 0.282*** 0.252*** 0.223** (0.78)
Practice Manager 0.220** 0.230*** 0.091 0.412*** 0.145* 0.226*** 0.172** (0.78)
Table 6.4.1: Inter-correlations and internal consistencies (Cronbach' s alphas) for
. bl d . h ( 240)
* p < 0.05 **p<O.OI *** p < 0.001
The latent variable, distributive equity, is based on the three equity sub-scales,
described in detail in Methods (p. 113-114). Fours items: pay reflects stress, pay reflects
experience, equity of rewards and work too hardfor rewards received, loaded into the
construct (Cronbach's alpha = 0.78) designated "extrinsic tangibles". Fours items:
interesting work, sense ofaccomplishment, extra effort worth the effort, and trivial
activity, formed the second construct designated "intrinsic intangible" (Cronbach' s alpha
= 0.70). The final four items, three dealing with respect from others and appreciation of
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patients, loaded into the third construct designated "extrinsic intangibles".
The latent variable, wish-to-reallocate-time, contained four sub-scales described
in Methods (pages 122-125). Three items (research, teaching, providing patient care
alone) in the first scale reflect the scholarly practitioner, with a reliability of 0.68
(Cronbach's alpha). The second scale (the knowledge seeker) consisted of two items
(reading journal, clinical rounds). The third scale (the practice manager) also consisted of
2 items (completing paperwork, meetings and reports). Both scales produced reliability
of 0.78 (Cronbach's alpha). The three remaining items (teamwork, communicating,
counseling) made up the fourth and final scale (the health team member) with a reliability
of 0.53 (Cronbach's alpha).
The Main Pathway model (Figure 7) is conceptually limited in that it does not
consider the contribution of practice conditions, however, it does allow for the
examination of the fundamental relationship between equity, distress and wish to
reallocate. SEM produced strong pathway coefficients between the three main pathway
constructs. All relationships in the model were highly significant (p < 0.000). The
correlation (R) between distributive equity and distress was 0.61 and explained 380/0 of
the variance associated with distress (R2). In tum, the correlation between distress and
the wish to reallocate time was also strong (0.71), explaining 50% of variance.
The latent variable, distributive equity, was significantly and strongly related to
each of the equity sub-scales. Correlations were 0.50 for extrinsic intangible equity, 0.63
for intrinsic equity, and 0.66 for extrinsic tangible equity. As with earlier analysis,
extrinsic intangible equity is relatively weak but still significant.
193
R~.25
R' •.50
Wish to
Reallocate
Time
Distributive
Equity
DISTRESS ..-@
Intrinsic
Equity
Practice
Manager
Extrinsic
Intangible '-."
R~.4o
Extrinsic &
Tangible
~~ .15
/:;L.J Scholarly ,o 'Practitioner
R~ .21
~Knowledge
~ I Seeker I
f!.; .27
fA Health Tea
~ Member
RoO, .18
Figure 7: Main Pathway Structural Equation Model
Note 1: Values inside circles represent path coefficients
Note 2: All critical ratios are highly significant (p< 0.001)
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The wish to reallocate time sub-scales were significantly and strongly related to
the latent variable: wish to reallocate time. Correlations were 0.38 for scholarly
practitioner, 0.42 for knowledge seeker, 0.46 for health team leader, and 0.52 for practice
manager. As with earlier analysis, the items associated with scholarly practitioners
produced the weakest association.
The Main Pathway Model produced Goodness-of-Fit statistics well within
accepted limits (Appendix 4). The Norm Fit Index and Incremental Fit Index indicated a
good fit relative to the worst possible model, and the P value was not significant
(p = 0.175). Discrepancy per degree of freedom was within the accepted limit of less than
2, and the Hoelter 0.05 Index (294) was greater than the minimum sample size. In
addition, P for Test of Close Fit was good at 0.718 (1.00 = best possible fit). The
RMSEA (0.028) was very low, with even the upper bound indices within the desired
range « 0.05). All indices indicate a valid model with excellent fit.
Critical ratios for all the model parameters (the parameter estimate divided by the
standard error of the parameter) were highly significant (p =0.000), indicating that the
model's good fit and explained variance was due to the variance captured by the items
used in the model, rather than due to excessively large error terms.
6.4.2 Stage ONE Model: Equity and Practice Conditions
Building the Stage One Model began with the variables identified by simple
regression, using the latent variable, distributive equity, as the dependent variable. The
variables tested included a range of items that were significantly associated with at least
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one of the equity scales. In building a model reflecting the relationships anticipated
between equity, practice conditions, and physician characteristics, significant associations
(p < 0.000) were found between distributive equity and the state of local health care,
coping with time demands and fairness of the remuneration process (Figure 8).
The model produced acceptable Goodness-of-Fit statistics (Appendix 5). The
Norm Fit Index and Incremental Fit Index indicated a good fit relative to the worst
possible model, and the P value was not significant (p =0.062). Discrepancy per degree
of freedom was within the accepted limit of less than 2, and the Hoelter 0.05 Index (247)
was greater than the minimum sample size. In addition, P for Test of Close Fit was
moderate at 0.463 (1.00 = best possible fit). The RMSEA was acceptable (0.050).
In the process of fitting the data to the proposed model, it became apparent that a
number of subjective environmental items were significantly associated with distributive
equity. State oflocal health care system was a latent variable created from three of these
items: efficiency of the system; the accessibility of hospital services; and the quality of
community-based health services. Coping was an exogenous construct of four items with
an acceptable reliability of 0.64 previously developed and tested. The process measure
was a single survey item measuring the fairness of the process used to determine the
remuneration of various specialties.
The correlation (R) between state of local health system and distributive equity
was very good (0.59), explaining 35% of the variance (R2) associated with equity. The
correlation between equity and coping (0.30), and between equity and the fairness of the
remuneration process (0.314), were somewhat less but still good. Together, the three
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Figure 8: Stage ONE Structural Equation Model
Note 1: Values inside circles represent path coefficients
Note 2: Values inside squares represent covariant correlations
Note 3: All critical ratios are highly significant (p< 0.001)
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variables explained 60% of the variance associated with equity.
Critical ratios for all intercept and mean parameters were highly significant
(p < 0.000). The relationship between the three independent variables were also
examined by estimating covariances. None of the pathways were found to be significant,
however, the pathways were retained to allow the model to compensate for minor inter-
item correlations.
6.4.3 Stage TWO Model: Distress, Equity and Practice Conditions
Distress (a five item construct) was used as the dependent variable in the next
stage in the model building process. As with the Stage One, variables found to be
significant using simple regression were introduced into the model. Given the presence
of the items identified by the Stage One Model, however, no new items, with the
exception of distress, were added to the model (Figure 9)
The Stage Two Model produced acceptable Goodness-of-Fit statistics
(Appendix 6). The Norm Fit Index and Incremental Fit Index indicated a good fit relative
to the worst possible model, and the P value was not significant (p =0.113). Discrepancy
per degree of freedom was within the accepted limit of less than 2, and the Hoelter 0.05
Index (269) was greater than the minimum sample size. In addition, P for Test of Close
Fit was good at 0.668 (1.00 =best possible fit). The RMSEA (0.040) was less than 0.05.
The addition of distress produced a model that was a good fit, and a slight improvement
over the indices reported for the Stage One model.
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Note 1: Values inside circles represent path coefficients
Note 2: Values inside squares represent covariant correlations
Note 3: All critical ratios are highly significant (p< 0.001)
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In addition to the very strong association with distributive equity (p < 0.000;
R = 0.51), a significant association was seen between distress and coping with practice
demands (p < 0.000; R = 0.22). Together, distributive equity and coping with time
demands explained 38% of the variance associated with distress. Critical ratios for all
intercept and mean parameters were highly significant (p < 0.000), indicating fit was not
due to large error terms. Although not significant, the existing covariant pathways (Stage
One Model) were retained to compensate for minor inter-item correlations.
6.4.4 Stage THREE Model: WRT, Distress, Equity and Practice Conditions
The addition of the latent variable, wish-to-reallocate time represented the final
stage of the model building process. As with previous stages, variables significantly
associated with the wish to reallocate time constructs were tested for inclusion in the
model. However, the building of the third stage of the model proved more contentious
than either the Stage One or Stage Two models, requiring a refinement of the model first
hypothesized and then supported by regression analysis (Figure 6).
6.4.4.1 The Initial Stage Three Model
The Initial Stage Three Model, incorporated the single latent variable, wish to
reallocate time (WRT), based on the four sub-scales: Scholarly Practitioner, Health Team
Member, Knowledge Seeker, and Practice Manager (Figure 10).
With the addition of WRT, a significant (p < 0.000) and substantial (R = 0.58)
association was seen with distress (Appendix 7). This association was comparable to the
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association seen with the Main Pathway model (Figure 7), though slightly weaker.
Significant associations were also found with: coping with time demands (p < 0.002), and
time currently allocated to administrative activities (p < 0.001). The correlation between
coping and WRT (R = 0.28), and between time allotted to administrative activity and
WRT (0.27) contributed equally to explaining WRT variance (R2). Distress and the two
exogenous variables explained 66 percent of the variance associated with the wish to
reallocate time. Only one covariance was found to be significant; the remuneration
process and time allocated to administrative activities ( R =0.171), with more time in
administration associated with less fairness in the remuneration process (p < 0.009).
Again, insignificant covariant pathways were retained.
This model produced mixed Goodness-of-Fit statistical results (Appendix 7).
Although the Norm Fit Index and Incremental Fit Index indicated a good fit, the P value
was significant (p =0.039). However, a significant P value is not itself an indicator of
poor fit as the value is affected by the size of the sample (Arbuckle and Wothke, 1999).
Both the P for Test of Close Fit (0.860) and the RMSEA value (0.037) were within
acceptable limits, and the Hoelter 0.05 Index (247) was greater than the minimum sample
size limit of 200.
Of greater concern was the fact that the critical ratios for two of the wish to
reallocate time parameters were not significant, indicating a higher than acceptable level
of error; Knowledge Seeker (p = 0.059) and Practice Manager (p = 0.686). Based on
these results, the model was rejected and an alternative model had to be considered.
201
R~.26
I I r-::,
Quality of Care ~
Community-based I
Access to
Hospital Care
®
.51
«"""- .37
R1;..27
Health System
Efficiency
~ -I Practice~I Manager
------'
Remuneration J
Process is Fair
--, ~
@ )w
1--~OPing Wit~I
(~ I 1<~ .38 @ /j Time Demands J.~J Di;ress j~/ /' J~~---)_17
___P.:_.. l....,2 1________ I UQJ
G\-j@j8\0 I @ ~
'L 1 Time AIIo~ted I
" {<·.66,1 ~ . to Admin
-----.., ----
Wish to ~
Reallocate
Time
I
(~\-.J Extrinsic &
e; I Intangible
-------'
~, I4=~
r::::LJ Extrinsic &~-I__T_a_n_g_ib_le_-J
Figure 10: Initial Stage THREE Structural Equation Model
Notel: Values inside circles represent path coefficients
Note 2: Values inside squares represent covariant correlations
Note 3: Except where indicated (e9 & elO) all critical ratios are highly significant (p< 0.001)
202
6.4.4.2 Alternative Stage Three Model
Given the critical ratio of the scale, Practice Manager, it was removed from the
latent variable and introduced into the model as a measured construct. The WRT latent
variable, reduced to three components (Scholarly Practitioner, Health Team Member and
Knowledge Seeker), was renamed Wish to Reallocate Professional Time (WRPT).
The Alternative Stage Three Model (Figure 11) produced much better Goodness-
of-Fit statistics (Appendix 8). The Norm Fit Index (0.991) and Incremental Fit Index
(0.998) indicated a good fit and the P value was not significant (p = 0.088). Discrepancy
per degree of freedom (1.241) was within the accepted limit of less than 2, and the
Hoelter 0.05 Index (251) was greater than the minimum sample size. In addition, P for
Test of Close Fit was excellent at 0.927 (1.00 =best possible fit). The RMSEA (0.032)
was less than 0.05. Indices were similar to, and in some cases better than, those reported
for the Stage Two model.
In addition to the associations and pathways established with equity (Stage 1) and
distress (Stage 2), significant relationships were found between distress and both the
latent (R =0.44) and the exogenous (R =0.39) time reallocation variables.
With the conceptual split in wish to reallocate time between professional and
administrative activities, new model pathways emerged. Coping with time demands
correlated somewhat higher with WRPT, but not at all with Practice Manager. Not
surprisingly, time currently allocated to administrative tasks was related to Practice
Manager (p < 0.000), with more time associated with a greater wish to reallocate that
time, but was not associated with WRPT. Combined, distress and the coping explained
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38 percent of the variance associated with WRPT. Distress and time for administrative
activities explained 23 percent of variance associated with Practice Manager.
R~ .21 ~t\26
,---.1--:"""--, Quality of Care ~....@
Community-based I
~ .~
State of local
Health Care System'/llllr:::::::::_
R.1;.53
Intrinsic
Equity
R~.27
Extrinsic &
Tangible
Distress
~; .19
®1 Scholarly .44Practitioner @
t:..39
R; .19
~ HealthTeam Wish toMember ReallocateTime
lJ,;.33@ @@-1 Knowledge rSeekerI
R'; .2;@
~J Extrinsic & r'I Intangible
-----'
@1
....'-----
Figure 11: Alternative Stage THREE Structural Equation Model
Note 1: Values inside circles represent path coefficients
Note 2: Values inside squares represent covariant correlations
Note 3: Except where indicated (e9 & d4) all critical ratios are highly significant (p< 0.001)
204
However, in the Alternative Stage Three Model, problems continued with the
critical ratios of the intercepts. Although the removal of Practice Manager appeared to
improve Knowledge Seeker within the new WRPT variable (p < 0.021), Practice Manager
was still not significant (p =0.948). Despite the favourable Goodness-of-Fit indices, the
Alternative Stage Three Model was also rejected in favour of a third and final model.
6.4.4.3 Final Stage Three Model
As a further extension of the conceptual separation between Professional and
Administrative activities, the original 5 point scales measuring the wish to change the
time allotted to: 1) practice paperwork; and 2) attending meetings and writing reports
(Appendix 2: Follow-up Questionnaire), were used to create a new latent variable. Wish
to Reallocate Administrative Time (WRAT). WRAT was analysed along with WRPT as
two separate endpoints in the model.
The Final Stage Three Model (Figure 12) produced very good Goodness-of-Fit
statistics (Appendix 9). The Norm Fit Index (0.991) and Incremental Fit Index (0.999)
indicated a good fit, and the P value was not significant (p =0.112). Discrepancy per
degree of freedom (1.196) was within the accepted limit of less than 2, and the Hoelter
0.05 Index (255) was greater than the minimum sample size. In addition, P for Test of
Close Fit was excellent at 0.965 (1.00 =best possible fit), and the RMSEA (0.029) was
less than 0.05, with even the upper bound limit less than the 0.05 level of significance.
Indices were similar to, and in some cases better than, those reported for the Stage Two
model.
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The pathways previously reported as significant were still significant in the Final
Stage Three model. Combined, distress and coping continued to explained 39 percent of
the variance associated with WRPT. Distress and time allotted to administrative
activities explained 20 percent of variance associated with WRAT. Perhaps more
importantly, critical ratios for all intercept, mean, and variance parameters were
significant. With the exception of Knowledge Seeker which was significant (p =0.021),
all parameters were highly significant (p =0.000).
6.4.5 Summary
The goodness-of-fit statistics for the main pathway model and each stage of the
model building process are summarized in Table 6.4.5. For the most part, the
relationships and contributions of significant exogenous variables and latent variables
using SEM were consistent with those found in the various linear regression models.
SEM was superior to MLR analysis in that it allowed the hypothesized complexity of the
relationships between: practice conditions, equity, distress and wish to reallocate time, to
be more fully explored and expressed.
Because of the ability of SEM to remove error from the model, there is the
possibility that the relationship between the latent variables: wish to reallocate time
(professional and administrative), equity, local health care system, and other exogenous
variables have been overstated. Conversely, the relationship may have been understated
in earlier regression models due to the weak reliability of some of the constructs.
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Goodness-of-Fit Good Fit Main Path Stages 1 Stages 2 Stage 3 Stage 3 Stages 3
Indices Values Initial Alternative Final
Discrepancy - 24.585 25.481 30.234 88.696 83.164 94.514
Degrees of Freedom - 19 16 22 67 67 79
P >0.05 0.175 0.062 0.113 0.039 0.088 0.112
Number of Parameters 25 28 32 52 52 56
Discrepancy / df < 2.0 1.294 1.593 1.374 1.324 1.241 1.196
Normed Fit Index 1.000 0.996 0.996 0.995 0.991 0.991 0.991
Incremental Fit Index 1.000 0.999 0.998 0.999 0.998 0.998 0.999
Parsimony Ratio 0.000 0.528 0.444 0.489 0.638 0.638 0.658
FO <0.05 0.023 0.040 0.034 0.091 0.068 0.065
FOLower 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000
FO Upper 0.094 0.114 0.112 0.210 0.182 0.184
RMSEA <0.05 0.035 0.050 0.040 0.037 0.032 0.029
RMSEALower 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000
RMSEA Upper 0.070 0.085 0.071 0.056 0.052 0.048
P for Test of Close Fit 1.000 0.718 0.463 0.668 0.860 0.927 0.965
Hoelter 0.05 Index >200 294 247 269 235 251 255
Hoelter 0.01 Index >200 352 301 319 261 279 282
T bl 645 S
In addressing these concerns, commentators have been somewhat equivocal about
the use and limitations of SEM and of latent variables. However, Maruyama (1998)
observed,
"... the logic of reliability correction is the heart of multiple-indicator,
latent variable SEM. Those techniques ... produce a generally effective
way in which to address problems of random error by estimating reliability
in terms of the specified model."
Basics ofStructural Equation Modelling, p. 87.
Given concerns about the reliability of some of the constructs associated with this
study, specifically health team member and extrinsic intangible equity, the use of latent
variables would seem to be an appropriate method by which to improve reliability and to
prevent the understating of important relationships. The potential for overstating
relationships must be acknowledged, but should not preclude the empirical exploration of
these relationships using latent variable SEM .
Based on analysis using linear regression and structural equation modelling, there
is support for the hypothesized multi-stage model of the relationship between equity,
distress and the physician's wish to reallocate time. Practice conditions make a
contribution to the relationship, but for the most part its affects occur in relation to the
perception of equity, only indirectly affecting distress and the wish to reallocate time.
The exceptions were: coping with time demands, which was also associated with distress
and the wish to reallocate professional time; and time allocated to administrative
activities, which was associated with the wish to reallocate administrative time.
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7 Discussion
The overall objective of the study was to model the pathway between equity,
distress and the wish to reallocate time, and to determine the contribution of practice
conditions to this model. Previous modelling of the relationship between wish to
reallocate time and equity had not considered distress as an intervening variable, but
looked only at the relationship between equity and wish to reallocate time
(Dobson, 1997). Analysis using structural equation modelling provided strong evidence
of a pathway from equity to wish to reallocate time, with distress serving as the
intervening or intermediate step.
The validity of the main pathway of equity, distress and wish to reallocate time is
supported empirically by the work of VanDierendonck et al. (1994, 1996), and Bakker et
ale (2000) in their investigations of the relationship between patient demands and
attitudes, perceptions of equity among general practitioners, and emotional withdrawal by
these physicians from their patients. However, their research did not consider the
potential for physicians to reallocate their time or how practice conditions, aside from the
attitudes and demands of patients, might affect perceptions of equity and the distress that
unresolved inequity can produce.
Understanding the process by which physicians seek to allocate their time is
especially relevant at a time when the health care system is attempting to redefine the role
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of physicians and other health care providers (Fyke, 2001). Due to the key position
occupied by physicians within the system, finding ways to support the appropriate
allocation of the physician's time will be essential to insuring the efficient delivery of
quality health care (Morrison, 2000). By identifying practice conditions that support
physician equity and the best allocation of their time, it may be possible for physicians to
achieve professional and personal objectives in a manner that is congruent with broader
health system objectives.
7.1 Equity and Practice Conditions
Hypothesis I: Controlling for physician characteristics, there is no significant association
between practice conditions and perceptions of equity among physicians:
Equity :;t f(Practice Conditions, Control Variables)
The Objective Practice Environment: The literature suggested objective
environmental factors, such as community size, location, ownership, and group size
might affect intrinsic and extrinsic rewards, thus contributing to the perception of equity
(Eisenberg, 1994). This association was only partially supported by these findings.
Significant relationships were seen between intrinsic equity and community size
(p < 0.05), specialty designation (p < 0.001), and group size (p < 0.01). Significant
associations with extrinsic equity (tangible or intangible) were limited to sponsorship
(p < 0.05) sponsorship with extrinsic tangible equity .
Smaller centres often lack the infrastructure and resources to allow physicians the
opportunity to treat more interesting and complex cases (Shride, 1997; Eisenberg, 1994;
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Riley et aI., 1991; Morrisey et aI., 1991; Langwell et aI., 1987); therefore, the perceived
lack of intrinsic equity in smaller centres, relative to larger centres, is not surprising. For
many years, researchers and policy makers have been aware of the practice of patients
"leap-frogging" or by-passing services available in their community in favour of
travelling to larger centres (Lepnurm & Lepnurm, 2001; Murray & Warren, 1986). Not
only has this caused access problems in larger centres and the under utilization of services
in smaller centres, but may be contributing to lower levels of intrinsic equity for
physicians working in the smaller communities.
While there may be some disparity between small and large centres, the content of
medical work is essentially the same in terms of the intrinsic benefits physicians receive
relative to the work carried out across most communities in Saskatchewan and British
Columbia (p < 0.05). In terms of intrinsic equity, only the very largest urban centre
(i.e. Vancouver) differed from other communities. These findings are supported by the
work of Ritchie et ale (1999), who found that urban surgeons had similar workloads to
"rural" surgeons. Urban surgeons were seen to perform a few more tertiary-type
procedures than their rural counterparts, with rural surgeons performing more total
procedures (Ritchie et aI., 1999).
Self-selection may explain the relative homogeneity of responses based on
community size. Physicians, inclined to seek out positions offering more interesting and
challenging patients, are more likely to possess greater skills and competencies than their
less accomplished colleagues (Longest, 1996). Given the mobility enjoyed by Canadian
physicians (Ryten et aI., 1998), opportunities to move to a larger centre invariably exist
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for more skilled physicians. In effect, many physicians are in a position to pursue and
obtain sufficiently challenging and interesting work that is commensurate with their
abilities and need for accomplishment.
Despite efforts to provide additional financial incentives and other tangible
benefits to physicians in smaller centres, physicians working in these smaller centres did
not assess their extrinsic tangible equity to be greater than that of their "big city"
colleagues. This is consistent with other research which found physicians place little
weight on financial rewards when deciding to locate to a smaller centre (Lin et aI., 1997).
Greater weight is given by physicians to less tangible factors, such as spousal opinion,
time off and collegial interaction (Lin et al., 1997). Current remuneration policies appear
to be sufficient to the extent that physicians perceived equity of extrinsic tangible rewards
to be similar regardless of community size.
The effects of a single public payer for physician services and widely held social
attitudes among other stakeholders toward physicians may also explain the lack of
significant differences in extrinsic equity between communities of different sizes. With
some exceptions, primarily new physicians in over-serviced areas (Levine, 1997), a single
payer system has meant that the same fee is collected for the same procedure or activity
regardless of where it occurs within a province. Although the effort required to carry out
these tasks may differ across communities (Hamilton, 1995), it does not appear to be
sufficient to cause a significant difference in the perceptions of physicians about the
fairness of extrinsic tangible rewards. Although respect and appreciation for physicians
may be declining (Hafferty & Light, 1995), it would appear, as perceived by physicians,
213
that these extrinsic intangible attributes are similar, regardless of community size.
Not surprisingly, general practitioners indicated significantly less intrinsic equity
compared to specialists (p < 0.001). Due to their own attitudes and training, changing
patient expectations, and more limited access to diagnostic services, general practitioners
often find it necessary to refer more complex (and often more interesting) patients to their
more specialized colleagues (Montouris, 2000; Allery et al., 1997; Howe, 1996).
Technical specialists, such as anesthesiologists, pathologists and radiologists, also
reported more intrinsic equity compared to other physicians induding cognitive
specialists, procedural specialists, and general practitioners (p < 0.01).
Particularly interesting was the lack of association between specialty and extrinsic
tangible equity. Financial rewards have historically favoured specialists, especially
procedural specialists (Schroeder, 1992). Significant differences were anticipated, but
were not found in this study. The lack of a significant difference between general
practitioners and other specialist groups may indicate a shift in the relative financial
rewards of these physicians, with less disparity between groups. This is not to say that
general practitioners are better rewarded for their efforts than in the past. Instead, it may
indicate that specialists now perceive a similar balance or imbalance between their inputs
and these extrinsic tangible rewards.
Alternatively, the higher incomes enjoyed by physicians compared to other
professional groups (Rosen, 1989), and the increasing demands placed on all health care
professionals (Buchan, 1999; Corey-Lisle et aI, 1999; Boon, 1998), may help to offset
perceptions of financial inequity between the different physician specialty groups.
214
Being part of a practice group rather than a solo practitioner was associated with
higher ratings for intrinsic equity (p < 0.01). The benefits of working in a group may be
due to its effect on the workload, the call schedule, and professional interaction, as well
as lifestyle and the time available for family activities (Langwell et aI., 1987).
The size of the practice group was also seen to be important. Physicians in groups
of 5 to 7 reported higher intrinsic equity than other group sizes (p < 0.05). At the same
time, groups of 3 to 4 physicians indicated less intrinsic equity than other groups,
including "groups" of only one or two practitioners (p < 0.01). Although cognitive
specialists were more likely to practice in a large group, no differences were seen between
groups, based on specialty, that might explain group size differences in intrinsic equity.
As well, the distribution of groups of 3 to 4 physicians, and groups of 5 to 7 physicians
were the same for communities of more than 500,000 and those less than 500,000. In
addition to group size being associated with intrinsic equity, there is also an optimal
group size for the medical practice of between 5 to 7 physicians.
A possible explanation may be that smaller practice groups are less able to employ
economies of scale, limiting their capacity to delegate activities to support staff compared
to larger practice groups (Williams et aI, 1997). With a smaller number of physicians in
the group, less intrinsically rewarding tasks are harder to avoid (Woodward et aI., 1996;
Breslau et aI., 1978), and by necessity must be performed by the physicians who make up
the practice group.
The Subjective Practice Environment: For many Canadians, the funding
constraints of the 1990s adversely affected their perceptions about the state of the health
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care system (CCHSE, 2000). Health care workers are no different, and physicians, in
particular, have voiced their concerns regarding declining quality and poorer access
(Hamilton, 1995). The physician's assessment of the state of the local health care system
was expected to make a significant contribution to both intrinsic and extrinsic equity
perceptions. This association is also suggested by Arnetz (1997, 1999), who found that
the actual work environment was important in determining how physicians perceived
their workload and working conditions.
Whether assessed in terms of efficiency, access, quality of services, cooperation
among health care providers, or the level of participation in local health policy and
planning, the study found that items used to measure the state of the local health care
system, as perceived and reported by the study physicians, were significantly related to
distributive equity. Unlike objective environmental characteristics, such as group size or
ownership, these associations were similar across intrinsic, extrinsic tangible and
extrinsic intangible equity. The physician's perceptions of the local health care system,
particularly the quality of services, were strongly related to equity perceptions.
Practice Integration: In recent years, physicians have begun to move away from
the fee-for-service, stand alone medical practice (Frank et ai, 1997; Kletke et aI., 1996).
More physicians are seeking the security of a salaried income and the support provided by
large, integrated health care organizations (Montague, 1994). Although the traditional
cost sharing arrangement was the most common form of practice arrangement among
survey respondents, it was significantly associated with less tangible extrinsic equity
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The manner in which physicians organize themselves to share practice costs and
revenues affects their perception of extrinsic equity. This finding is supported by the
presence of an association between practice arrangement and extrinsic equity. Physicians
indicating a cost sharing arrangement indicated less extrinsic tangible equity (p < 0.001)
and less extrinsic intangible equity (p < 0.05). No association was found between
practice arrangement and intrinsic equity. The present trend toward more economically
integrated practice arrangements may contribute to a better balance between physician
inputs and outcomes derived from external sources, but is not associated with the intrinsic
value of the work of physicians. Physicians appeared to link the content of their work to
how they arranged themselves to deal with the economic aspects of the practice.
A great deal of debate has centred around the use of other health professions to
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the health care system by reducing the
inappropriate utilization of physician services (Buknoda, 1996; Bezjak, 1987; Temkin-
Greener, 1983). Within the medical profession, some physicians view the greater use of
these "substitutes" with some trepidation (Barton et aI., 1999); perceiving these
increasingly influential groups as an economic threat, as well as a threat to clinical
autonomy. Among the physicians responding to the survey, greater intrinsic equity was
associated with a higher rate of referral to other health care providers (p < 0.05), as well
as health support workers, such as psychologists and social workers (p < 0.01).
Perhaps, physicians who choose to use, or have access to, other service providers
are better able to delegate less intrinsically rewarding activities, or activities requiring
greater effort. If the concerns of physicians about the use other provider groups as the
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principle health care provider can be dealt with successfully, both the patient and the
physician could benefit.
Practice Demands: Given the contribution of inputs to the perception of equity
(Major & Testa, 1989), one would anticipate a strong association between practice
demands and equity (Lawler & Q'Gara, 1969). Therefore, the general lack of association
was somewhat surprising. Total hours of work and time spent on continuing medical
education showed only a weak association, and although the proportion of patients with
personal problems was associated with the level of equity (p < 0.05), the contribution of
practice demands, per se, was relatively minor.
This lack of association might be explained by the fact that a demanding practice
may be more involving, and therefore, may be intrinsically more interesting to the
physician (Ben-Sira, 1986). Practice demands are certainly perceived by some physicians
as a positive, rather than a negative aspect of being a physician. A more demanding
practice may also serve as a signal to some physicians that the need for medical services
is great, giving them a greater sense of accomplishment (Huseman et aI., 1987). In this
case, ambiguity over the assigning of a practice demand, either an input or as a reward,
may explain the lack of association with equity.
Alternatively, the weak association between equity and various practice demands
might be due to physicians adopting a psychological strategy for restoring equity (Walster
& Walster, 1975). When confronted with substantial barriers to change, a person in
distress may attempt to redefine the value attached to inputs and outcomes as a way to
reestablish equity (Hatfield & Sprecher, 1984). If having a large number of difficult
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patients is seen as unavoidable, the physician may be inclined to redefine the workload's
effect on the exchange as a way to maintain equity.
Conversely, the survey respondents, in comparing themselves to other physicians,
may have perceived their practice demands and the associated rewards to be similar to
other physicians (Dornstein, 1989). Reference groups (those one compares oneself to)
help the individual establish the conditions necessary for an equitable exchange, as well
as defining acceptable levels of inputs and rewards (Molm et aI., 1993). While
expressing concerns about workloads, a physician may see the situation as the same for
most physicians; even for most health care workers, and objectively high workloads may
not represent a particularly important source of inequity (Major & Testa, 1989).
In assessing the role of demanding patients, the physician's share of clinically
complex and socioeconomically disadvantaged patients were not related to the level of
equity, but probably for different reasons. As alluded to previously, clinically complex
patients represent both a demand and a reward for the physician (Cook et al., 1995; Ben-
Sira, 1987), and as such, can result in ambiguous responses (Huseman, 1987). Low
socioeconomic status, while associated with greater health care needs (Terris, 1992), may
not represent an additional demand for the physician. This interpretation is supported by
the fact that, despite a greater need for such services among the poorer citizens of our
society, the utilization of health services is similar across socioeconomic groups (Mhatre
& Deber, 1992).
On the other hand, the proportion of patients with personal problems was
associated with the physician's perception of equity (p < 0.05). Patients with emotional
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problems have been associated with higher rates of utilization (Angel & Angel, 1997),
and dealing with personal problems is often time consuming for the physician (Roter et
aI., 1995). Effectively dealing with a patient's personal problems can be challenging and
with the possible exception of psychiatry, tends to fall outside the physician's areas of
competency (Durand, 1994). Physicians with a greater proportion of patients with
personal problems may view this as an excessive or unfair practice demand because they
lack the time and requisite skills.
Practice demands, even if not perceived as unfair, can be onerous if they exceed
the physician's ability to cope. Individuals unable to cope with practice demands are
more likely to seek ways to reduce these demands (Van Yperen, 1996). In effect, it may
not be the amount of work or the level of demand which affects the physician's perception
of equity, but rather the extent to which the physician is capable of dealing with these
demands.
For the physician with the requisite clinical and coping skills, higher workloads
may be associated with greater rewards, both extrinsic and intrinsic. For other physicians,
with fewer skills and less physical and/or emotional capacity, a similar workload could
constitute an important input for which the rewards mayor may not be available, or
desired. This is somewhat analogous to the entitled-benevolent continuum hypothesized
by Huseman et aI. (1987). However, instead of preferences determined by personality
type, it may be the capacity of the physician to handle the demands of the practice which
determines whether practice demands are perceived as a significant input factor or as a
reward.
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In coping with time demands, a highly significant association was found with
equity (p < 0.00l). This is most evident with intrinsic equity ( R = 0.312). A diminished
ability to cope may be reducing the time available to carry out intrinsically rewarding
activities or reducing the actual benefits associated with these activities.
Remuneration: The role of remuneration cannot be overlooked in assessing equity
in an economically-linked exchange. Historically, the remuneration of most medical
services has been based on a fee-for-service paYment model. Although fee-for-service
has been acknowledged as unfair; favouring procedural specialists and the provision of
discrete medical procedures (Victoria Report, 1995), this method of remuneration
continues to be the dominant method of reimbursement among physicians
(CCHSE, 2000). Under fee-for-service, general practitioners and cognitive specialties
such as internal medicine are seldom compensated for spending more time with a patient,
and the majority of physicians are not compensated for carrying out activities not
perceived as contributing directly to individual patient care (Wright, 1996).
Among the physicians surveyed, the four items associated with remuneration were
all found to be significantly associated with overall equity. However, the actual method
of paYment (p < 0.05), whether the physician thought the method of payment appropriate
(p < 0.05), and the ability to change the method of payment (p < 0.05) seem to be of only
minor importance. In particular, the relatively weak association between equity and the
method ofremuneration supports earlier work which found the method of pay made only
a minor contribution to the physician's perception of equity (Dobson & Lepnurm, 2000).
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On the other hand, the perceived fairness of the process of detennining the rate of
remuneration for different specialty groups was expected to contribute to the perception
of distributive equity (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler et al., 1985), and was subsequently
supported by the data (p < 0.001). Conceptually different from distributive equity
(Greenberg, 1990), the substantial contribution of the remuneration process ( R =0.328 )
emphasizes that remuneration should not only be fair, but that it should be seen to be fair.
Interestingly, analysis of the data indicated that among the four specialist groups,
procedural specialists rated the process used to detennine remuneration less fair than
other groups, despite their apparently preferential position (see Appendix 10 for analysis).
This might be explained by changes occurring in the relationship between the provincial
plans and medical associations, and between groups of physicians within the medical
associations.
In the past, strong representation by general practitioners on the boards of most
provincial medical associations helped to offset a bias for procedurally-based specialty
services (Katz et aI., 1997). Over the years, however, procedural and technical specialists
became increasingly more efficient and were able to increase their incomes through
greater productivity. While general practitioners and cognitive specialists secured greater
fee increases for the services they were providing, they were not able to exploit the
efficiencies realized by their more technically driven colleagues. Now, as provincial
governments place greater emphasis on continuity of care and case management (Fyke,
2001), the demand for general practitioners and cognitive specialists needed to carry out
these functions is expected to increase. Subsequently, greater demand for their services
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may allow general practitioners and cognitive specialists to seek a larger share of the
funds allocated for physician services.
In practical terms, general practitioners and cognitive specialists may not see
substantial increases in their income levels due to ongoing efforts by most provincial
governments to constrain physician expenditures. However, the strategies used to
constrain physician expenditures are more likely to be applied to procedure-based
specialties. While the favouring of general practitioners and cognitive specialists may be
appropriate, other physician groups experiencing a relative decline in their traditional
rewards are more likely to perceive increased inequity. At this point, procedural
specialists are more likely to perceive the process as unfair. To ameliorate this response,
it will be necessary to ensure that the process by which these changes occur is open to
scrutiny and seen to be fair by all physicians, especially procedure-based specialties.
Overall Contribution ofPractice Conditions to Perceptions ofEquity: Practice
conditions were expected to make a substantial contribution to the physician's perception
of equity. Of the three equity sub-scales, 36.6 percent of the variance associated with
intrinsic equity was explained by practice conditions, the ability to cope, and the control
variables. This was followed by extrinsic tangible equity at 29.3 percent and intangible
extrinsic equity at 17.1 percent. Practice conditions, coping with time demands, and the
control variables explained 40 percent of Overall Equity variance. Among the practice
conditions variables, community size, specialty, quality of community and long term care
services, practice arrangement, the sharing of medical records, and fairness of the process
used to determine remuneration all made significant contributions to the overall equity
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construct.
Of the practice condition variables found to contribute to overall equity, the items
associated with the practice environment made the most substantial contribution
(R2 =0.148), followed by the remuneration process (R2 =0.124). Coping with time
demands (R2 =0.070) and items associated with practice integration (R2 =0.058) were
seen to be responsible for the remainder of the explained variance.
Although the model of intrinsic equity was comparable to overall equity and
explained a large proportion of variance (R2 =0.366), the models of extrinsic equity
(tangible and intangible) were substantially different and were less effective in explaining
variance. Not surprisingly, the importance of the remuneration process was most evident
in association with extrinsic external equity (p < 0.001).
By comparison, there was no association between the fairness of the remuneration
process and extrinsic intangible equity. The process of setting remuneration rates for
services rendered continues to be the preserve of physicians, their professional
associations and the government (Katz et aI., 1997). Given that other stakeholders, such
as patients, nurses and administrators, do not playa role in the remuneration process, the
lack of association with intrinsic and extrinsic intangible equity is not unexpected.
Although aspects of the practice environment, such as community size and
specialty, are not particularly amenable to change, perceptions about the state of the local
system and the other practice conditions may be susceptible to some degree of
modification. Changes in how physicians are organized, the remuneration process and
the types of clinical and managerial support provided to them, as well as information on
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the relative performance of the health care system have the potential to improve overall
equity perceptions.
7.2 Distress, Equity and Practice Conditions
Hypothesis II: Controlling for physician characteristics and practice conditions, there is
no significant association between distress and perceptions of equity
among physicians:
Distress = f(Equity, Practice Conditions, Control Variables)
The Objective Practice Environment: Based on theory and empirical evidence, a
perception of inequity will lead to distress, which serves to motivate the individual to
restore equity (Bakker et aI., 2000; Hatfield and Sprecher, 1984). However, the distress
reported by physicians may also be caused by other factors associated with the medical
practice. The physician may experience distress if professional responsibilities and
activities associated with the practice cannot be handled in a timely manner, or if the
physician lacks the skills necessary to effectively carry out certain tasks.
Different practice environments promote specific practice conditions and
expectations (Donaldson, 1997; Childs, 1997). In different practice environments,
therefore, it might be easier or more difficult for physicians to meet their professional and
personal obligations. It may also be more difficult to eliminate activities contributing to
the level of distress experienced by the physician.
From this reasoning, it was anticipated that different aspects of the physician's
practice environment, whether perceived as fair or unfair, might be associated with a
higher level of distress. Based on the study findings, however, any association between
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practice environment and distress would appear to be relatively weak. Among the
objective practice environment variables tested, only speciality and practice sponsorship
were significantly associated with distress.
The least distressed of the specialist groups were the technical specialists
(p < 0.01). This might be explained by the fact that the work of technical specialists, such
as radiologists, anaesthesiologists, and pathologists is relatively uncharacteristic of the
profession:. As a group, physicians often experience long working hours, erratic
schedules and excessively demanding patients (Arnetz, 2001). Technical specialists, on
the other hand, often have more routinized work and more predictable work schedules
than other physician specialty groups (Ritchie et aI., 1999; McAvoy et aI., 1999; Chan et
aI., 1998). Being able to focus on a more technical area of expertise and the ability to
plan ahead would appear to be beneficial in terms of the distress reported.
The study found that non-physician practice sponsorship was associated with less
distress an[}ong the physicians surveyed (p < 0.05). Many physicians are opting to
become ernployees, rather than owners of the medical practice (Kletke et aI., 1996).
Reasons for this trend include: more predictable schedules and income levels; and greater
opportunity for collegial contact and support (Montague, 1994). The trend toward being
a salaried or employee physician is especially prevalent among young, new-to-practice
physicians. (Kletke et aI., 1996); possibly due to changing attitudes about the relationship
between professional and economic autonomy (Coburn et aI, 1983), and the desire for
more personal time (Sullivan & Buske, 1998). The findings of this study seem to support
the suggestion that the perceived benefits of this type of practice sponsorship are real; in
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that physician ownership of the practice was associated with more distress. Greater levels
of distress were possibly due to the administrative responsibilities associated with
running the practice as a business, and the additional financial risks associated with
ownership.
The Subjective Practice Environment: The distress reported by physicians in this
study appeared to be affected by the state of the local health system, particularly on issues
relating to access and quality of health services. The health reforms of the 1990s and the
push to constrain costs and inappropriate utilization have caused many people, including
physicians, to express concern over the state of health care in Canada (CCHSE, 2000;
Hamilton, 1995). Many physicians have also expressed concern over a lack of
consultation regarding changes being made in the healthcare system (Gutkin, 1997).
It has been suggested that concerns about health reform has politicized physicians
(Sibbald, 1998; Weissenstein, 1998). Therefore, the distress reported by physicians might
be due, in part, to limited opportunities to participate in these processes, or distress might
be pushing physicians to participate more. The distress reported by physicians was not
associated with either a lesser or greater rate of participation by physicians in the local
policy or planning process. The perceived ability to participate in decisions affecting the
local health care system did not contribute to the level of distress reported by physicians.
Practice Integration: While many physicians continue to work within the solo
practice se:tting, the long term organizational trend has been toward group practice
(Ubokudo:m, 1998). Within these groups, physicians often adopt a cost-sharing
arrangement in which they are responsible for generating sufficient revenues to cover
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their share of the costs and to provide an income for themselves (Williams et aI, 1997).
Due to the relative financial security and flexibility offered by revenue-pooling
arrangements (Montague, 1994), it was anticipated that practice arrangements limited to
cost sharing would be associated with higher levels of distress. This supposition was
supported by the study findings that showed physicians sharing practice costs had a
significantly higher level of distress than physicians working in solo practice or organized
to share revenues through some fonn of income pooling arrangement (p < 0.001).
Thle fact that solo practitioners also reported less distress might be explained by
the fact that a relatively large number of solo practitioners in the study indicated non-
physician practice sponsorship compared to physicians in cost-sharing arrangements
(Appendix 10). As reported previously, non-physician sponsorship was significantly
associated with less distress, and this may explain why solo practitioners, as a group,
reported less distress. In fact, after controlling for the affect of practice sponsorship, no
significant difference was seen between solo and cost-sharing practice arrangements.
However, the difference between cost-sharing and revenue sharing remained significant.
Being able to refer patients to the appropriate care provider should reduce the
distress associated with a physician's practice due to the ability to shift workloads, and
the increased ability to focus on tasks better suited to the physician's expertise (Fyke,
2001~ Woodward et aI., 1996). Alternatively, physicians may view other providers as a
threat to their clinical autonomy (Buknoda, 1996), and their traditional role of patient
advocate (CJutkin, 1997). Physicians may also perceive other provider groups as a threat
to their economic well-being (Cooper, 2001; Arnetz, 2001).
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Distress was found to be inversely associated with the rate of referral by the
physician to other health care professionals (p < 0.01), and to health support workers such
as psychologists and social workers (p < 0.001). The practice of referring patients to
other health workers appeared to have a beneficial effect on the physician's level of
distress arid concerns over the use of these professional groups may be less important.
Alternatively, physicians who are less distressed may simply be more inclined to refer
their patients to other provider groups. In this case, creating a more equitable medical
practice Inay serve to reduce distress and promote health system integration at the same
time.
Greater practice integration, as measured by revenue sharing and referral to other
provider groups, was associated with less physician distress. However, some physicians
may find themselves in a situation where the adoption of new practices is not feasible
(Ubokudom, 1998). The inability of the physician to change practice arrangements, and
the lack of individual control it represents, may be a further source of distress (Johnson et
aI., 1995). This was confirmed by this study which found that physicians who believed
they could not easily change their practice arrangement reported greater distress in
association with their medical practices (p < 0.05).
In promoting a more integrated health care system, physicians may need to feel
that they have some influence over the rate and nature of change as a way to reduce the
level of distress. Newly proposed integrated health care systems, while promoting less
traditional practice arrangements, greater financial security, and the use of non-physician
health care providers and community support workers, should have some flexibility in
229
their organizational design to allow for choice and movement between different practice
arrangemc:~nts.
Practice Demands: Higher workloads were expected to be associated with higher
levels of physician distress. This is based on the fact that heavier workloads place greater
demands on the physician, while reducing the flexibility of reallocating practice time
(Rout & Rout, 1994; Howie et aI., 1989). This study found that only the number of
working hours was associated with distress. However, even this association was
relatively weak (p < 0.05)
The relative affluence of physicians may help to explain these findings. Despite
recent constraints, physicians are one of the highest paid groups of workers in Canada.
(Colohan, 1996). With less of an economic imperative to work long hours, physicians
distressed by their hours of work are better able to adjust their level of participation
compared to other workers. It is possible, therefore, that only physicians with recent
concerns about their workload levels, or those with little control over their hours of work,
would be distressed by their current hours of work. Much like their ability to control their
total hours of work, the time allocated to anyone activity, if deemed excessive, may be
open to modification. Alternatively, physicians may not be distressed with the actual
time allocated to each of these functions. In other words, physicians may prefer to be
engaged in other activities, but the amount of time currently spent on each activity is not a
source of great concern, in and of itself.
Dealing with difficult patients can be particularly challenging for physicians
(Calnan et aI., 2000). Therefore, it was anticipated that having more clinically complex
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patients, socially disadvantaged patients, or patients with personal problems would be a
source of distress. However, either due to the clinical focus of most physicians (Sullivan
& Buske, 1998; Chan et al., 1998; Cook et aI., 1995), or due to the fact that poverty is
less of an indicator of demand within a health care system (Wilkins and Park, 1997;
Mhatre & JDeber, 1992), clinically difficult and socially disadvantaged patients were not
associated with distress. In effect, most physicians would seem to possess the skills or
resources needed to ameliorate the impact of these types of patients.
Furthermore, the ambiguity of clinically difficult patients, as both a source of
effort and reward for the physician (Huseman et aI., 1987), may have diminished its
aggregate affect on the level of distress. However, the general lack of training among
physicians to effectively deal with the patient's personal issues (Roter et aI., 1995;
Durand, 1995), may explain why patients with personal problems were a source of
distress for many physicians.
In addition to the actual workload, the ability of physicians to cope with workload
was anticipated to be linked to their level of distress (Ametz, 2001). A significant and
substantial association (p < 0.001; r =0.395) was found between coping and distress.
The capacity to deal effectively with their time demands appeared to be an important
contributor to the level of distress reported by physicians. Furthermore, the physician's
ability to cope had relatively little to do with the current demands of the practice.
Subsequent analysis of the relationship between hours of work and coping found no
significant relationship. Those with higher workloads were not more likely to report an
inability to cope.
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Remuneration: Given the concerns expressed by physicians about appropriate
methods of pay (Sullivan & Buske, 1998), it was anticipated that issues relating to the
method of remuneration and the ability to change one's method of pay would be
associated with distress. However, only the process by which remuneration was
determined had a significant impact on the level of distress reported (p < 0.01).
The literature and the findings of this study clearly establish the association
between distributive equity and distress (VanDierendonck et aI., 1994, 1996; Bakker et
aI., 2000). In this study, the fairness in the process used to allocate remuneration was also
associated with the distress reported by physicians (p < 0.05). While associated with
distributiv1e equity, the process of determining the distribution of rewards is a different
concept. '~hile distributive equity refers to what makes up the exchange, process equity
refers to the procedures used to determine what is to be exchanged (Greenberg, 1990).
Both process and distributive equity were associated with the distress reported by
physicians.
Overall Contribution ofEquity and Practice Conditions to Distress: Having
determined the contribution of practice conditions to the perception of equity among
physicians, the next step was to establish how practice conditions were likely to affect the
relationship between equity and distress. Among the practice condition variables, a
number of significant relationships with distress were identified, including: specialty
group, sponsorship, local health services access and quality, practice arrangement, ability
to change practice arrangement, rates of referral to allied professions and health support
workers, hours of work, patients with personal problems, the physician's ability to cope
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with time demands, and the remuneration process.
Induding the three equity sub-scales in the regression analysis eliminated most of
the practice condition variables from the distress model. Only specialty, share of
complicated cases and coping remained significant. Specialty and share of complicated
patients remained in the model because they were not significantly associated with overall
equity. Coping with time demands was significantly associated with equity, but was also
related significantly to distress independent of equity.
For the most part, practice conditions contributed indirectly to the distress
reported by physician by affecting the perception of equity, which in tum was strongly
associated with distress. Coping was the main exception to this general finding,
indicating that individual physician characteristics have a more direct affect on the level
of distress experienced by the physician. At the same time, these individual
characteristics may also affect the perceived level of equity.
7.3 Wish to Reallocate Time: Reacting to Practice Conditions
Hypothesis III: Controlling for immutable and mutable physician characteristics, practice
conditions, and perceptions of equity, there is no significant association
between distress and the wish to reallocate time (WRT) among
physicians:
WRT =f(Distress, Equity, Practice Conditions, Control Variables)
As a behavioural response to inequity (Geurts et aI., 1998), wish to reallocate
time is being considered as the direct manifestation of the distress created by inequity. It
was also anticipated that practice conditions would affect the manner in which physicians
responded to perceived inequities. However, the professional objectives of the physician
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may also affect how they respond to practice conditions. For example, if physicians find
current tirrLe allocations inappropriate for the tasks they want to carry out, they may be
motivated to reallocate their time toward those activities seen to support their perceived
roles and responsibilities (Hensel & Dickey, 1998), rather than as a means to correct
inequity per se.
Physicians who perceive themselves as clinicians may want to spend more time in
patient cane, whether or not their situation is perceived as equitable .. Similarly, physicians
perceiving teaching and research as critical to their professional development will be
inclined to spend time on these activities. The professional obligations and expectations
of physicians, therefore, must be given due consideration when interpreting the study
findings in relation to the wish to reallocate time.
The Practice Environment: It was anticipated that constraints associated with
different aspects of the practice environment would affect the ability of the physician to
reallocate time based on personal preferences (Donaldson, 1997), and this inability was
expected to manifest itself as a wish to reallocate time, independent of equity or distress.
However, little evidence was found to support this hypothesis. Although a number of
associations were seen between the practice environment and the wish to reallocate time
at baseline, these associations were weak, and could not be replicated at follow-up.
While analysis failed to show a relationship between wish to reallocate time and
practice environment, it was anticipated that environmental constraints might be
associated with the time currently allotted to patient care, teaching and research,
continuing medical education, and administration. Simple linear regression analysis was
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carried out using current time allocations as the dependent variable to assess the strength
of this relationship (Table 7.3).
Table 7.3 Contribution of Environment to the Time Allocated to Professional Activities
Dependent Variables
R
R2
Adjusted R2
Patient Care
0.266
0.071
0.059
Teaching & CME Admin
Research
0.554 0.000 0.305
0.307 0.000 0.093
0.286 0.000 0.078
n
Model
240 240 240
Standardized Beta Coefficients
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Community Size
< 25,000
25,000 to 99,999
100,000 to 499,999
> 500,000
Location
Ownership
Specialty
General practitioner
Cognitive
Procedural
Technical
Group Size
1 or 2 Doctors
3 to 4 Doctors
5 to 7 Doctors
8 or Morc~ Doctors
Access to Hospital Services
Cooperation Among Providers
Quality Community Services
* p < 0.05 ** P < 0.01
-0.146*
-0.180*
0.225**
*** p < 0.001
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-0.233***
-0.360***
0.370***
-0.145*
-0.172*
-0.264***
-0.144*
-0.275***
-0.194*
0.168*
-0.140*
Itelms representing the practice environment explained only a small portion of the
variance in the time currently allotted to patient care (R2 =0.059) and administration
(R2 = 0.078), and none of the variance associated with continuing medical education
(R2 =0.00). A number of practice environment variables did make a substantial
contribution to the time currently allotted to teaching and research (R2 =0.286).
Physicians participating in the study and indicating a greater amount of time
devoted to teaching and research were invariably more likely to be located in larger
centres, ha.ve their primary office located in a hospital, and indicate better access to
hospital-based services for their patients. The association between the practice
environment and time allocated to teaching and research is understandable given the
infrastructure and resources required to carry out these function (Pardes, 1997).
Typically, such resources and support have not been available to the physician practising
in the community or in a smaller hospital.
The disparity between groups of specialists carrying out teaching activities may be
explained, in part, by the community-based practice of general practitioners. Historically,
general practitioners working in the community were not called on to carry out formal
teaching duties. Most medical training was carried out by specialists based in large
regional hospitals and tertiary-care institutions (ReIman, 1983). It recent years, this has
begun to change as more attention is given to community-based training and the delivery
of effective primary care (Gray et al., 2001; Colohan, 1996). This has led to the
expansion of medical training programs to include physicians working in smaller centres
where general practitioners make up the largest physician contingent (Whiteside &
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Mathias, 1996; Gray et aI., 1994; Barer & Stoddart, 1992b). In the future, the effect of
practice environment on the ability of the physician to take on a greater teaching role may
be less important, depending instead on the interests of the individual practitioner.
On the other hand, differences in the time spent on teaching and research between
general practitioners and other specialties may be a manifestation of the priorities of the
medical-industrial complex (ReIman, 1983). The push for innovative pharmaceuticals
and technologies not only drives up the costs associated with health care (Evans, 1992),
but also represents the source of substantial profits for research-based, pharmaceutical
companies and equipment manufacturers (Bassett, 2000). By ensuring greater acceptance
of new products, clinical trials have become an effective method of marketing new drugs
and technologies (Evans, 2000), and physicians associated with these trials tend to rise in
stature within the profession.
In the drive for new, more profitable therapies, opportunities for physicians to
participate in clinical research will vary across specialties. Due to a general lack of
training in research methods, and a practice orientation less conducive to adopting
innovative, leading-edge technologies, there are fewer opportunities for general
practitioners to participate in research compared to other groups of physicians (Mainous
& Hueston, 1995).
Technical specialists participating in this study (pathologists, radiologists and
anaesthesiologists) also indicated that they did less teaching and research than other
physicians. Unlike the general practitioners, the reasons for this lack of participation was
less appare~nt. Yet, among the radiologists at least, it has been suggested that rapidly
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expanding workloads, a lack of recognition, and inadequate compensation have made
these activities less attractive (Samuel & Shaffer, 2000).
In summary, the current allocating of time to most physicians activities is best
explained by a preference-oriented approach (Westert and Groenewegen, 1999). That is
to say, physicians have general goals and specific objectives and can often ignore or
overcome environmental factors to achieve these goals and objectives. However,
teaching and research, with its significant association with various environmental
factors, appears to conform more to a constraint-driven explanation of behaviour
(Lindenberg, 1990). In effect, variations in time allocation are explained by differences
in practice conditions that provide incentives or restrict choice. Time allotted for
teaching and research appear to be more dependent on the specific environmental
opportunities and constraints compared to other professional activities.
Practice Integration: The degree to which the medical practice is integrated
within the larger health care system was expected to influence the wish to reallocate time.
Greater awareness of new roles and the ability to take on new roles should be enhanced in
practice seuings where the risks and workloads are shared, and where other providers are
available to assume responsibility for the patient's care (Williams et aI., 1997).
Thf~ findings of this study offer some evidence that physicians are less likely to
seek changes in time allocation within a more integrated practice model. Those working
in revenue sharing practice arrangements were less likely to indicate a wish to reallocate
time (p < 0.05). Those more likely to refer their patients to other health care providers
were also lless likely to express the wish to reallocate their time (p < 0.05). Greater
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security and flexibility in the medical practice may also reduce the wish to reallocate time
because physicians are already able to change time allocations to reflect their own
preferenc~~s.
The findings of the study also indicated that an inability to change the present
practice alTangement was associated with the wish to reallocate time (p < 0.05). Unable
to change their practice arrangement, physicians may be more inclined to seek change in
the content of their work. If resistance to change extends beyond the organizational
arrangeme:nt to other aspects of the practice, this may help to explain a greater wish to
reallocate time among these physicians.
Practice Demands: Higher workloads and practice commitments can limit
flexibility and prevent the physician from reallocating time (Camac;so & Camasso, 1994).
Therefore~, it was anticipated that the wish to reallocate time would be greater among
those physicians currently constrained by their workloads and current time allocations.
Practice demands may influence the wish to reallocate time. This was based on
the significant correlations found between wish to reallocate time and total hours of work,
time currently allotted to patient care, teaching & research, and administrative activities,
and proportion of patients with personal problems. However, given the weak associations
between equity and the practice demands, and between distress and practice demands, the
relationshi.p between practice demands and wish to reallocate time appears to be a
separate phenomenon.
In a study of pediatric surgeons, Bouchard and Laberge (1997) found that among
physicians. generally satisfied with their work, there was a preference to reallocate time
239
toward patient care, teaching and research, and away from administrative activities.
These preferences were attributed by the investigators to be a general desire to reduce
workloads, rather than a dissatisfaction with the work itself.
The capacity of the physician to cope with the demands of a medical practice may
also deterrnine the extend to which they would prefer to allocate their time among various
activities (Camasso & Camasso, 1994). As a result, physicians who are better able to
cope with practice demands should be less inclined to allocate time from duties for which
they have already assumed a responsibility.
Thl~ inability of the physician to cope with current time demands was also found
to be a strong indicator of the physician's wish to reallocate time (p < 0.001; r = 0.356).
Aside fronl its contribution to a more equitable exchange, physicians appear to have an
additional incentive for reallocating time; to support their ability to cope by reallocating
time away from professionally less attractive activities (Bouchard & Laberge, 1997).
Relnuneration: Given that most physicians are paid primarily by fee-for-service
(Sullivan 8~ Buske, 1998) and that their level of income depends on time spent providing
discrete patient care services (Feldham et aI., 1994), one would expect salaried and fee-
for-service physicians to have different preferences in terms of how they would wish to
reallocate their time. However, the method of remuneration, agreement with the method,
ability to change the method of pay, and the fairness of the remuneration process were not
associated with the wish to reallocate time. As with practice environment and practice
organization, this set of practice conditions did not appear to be substantially related to
the wish to reallocate time.
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The lack of association between the method of remuneration and the wish to
reallocate time was especially unexpected. The desire to reallocate time did not seem to
be fundamlentally connected to issues relating to physician remuneration, although
income has traditionally been an important aspect of equity assessment. Remuneration
and extrinsic tangible equity are important considerations, but the wish to reallocate time
may be equally or more strongly determined by the intangible and intrinsic aspects of the
work of physicians.
Overall Contribution ofPractice Conditions to the Wish to Reallocate Time:
Among the practice condition variables, the wish to reallocate time was significantly
related to: quality of long term care services; the practice arrangement; referral to allied
and suppo11ing health care providers; hours of work; time allocated to patient care,
teaching and research, and administration; proportion of patients with personal problems;
and coping with time demands. Inclusion of distress into the model supplanted most of
the practice condition variables.
In addition to distress, wish to reallocate time was also found to be associated
with the practice condition variables of specialty, practice arrangement, practice
arrangement appropriateness, and hours of work, as well as the proportion of time
teaching, the proportion of tinle in administration, and the ability to cope with practice
demands. Despite initially strong associations between the wish to reallocate time scales
and the equity scales, equity failed to contribute to the regression model once distress was
added. Distress was indeed the intervening variable as hypothesized, subsuming equity
and indirectly reflecting the physician's wish to reallocate time.
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7.4 The Multi-stage Model: The Role of Equity in the Allocation of Time
Based on equity theory, it was hypothesized that physicians would wish to
reallocate time in response to the distress caused by perceptions of inequity. The
empirical work of Bakker, VanDierendonck and their associates (2000,1996,1994),
regarding changes in physician attitudes toward the patient suggested the appropriate
SEM methods. The structural equation modelling resulted in a model explaining more of
the variance associated with the wish to reallocate time than could be explained using
more traditional constructs and simple linear regression. At the same time, the
fundamental relationships and pathways revealed by SEM were consistent with, and built
upon, the results produced using simple linear regression.
SEM produced a well-fitted model that explained a substantial amount of variance
at each stage of the model, and confirmed the primary pathways hypothesized. The
contribution of the practice conditions to the model, however, was shown to relate almost
exclusively to the equity stage of the model. The exceptions were ability to cope, which
contributed significantly to equity, distress and the wish to allocate professional time
(WRPT), and time allotted to administrative which made a significant contribution to the
wish to reallocate administrative time (WRAT).
To some extent, the general lack of association between practice conditions and
the main pathway did not conform to the model originally hypothesized. Still, state of
local health care system and remuneration process is fair did make substantial
contributions to explaining variance in distributive equity among physicians. The model
also identified the contribution of the individual physician's ability to cope at each step of
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the pathway, from perceiving inequity, to experiencing distress, to the wish to reallocate
time.
This study was able to link practice condition variables to equity and demonstrate
the subsequent contribution to distress and a desire to reallocate time among professional
activities. Furthermore, this study found that current time allocations were relatively
unconstrained by the practice conditions, in particular, environmental factors that are
more likely to be resistant to change. Physician ratings of the local health care system
and the re:muneration process were significantly associated with the perception of equity,
which in tum was shown to be associated with distress experienced by the physician and
their wish to reallocate their time. These factors are more amendable to change, either by
the systerrl managers and policymakers, or by the physicians themselves.
The distress experienced by physicians and others in association with their work
environm(~nt and its impact on health and quality of life has been the focus of a number of
researchers (Bosma et al., 1998; Theorell et aI., 1998; Johnson et aI., 1995; Schweitzer,
1994). Those looking at the role of equity in generating distress have tended to focus on
the consequences of inequity for patient-physician relationships (Bakker et aI., 2000). At
the same time, consideration of the factors contributing to inequity, such as patient
attitudes, were seen to be relatively resistant to change. The focus of attention has been
on providing symptomatic relief from the distress resulting from inequity rather than
addressing the underlying conditions creating the distress. The model created in this
study suggested that, given the contributing factors, fundamental changes in the perceived
fairness of the practice environment are possible.
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Pe:rhaps the most interesting and unexpected finding in building the model was
the splitting of wish to reallocate time construct into two distinct components of the time
allotted to activities carried out in association with the medical practice. The wish to
reallocate professional time (WRPT), in addition to its strong association with distress,
was also associated with coping with time demands. The wish to reallocate
administrative time (WRAT), on the other hand, was associated with time currently spent
on administrative activities and was not associated with coping with time demands.
Physicians distressed by inequity in the practice setting may be less likely to consider a
strategy of time reallocation of their professional activities provided they are currently
able to cope with the demands of the practice.
The wish to reallocate administrative time was unaffected by the physician's
ability to cope. While similarly affected by the distress associated with unfair practice
conditions, the physicians appeared less willing to persist with administrative activities.
The preference for spending less time on administrative activities was also associated
with a larger administrative load. Unlike professional activities, coping strategies are less
likely to promote physician participation in administrative activities. Professional
training and societal obligation may cause physicians to continue other professional
activities in the face of an unfair exchange, but administrative functions are not likely to
be given the same consideration.
The findings of the study reinforce the idea that most physicians perceive their
primary role to be that of a skilled medical practitioner, and don't particularly associate
this role with administrative activities. At the same time, there does not appear to be a
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strong desire to trade off administrative duties to spend more time on professional
activities. Although there was some correlation between WRPT and WRAT, the
association was not significant. Perhaps this speaks to a general feeling among
physicians that they are over-worked (Sullivan & Buske, 1998).
A simple desire to work less in the future was noted by Bouchard and Laberge
(1997). Rather than simply shifting time to other professional or administrative activities,
physicians may wish to reduce their time commitments, with a preference to reducing
administrative activities. While this wish to work less may be a wider trend, those
reporting greater inequity were also more inclined to wish to reallocate both professional
and administrative time.
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8.0 Conclusions
The study conclusions are presented in two parts. First, equity theory and its
implications for organizational theory will be presented. This will be followed by
possible itnplications for the health care system in the application of equity theory.
8.1 Applying Equity Theory: Implications for Organizational Theory
The most plausible theoretical explanation of the relationships found in this study
from a organization theory perspective is strategic choice theory. Strategic choice theory
holds that the perceived contribution of a factor to achieving specific goals determines its
influence rather than any objective impact of the factor on achieving an outcome
(Child, 1997). In the Final Stage Three Model of equity-distress-wish to reallocate time,
no association was demonstrated between perceptions of equity and the objective
characteristics of the external practice environment. The strongest associations were with
items measuring the state of the local health care system as perceived by the physicians
rating quality, access and efficiency. In effect, physicians were unaffected by their
environme:nt unless assigned importance by the physician.
Based on strategic choice theory, decisions of how to organize the practice to
achieve desired outcomes is evolutionary, with new structures and processes emerging as
those within the organization gain experience with, and are changed by, the existing
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organization and the external environment (Ranson et al., 1980). Success is less
determined by what is actually required, than by what is perceived to be needed.
The study findings support the contention that physicians are relatively free to create an
organizational arrangement based on their understanding of the environment.
At the same time, more deterministic organizational theories explaining physician
behaviour cannot be rejected outright. Although environmental factors were not
constraining most physician behaviour to a substantial degree, physicians may choose to
adopt certain organizational structures to conform with widely held preferences and
expectations (Scott, 1987).
The association between objective environmental factors and the current use of
time (Table 7.3) and the gradual adoption of more appropriate new organization
arrangements (Williams et al., 1997) gives support to contingency theory (Donaldson,
1997). However, constraints on current practices seem to be limited to physician
participation in teaching and research activities. Other activities were not associated with
the external environment. As a result, physicians are still able to carry out these tasks
independent of the external environment. There appears to be little connection between
organization of the medical practice and the behaviour of physicians; both in terms of
how time is allocated or how physicians would wish to allocate their time. However, as
the organi~~ationalliberalityenjoyed by physicians erodes, they may find it necessary to
adopt more efficient practice structures and processes.
As with contingency theory, resource dependence theory supported some of the
study findings, but did not seem to provide a good explanation. Maintaining equitable
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arrangeme:nts is an important aspect of resource dependence theory (Van de Ven &
Walker, 1984), and less acceptable environmental conditions were expected to be
associated with perceptions of inequity. The significant associations between equity and
the physician's assessment of the local health care system and the remuneration process
supports the need for physicians to be aware of the practice environment, and its impact
on their ability to achieve preferred outcomes. However, if time allocation behaviour is
determined by the practice environment, one would expect to see a significant
relationship between these environmental conditions and the wish to reallocate time. No
associations were found; physicians perceiving inequity were not seeking to influence the
quality of lthe environment through time reallocation.
Institutional theory, in explaining the influence of environment, argues that the
structure of an organization is merely a reflection of the larger social institution in which
the organization exists (Scott, 1987). Institutional theory argues that the success and
survival of the organization is linked in compliance with, and a reflection of, the larger
institution rather than the optimal performance of the organization (Meyer & Rowan,
1977). Thle physicians in this study were inclined to adopt traditional arrangements such
as solo practice and cost-sharing medical practice groups which can limit access to other
providers and supportive infrastructure. Despite the expressed wish of governments to
change the health care system, physicians do not appear to be inclined to comply.
Instead, they seem to be holding on to established practices and arrangements.
Institutional theory also suggests environment and organizational variables
represent potential sources of inequity, but if these factors conform to broad institutional
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orthodoxy, their impact on equity should be relatively weak. There was some support for
this position, in that a very strong association was seen between equity and the state of the
health care system. A system in transition does not match with orthodoxy, and the
adverse consequences of reform may be interpreted as unfair to the physician.
Despite the apparent impact of practice arrangement on equity and the physicians
level of distress, physicians were less likely to be working in a more integrated practice
model. Although the environmental signals indicate that a more integrated model is
inevitable as well as beneficial to patient care and the physicians' own working
conditions., many of the physicians in this study reported practising in an organizational
arrangeme:nt that was less advantageous to themselves and their patients.
Although environmental conditions seem to be pushing physicians toward a new
practice m.odel, the new model does not necessarily comply with the preferred model of
most physicians. Strategic choice explains this ongoing incongruence as a manifestation
of physicians' particular understanding of the environment and their ability to react to it
independent of any overriding imperative for improved performance.
8.2 AI.plying Equity Theory: Implications for the Health Care System
This study also sought to identify actual practice conditions that affected
perceptions of equity or were likely to affect the physician's wish to reallocate time.
Unlike patient attitudes and demands, which may be beyond the influence of the
physician, practice conditions may be more amenable to change, thereby enhancing equity
and reducing or preventing distress.
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In reacting to inequity, the high degree of autonomy exercised by physicians
within health care permits a wide range of time reallocation strategies which may not
necessarily support the evolving health care model. By evaluating the impact of practice
conditions on equity and time preferences, it should be possible to identify and establish
practice conditions which promote equity and collaboration, while supporting time
allocation preferences that align with broader policy objectives.
Given the relationship between equity and the wish to reallocate time, the
potential seems to exist to improve equity among physicians and to advance collaborative
practices through better organizational models. However, such changes must be made in
collaboration with physicians, given the inclination of many physicians not to support
government led reforms and initiatives.
Thle study findings indicated that the time reallocation preferences of physicians
favour a team-based clinical practice, with more time for research, teaching, and
professional development (Table 8.2). Having more time for solo clinical practice, on the
other hand, was not favoured by physicians; to the point that physicians seemed
disinclined. to change the time allotted to this activity.
Markedly less favoured by physicians were administrative tasks such as
paperwork, attending committee meetings, and writing reports. Left to themselves,
strategies adopted by physicians to restore equity are not likely to increase involvement
by physicians in the administration of the system, although these activities represent the
foundation upon which a more collaborative and integrated health care system can be
implement1ed.
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Table 8.2 Time Allocation Preferences of Study Physicians
Level of Activity Preferred (n=240)
Activity Much No Much
More More Change Less Less
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Assess & Treat Alone 2.5 15 66.3 15.4 0.8
Assess & Treat in Team 1.7 30.8 59.6 7.1 0.8
Communicating Care Plan 1.3 23.8 60 12.5 2.5
Counselling Patients 9.6 34.6 48.3 6.7 0.8
Research 7.9 30 56.3 5.4 0.4
Teaching 7.1 34.6 54.6 3.8 0.0
Reading Joumals/CME 15.8 60.4 23.3 0.4 0.0
Rounds/Case Conferences 13.3 51.3 34.6 0.8 0.0
Practice Paperwork 1.3 6.3 27.5 46.7 18.3
Committee Meetings 0.4 4.2 31.3 40 24.2
As unattractive as administrative activities may seem to many physicians, they are
necessary :in a health care system increasingly concerned with evaluation and
accountabillity (Mullin, 1998; Marriott & Mable, 1998). Computerization and automation
will reduce or eliminate the time or effort associated with some of these administrative
activities (Simpson, 1998), but given the key role of physicians within the health care
system, thc~ir continued presence and committed participation in the management and
administration of the system will be required for the efficient, effective and equitable
delivery of health care services to Canadians.
The rewards associated with administrative activities will need to be enhanced,
both in terms of: better remuneration associated with these duties; better training to carry
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out these duties; and greater recognition of the importance of these activities (Swartz &
Pogge, 2000). Physicians must also come to see these activities as an important
component of their role as a physician, and not merely time taken away from the practice
of medicine. By improving both tangible and intangible rewards, as well as the perceived
importanc:e of these activities, physicians are more likely to consider administration
activities to be an essential and rewarding use of their time. Furthermore, enhancing the
ability of the individual to cope with the demands of the practice is also unlikely to
reduce the: desire to reduce or eliminate time spent on administrative activities.
Given the role physicians occupy within the Canadian health care system, meeting
their equity concerns will be an important key to a successful transition in the
organization of the system and in the delivery of quality care. However, one must be
cautious not to interpret from the findings that perceptions of inequity will automatically
push physicians toward more collaborative models of care. For example, researchers in
the United Kingdom found that physicians working in group practice spent less time
counselling patients on preventive practices than solo practitioners (McAvoy et aI., 1999).
Group practice is an organizational arrangement that appears to support a more integrated
health care system, but has the potential to reduce the tendency for physicians to adopt
more appropriate practice patterns.
Anrlong the physicians participating in this study, both solo and cost-sharing
physicians indicated a desire to do more patient counselling compared to those in revenue
sharing groups (p =0.013). Furthermore, the wish to spend less time on administrative
activities was evident in all three types of practice arrangements reported in this study
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(solo, cost-sharing, revenue sharing), but was significantly greater among cost-sharing
group practice physicians (paperwork, p =0.001; meetings & reports, p =0.006). The
adoption of group practice is widespread and increasing among physicians (Chan et aI.,
1998; Kletke et al., 1996). However, if this trend does not include revenue sharing,
physicians may find they lack the ability or may feel less inclined to carrying out
important preventive and administrative activities.
Physicians do seem inclined to adopt more integrative and collaborative practices
within the: current health care environment, but barriers to adopting such practices may
lead to frustration and declining morale (Bakker et aI., 2000). Persistent barriers to new
practice patterns may cause distressed physicians to pursue less appropriate strategies for
restoring equity. For example, they may choose coping strategies such as emotional or
behavioural withdrawal from patients (Geurts et aI., 1998; Van Dierendonck et aI., 1994;
Koehler et aI., 1992), or choose to pursue greater financial rewards in order to restore
balance to a exchange seen to be unfair.
Finally, the failure to promote equity may actually prevent the development of a
more integrated health care system (Geurts et aI., 1998). In supporting teamwork and a
more collaborative work behaviour, Hatfield and Sprecher (1984) found that when
rewards are equitable, workers were more likely to cooperate with one another for their
mutual benefit. When rewards are perceived as inequitable, workers may choose not to
cooperate and opt instead for individually defined tasks, even if this results in reduced
levels of compensation (Hatfield & Sprecher, 1984)
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If true, the response to inequity has important implications in a health care system
where greater teamwork and cooperation between health professions are essential to the
delivery of efficient, effective and equitable care (Mullin, 1998; Marriott & Mable, 1998;
Sapsford, 1997). Because of their central role in the Canadian health care system, greater
teamwork and integration within the system still depends to a large degree on the support
and cooperation of physicians (Anderson, 1998). More collaborative and cooperative
behaviour by physicians, in tum, will depend on the perceived fairness associated with
working in the Canadian health care system.
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Glossary
Cognitive Specialists: dermatologists, internists (including physiatrists), neurologists,
pediatricians (including medical geneticists) and psychiatrists
Coping: A four items scale measure the ability of the physician to cope with the demands of
their work environment. Items included: 1) time to pursue special interest or hobby; 2)
time to keep up with clinical specialty; 3) time to complete tasks without feeling rushed;
and 4) ability to get a full night's sleep, with a reliability of 0.64.
Distress: A five item scale measuring the level of concern experienced by physicians about their
work. Consisting of: 1) level of frustration when dealing with demanding patients; 2)
fatigue experienced during the day; 3) level of frustration over gaining access to services;
4) the overall level of stress; and 5) the level of conflict between work and personal
demands, with a reliability of 0.74.
Equity, Intrinsic: A four item scale measuring the rewards of physicians that are intrinsic in the
work itself. Consisting of 1) amount of interesting work, 2) sense ofaccomplishment from
work, 3) extra effort worth the effort, and 4) level of trivial activity, with a reliability of
0.70.
Equity, Extrinsic Tangible: A four item scale measuring the tangible rewards physician receive
for their work. Consisting of: 1) pay reflects stress, 2) pay reflects experience, 3) equity
of rewards and 4Jwork to hardfor rewards received, with a reliability of 0.78
Equity, Extrinsic Intangible: A four item scale of non-monetary external rewards provided to
physicians by others. Consisting of; 1) respect for physicians by nurses; 2) respect for
physicians by administrators; 3) respect for physicians by patients; and 4) appreciation of
patients for the effort of physicians, with a reliability of 0.58.
Equity, Overall: A global scale measuring perceived equity by physicians for the work they do.
A eight item construct derived from the three equity sub-scales with a reliability of 0.81.
Health Team Member: A wish-to-reallocate time sub-scale measuring the wish of the physician
to spend more or less time on team-based patient care activities. Consisted of three
items: 1) assessment and treatment by you as part of a team; 2) communicating care plan
to other health personnel; and 3) counseling patients on risk factors and health habits,
with a reliability of 0.53.
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Knowledge Seeker: A wish-to-reallocate time sub-scale measuring the wish of the physician to
spend more or less time on maintaining knowledge. Consisted of two items: 1) reading
medical journal, CME activities; and 2) clinical rounds, case conferences, with a
reliability of 0.78.
Practice Manager: A wish-to-reallocate time sub-scale measuring the wish of the physician to
spend more or less time on administrative activities. Consisted of two items: 1)
completing paperwork associated with your practice; and 2) attending committee
meetings, writing reports, with a reliability of 0.78.
Procedural Specialists: obstetricians and gynaecologists, otolaryngologists, ophthalmologists
and surgeons (including general, thoracic, orthopedic, plastic & reconstructive,
neurological and urological).
Scholarly Practitioner: A wish-to-reallocate time sub-scale measuring the wish of the physician
to spend more or less time on individual practice and academic functions. Consisted
team-based patient care activities. Consisted of three items: 1) assessment and treatment
by you alone; 2) research; and 3) teaching, with a reliability of 0.68.
Technical Specialists: anaesthetists, pathologists and radiologists (including diagnostic and
therapeutic)
Wish to Reallocate Time: A global scale measuring the wish of the physician to reallocate
professional time regardless of the specific activity. Combines eight items measuring
patient care, research and teaching, maintaining knowledge, and management functions
into a single construct with a reliability score of 0.70.
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APPENDIX 1:
Baseline Questionnaire
MEASURING
EQUITY IN THE
WORK OF
PHYSICIANS
Institute for Health and Outcomes Research
Department of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation
University of Saskatchewan, 1998
Measuring Equity in the Work ofPhysicians
rhe objectives of this survey are 1) to seek the views ofphysicians on health care issues in
:anada; 2) to measure equity in the work ofphysicians; 3) to identify how physicians allocate
heir time; and 4) to assess physician satisfaction with various aspects of their medical career.
A. Health Care: In this section of the survey, we are seeking your views on the state of
1e health care system in your community.
The QUALITY of the health care system in your community is:
Very Good Good Fair Poor Very Poor Unable to Judge
0 0 D 0 0 D
The EFFICIENCY of the health care system in your community is:
Very High High Moderate Low Very Low Unable to Judge
D D 0 0 0 D
Please indicate your assessment of the ACCESS to specific services in your community using the
,Howing scales (please circle the appropriate response):
Community-based services (Excellent
Hospital services (Excellent
Long-tenn care services (Excellent
Good
Good
Good
Fair
Fair
Fair
Poor
Poor
Poor
Very Poor
Very Poor
Very Poor
No Opinion)
No Opinion)
No Opinion)
COOPERATION among the different health care professionals in your community is:
Very High
D
High
D
Moderate
o
Low
o
Very Low
o
Unable to Judge
o
PARTICIPATION by physicians in POLICY AND PLANNING in your community is:
Very High
D
High
o
Moderate
o
Low
o
Very Low
o
Unable to Judge
o
Jsing the following grading scale please indicate your assessment of the QUALITY of specific
rvices in your community (100 = the best, 0 =the worst):
Community-based services ( 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 No opinion)
Hospital services ( 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 No opinion)
Long-tenn care services ( 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 No opinion)
2
1B. Health Policy: In this section we ask for your views on national health policy.
• Health care should be funded by a single comprehensive public health insurance plan provided to
all residents in each province and territory of Canada.
Strongly Agree
o
Agree
o
Neutral
D
Disagree
o
Strongly Disagree
o
No Opinion
o
• For people in the workforce and their families, health care benefits should be financed by
employer and employee contributions to health insurance funds.
Strongly Agree
o
Agree
o
Neutral
o
Disagree
o
Strongly Disagree
o
No Opinion
o
• People ought to be able to choose their health insurance plan from competing for-profit and
non-profit plans.
Strongly Agree
o
Agree
o
Neutral
D
Disagree
o
Strongly Disagree
o
No Opinion
o
• The range ofbenefits in your existing provincial health care plan should be expanded to include
additional services (eg. respite care, rehabilitation services/prosthetics).
Strongly Agree
D
Agree
o
Neutral
D
Disagree
o
Strongly Disagree
o
No Opinion
o
• Public health insurance should be limited to treatments likely to cause financial hardship.
Strongly Agree
o
Agree
o
Neutral
o
Disagree
o
Strongly Disagree
o
No Opinion
D
• Health care expenditures should be directly linked to private sector prosperity.
Strongly Agree
o
Agree
o
Neutral
o
Disagree
o
Strongly Disagree
o
No Opinion
o
• Those willing to pay out-of-pocket to gain quicker access to health care in your province should
be allowed to do so.
Strongly Agree
o
Agree
o
Neutral
o
Disagree
o
Strongly Disagree
o
No Opinion
D
• How have the following groups been affected by health care reforms in your province?
Physicians: o Benefited o No change o Hanned o No Opinion
Nurses: o Benefited o No change o Hanned o No Opinion
Administrators: o Benefited o No change o Hanned o No Opinion
Patients: D Benefited D No change o Hanned o No Opinion
3
!. Equity: In this section, we are seeking to measure levels of equity among physicians.
:quity is defined as the fairness of the exchange between efforts and costs (inputs) and
he value of the rewards (outputs) received. Please indicate your opinion in each of the
ollowing statements.
The INFLUENCE of physicians over health policy is:
Very High High Moderate Low Very Low No Opinion
0 0 0 D 0 0
The level of RESPECT for physicians by
PATIENTS is: (Very High High Moderate Low Very Low No Opinion)
NURSES is: (Very High High Moderate Low Very Low No Opinion)
ADMINISTRATORS is: (Very High High Moderate Low Very Low No Opinion)
The amount of INTERESTING WORK in your daily activities is:
Very High
o
High
o
Moderate
o
Low
o
Very Low
o
No Opinion
o
The amount of time taken up by activities which do not contribute to your DEVELOPwIENT AS
, PHYSICIAN is:
Very High
D
High
o
Moderate
o
Low
D
Very Low
D
No Opinion
o
Presently yOUf SENSE OF ACCOrvIPLISHlVIENT in daily activities is:
Very High
o
High
o
Moderate
o
Low
o
Very Low
o
No Opinion
D
How often do you feel that you WORK TOO HARD fOf the rewards received?
Very Often
D
Often
o
Sometimes
o
Rarely
o
Very Rarely
o
No Opinion
o
How often do you feel that MAKING THE EXTRA EFFORT is worth the rewards received?
Very Often
o
Often
o
Sometimes
o
Rarely
o
Very Rarely
o
No Opinion
D
Compared to other physicians. your share of DIFFICULT TO TREAT patients is:
Very High
D
High
D
Moderate
o
4
Low
o
Very Low
o
No Opinion
D
• How often do you feel that you give a great deal of attention to YOUR PATIENTS, but get
little appreciation in return?
Very Often
o
Often
o
Sometimes
o
Rarely
o
Very Rarely
o
No Opinion
o
• How often do you feel that you give a great deal of attention to ADMINISTRATIVE DUTIES
associated with your practice, but get little acknowledgement in return?
Very Often
o
Often
o
Sometimes
o
Rarely
o
Very Rarely
o
No Opinion
o
• Your level of financial compensation fairly reflects:
Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly
Agree Disagree
the responsibilities you have.
the experience you have.
the effort you put forth.
the stresses of your work.
• The process used in your province to determine rates of reimbursement:
Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly
Agree Disagree
fairly represents all areas of
specialization in the deliberations.
fairly represents all geographic areas
in the deliberations.
fairly represents you in the
deliberations.
• In general, the rewards for the work that you do are:
Excellent
o
Very Good
o
Good
o
Fair
o
5
Poor
o
Very Poor
o
Terrible
o
3. Allocating Time
A. rvlanaging Stress: In the course of managing your practice and attending to family
and / or personal needs you:
Vay Often Often Slmlc.:times Rarely Very Rarely
get regular exercise
eat well balanced meals
get enough sleep
get tasks done without feeling rushed
experience contlict between work commitments
& personal I family responsibilities
have rime to keep up with developments in your
clinical specialty
experience fatigue during I.he day
regularly interact with colleagues to discuss
professional issues (besides referr.ds or consults)
• How would you rate your level of stress? Very High High Moderate Low Very Low
0 0 0 0 0
• How would you rate your overall health? Very Good Good Fair Poor Very Poor
0 0 D 0 0
B. Monthly On Call Duties: Please estimate your call-backs in an average month.
Average Hours On-Call per Month
Location of On-Call activities Number of Call Backs / Month
Hospital Emergency/O.R.
Hospital Ward/O.P.D.
Chronic Care Facility
Clinic
Doctor's Office
Patient's Home
Other Call-Backs
HoursIMonth
Hours spent / Momh
In an average month how many of the following telephone calls do you handle while On-Call?
Consultations over the phone
Emergency Phone Calls
Administrative Phone Calls
Other Phone Calls
ALL PHONE CALLSIMONTH
What erenta e of ALL On-Call Duties fall on the \Veekend (after 6 on Friday)? %
6
C. Weekly Practice Duties (Excluding On Call) Please indicate the number of hours you
devote to each activity, and whether you prefer to spend more or less time on these activities. We
understand that some activities overlap. We seek your best estimates.
Total Hours Worked per Week
How many hours I week do you usually spend on:
Providing Patient Care
Assessment & Treatment carried out by you alone
Assessment & Treatment carried out in a group:
- with you in charge
- with you assisting
Communicating care plan to other health personnel
Giving instructions to your patients about their therapies
Counselling your patients on health habits
Teaching and Research
Supervision of residents I students
Lecturing & demonstrating clinical techniques
Instructing at workshops I colloquia I seminars
Participating in research projects
Maintaining Knowledge Base
Participating in patient care conferences I rounds
Reading medical journals I texts
Attending clinical meetings related to QA, utilization
Accumulating· CME credits
Management Functions
Routine paperwork associated with your practice:
- your own patients
- activities of the practice group
Administrative duties related to medical programs
- writing of reports
- committee work
Other Duties:
---------------
Hours / Week
hrs I week
hrs I week
hrs I week
hrs I week
hrs I week
hrs I week
hrs I week
hrs I week
hrs I week
hrs I week
hrs I week
hrs I week
hrs I week
hrs I wt:ek
hrs I week
hrs I week
hrs I week
hrs I week
hrs I week
More
Prefer to spend:
Same Less
How much time during the week is taken up by phone calls?
About what percentage can be attributed to:
talking with patients & their family members
physicians. nurses, & other health professionals
administrators & other health authorities
insurers, lawyers, employers & other third parties
7
100
hrsIweek
%
%
%
%
%
4. Satisfaction with Medicine as a Career: In the following questions we would like you
:0 indicate your satisfaction with various aspects of your professional career.
· The predictability of your work schedule.
Somewhat Somewhat
Very Satisfied Satisfied Satisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied Very Dissatisfied
0 0 0 0 0 0
The congeniality of your practice setting.
Somewhat Somewhat
Very Satisfied Satisfied Satisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied Very Dissatisfied
0 D 0 0 0 0
The quality of resources used to treat your patients.
Very Satisfied
o
Satisfied
o
Somewhat
Satisfied
o
Somewhat
Dissatisfied
o
Dissatisfied
o
Very Dissatisfied
o
Your ability to access resources needed to treat your patients.
Very Satisfied
o
Satisfied
o
Somewhat
Satisfied
o
Somewhat
Dissatisfied
o
Dissatisfied
o
Very Dissatisfied
o
The amount of time available to spend with your patients.
Somewhat Somewhat
Very Satisfied Satisfied Satisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied Very Dissatisfied
D 0 0 0 0 0
The level of awareness you have about the lives of your patients.
Somewhat Somewhat
Very Satisfied Satisfied Satisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied Very Dissatisfied
D 0 0 0 0 0
The degree of trust between you and your patients.
Somewhat Somewhat
Very Satisfied Satisfied Satisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied Very Dissatisfied
0 0 0 0 0 0
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• The level ofautonomy over how you do your job.
Somewhat Somewhat
Very Satisfied Satisfied Satisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied Very Dissatisfied
0 0 0 D 0 0
• Your level ofdevelopment as a professional.
Somewhat Somewhat
Very Satisfied Satisfied Satisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied Very Dissatisfied
0 D 0 0 0 D
• Your involvement in developing resources needed to treat patients in your community.
Very Satisfied
D
Satisfied
D
Somewhat
Satisfied
D
Somewhat
Dissatisfied
D
Dissatisfied
D
Very Dissatisfied
D
• The level of recognition by your peers for the quality ofyour work.
Somewhat Somewhat
Very Satisfied Satisfied Satisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied Very Dissatisfied
0 D 0 0 0 0
• The variety in the work that you do.
Somewhat Somewhat
Very Satisfied Satisfied Satisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied Very Dissatisfied
0 0 0 0 0 0
• Your level of income.
Somewhat Somewhat
Very Satisfied Satisfied Satisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied Very Dissatisfied
0 0 0 D 0 0
• Time available to he with your famil)T and friends.
Somewhat Somewhat
Very Satisfied Satisfied Satisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied Very Dissatisfied
0 D 0 D 0 0
• The ability to minimize interruptions to your time at home.
Somewhat Somewhat
Very Satisfied Satisfied Satisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied Very Dissatisfied
0 D 0 0 0 0
• In general, how satisfied are you with your medical career?
Somewhat Somewhat
Very Satisfied Satisfied Satisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied Very Dissatisfied
0 0 0 0 0 0
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i. Your Practice
.. Location of Primary Office:
o Downtown Residential
o Downtown Commercial
I. Community Size:
::J < 5,000
::J 5,000 to 9,999
::J 10,000 to 24.999
. Practice Sponsorship:
:J Physician Group
:J University Group
o Suburban Residential
o Suburban Commercial
o 25.000 to 49,999
o 50,000 to 99,999
o 100,000 to 499,999
o Hospital
D Local Community Group
o Community Hospital
D University Hospital
D Other
--------
o 500,000 to I million
o over I million
D Health Region / DistrictD Other __.... _
. Organizational Arrangements:
] Individual practice
] Share space and reception staff expenses
] Share space, reception and clinical staff expenses
l Share revenues, space, reception and clinical staffexpenses
lOther:
e. Administrative Arrangements:
Do you have a rotation system
for on-call coverage?
DYes D No
Does your group share medical records'?
DYes D No
Working with other professionals in your practice and in your community:
Please indicate the TOTAL number of For professionals NOT working in your practice please indicate the
professionals in your practice PRIMARY fonn ofinteraction with an (X) in the appropriate space.
Professional Designation Number Professional Designation Face- Phone Written None
to-face
MDs: General practitioners MDs: General practitioners
MDs: Specialists MDs: Specialists
Nurses Nurses
Laboratory technicians Laboratory technicians
Pharmacists Pharmacists
Dietitians Dietitians
~ocialWorkers Social Workers
Physical therapists Physical therapists
:::hiropra( ~ors I I Ch"i i lropractors
I
)ther: Other:
)ther: Other:
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g. What percentage ofyour reimbursement comes from the following methods?
IFee-for service~~I Salary
ICapitated rate per patient~~I Sessional
0.....----"1 Other _
100 0/0
h. Which is your PREFERRED approach to complex clinical decisions?
D To gather all ofthe relevant facts myselfand make the clinical decision myself.
D To obtain information from relevant professionals and then make the clinical decision myself.
D To meet with the relevant professionals to discuss the case and then make the clinical decision myself.
D To lncet with relevant professionals to discuss the case and then have the clinical decision made by the
group
6. Topic of Interest: Evidence Based Medicine.
• The extent that physicians in your community use evidence-based medicine is:
Very High
D
High
D
Moderate
D
Low
D
Very Low
D
No Opinion
D
• In complex clinical cases how often do you search the clinical literature?
Always
D
Most of the Time
D
Sometimes
D
Rarely
o
Never
D
• In reviewingjournal articles how often do you assess the methodology section?
Always
D
Most of the Time
D
Sometimes
D
Rarely
D
Never
D
• How would you rate your own knowledge ofmethodology issues in assessingjoumal articles?
Excellent
D
Good
o
Adequate
D
Needs
Improvement
o
Needs Substantial
Improvement
D
Unable to Judge
D
• In searching the clinical literature how often do you use MEDLINE or equivalent?
Always
D
Most of the Time
D
Sometimes
D
Rarely
D
Never
D
• In your opinion, the potential for evidence-based medicine to improve clinical outcomes is:
Greatly Overrated
D
Overrated
o
Neither Overrated
nor Underrated
D
11
Underrated
D
Greatly Underrated
D
Unable to Judge
D
· Demographics
· l\'lain area of specialization: b. Additional areas of practice:
How old are you? ___ years d. Gender: D Female D Male
How many years have you been practising? ___ years
Did you work prior to entering medical school? DYes DNo
, If YES to (0, What position? How many years? _
What position? How many years? _
Living Arrangements:
:lLiving alone
:J Living with spouse/partner
:J Living with parent or relative
:J Living with spouse/partner & parent or relative
:J Other _
i. Dependents:
Ages ofChildren still living with you
--'--'--'--'--
Ages of dependent adults living with you
--'--'--'--'--
If living with someone, how many days/week do they work outside the home?
:J On a full-time basis 0 1 or 2 days each week
:J 3 or 4 days each week 0 not working outside the home
· What issues should be covered in follow-up surveys?
'IllJlk-YOlI for YOllr cooperation in this sllldy. The results will be llnll(vsed and reported in broad groups to protect
e idemit)' of indil'idllal physicians. Your identity will be held in strictest confidence.
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APPENDIX 2:
Follow-up Questionnaire
Measuring Equity
in the
Work ofPhysicians
,~ <,t .
University of Saskatchewan
2000
Aleasuring Equity in the Work of Physicians
The objectives of this survey are 1) to seek the views of physicians on health care
issues iR Canada; 2) to measure equity and stress in the work of physicians; 3) to
identify how physicians allocate their time and organize their practices; and 4) to
assess physician satisfaction with various aspects of their medical career.
Unable to Judge
[ ]
Very Poor
[ ]
1.A Health Care: In this section of the survey, we are seeking your views on the state of the health
care system In your community and your preferences regarding Canada's health policy.
• The QUALITY of the health care system in your community is:
Excellent Good Adequate Poor
[] [] [] []
• The EFFICIENCY of the health care system in your community is:
Very high High Moderate Low
[] [] [] [J
Very Low
[ J
Unable to Judge
[ J
• Please indicate your assessment ofACCESS to specific services in your community using the
following scales (please circle the approprIate response):
Community-based services:
(Excellent Good Adequate Poor Very Poor No Opinion)
Hospital services:
(Excellent Good Adequate Poor Very Poor No Opinion)
Long-term care services:
(Excellent Good Adequate Poor Vcry Poor ~o Opinion)
• COOPERATION among the different health care professions in your community is:
Very high
[ ]
High
[ ]
Moderate
[ ]
Low
[ ]
Very Low
[ ]
Unable to Judge
[ ]
• PARTICIPATION by physicians in HEALTH POLICY AND PLANNING in your community is:
Very high
[ ]
High
[ ]
Moderate
[ ]
Low
[ ]
Very Low
[ ]
Unable to Judge
[ ]
* Using the following grading scale please indicate your assessment of the quality of specific services in
your community (100 = the best, 0 = the worst):
Community-based services ( 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 No opinion)
Hospital services ( 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 No opinion)
Long term care services ( 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 No opinion)
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1B. The Regionalisation of Health Services
* The regionalisation ofhealth services has resulted in greater responsiveness to local community
needs.
Strongly agree
[ ]
Agree
[ ]
Neutral
[ J
Disagree
[ ]
Strongly disagree
[ ]
No Opinion
[ ]
* The regionalisation ofhealth services has reduced costs.
Strongly agree
[ ]
Agree
[ ]
Neutral
[ ]
Disagree
[ ]
Strongly disagree
[ ]
No Opinion
[ ]
* The regionalisation ofhealth services has improved the services available to your patients.
Strongly agree
[ ]
Agree
[ ]
Neutral
[ ]
Disagree
[ ]
Strongly disagree
[ ]
No Opinion
[ 1
* The members ofyour local health board are:
All elected by the
community
[ ]
Mostly elected with
some appointed by the
Ministry of Health
[ ]
Approximately half
are elected and half
are appointed
[ ]
Mostly appointed
with some elected by
the community.
[ ]
All appointed by the
Ministry of Health
[ ]
* Physicians are sufficiently represented on your local health board.
Strongly agree
[ ]
Agree
[ ]
Neutral
[ ]
Disagree
[ ]
Strongly disagree
[ ]
No Opinion
[ ]
* The members of your health board seem knowledgeable about local health service issues.
Strongly agree
[ ]
Agree
i ]
Neutral
[ ]
Disagree
[ ]
Strongly disagree
[ ]
No Opinion
[ ]
* In your opinion, the members ofyour local health board are able to work together to meet
common objectives.
Strongly agree
[ ]
Agree
[ ]
Neutral
[ ]
Disagree
[ ]
Strongly disagree
[ ]
No Opinion
[ ]
*Your local health board is effective in governing the health region.
Strongly agree
[ ]
Agree
[ ]
Neutral
[ ]
Disagree
[ ]
Strongly disagree
[ ]
No Opinion
[ ]
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2. EQUITY: In this section, we are seeking to measure equity. Equity is defined as the
fairness of the exchange between efforts and costs (inputs) and the value of the rewards
(outputs) received. Please indicate your opinion in each of the following statements.
* The level of RESPECT for physicians by
Patients is: (Vc=ry High High Moderate Low Very Low No Opinion)
Nurses is: (Very High High Moderate Low Very Low No Opinion)
Administrators is: (Very High High Moderate Low Very Low No Opinion)
* How often do you feel that you give a great deal ofATIENTION TO YOUR PATIENTS, but
get little appreciation in return.
Very Often
[ 1
Often
[ ]
OCcasionally
[ ]
Rarely
[ ]
Very Rarely
[ ]
No opinion
[ ]
* The amount of INTERESTING ",\lORK in your daily activities is:
Very High
[ I
High
[ 1
Moderate
[ ]
Low
[ ]
Very Low
[ ]
No opinion
[ ]
* The amount ofTRNIAL WORK in your daily activities is:
Very High High Moderate Low Very Low No opinion
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
:I: Do you FACE BARRIERS in developing your clinical skills?
Very Often Often OCcasionally Rarely Very Rarely No opinion
[ 1 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 1 [ ]
* Presently your SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT in daily activities is:
Very High High Moderate Low Very Low No opinion
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 1 [ ]
* The quality of your work is RECOGNIZED BY YOUR PEERS:
Very Often Often OCcasionally Rarely Very Rarely No opinion
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ 1 [ I [ ]
* How often do you feel that you WORK TOO HARD for the rewards received?
Very Often
[ ]
Often
[ ]
Occasionally
[ ]
Rarely
[ J
Very Rarely
[ ]
No opinion
[ ]
* How often do you feel that making the EXTRA EFFORT is worth the rewards received?
Very Often
[ ]
Often
[ J
Occasionally
[ J
Rarely
[ J
Very Rarely
[ J
No opinion
[ ]
* The proportion of your patients with COMPLICATED CLINICAL CONDITIONS is:
Very High
[ ]
High
[ ]
Moderate
[ ]
Low
[ ]
Very Low
[ ]
No opinion
[ ]
* The proportion ofyour patients with LOW SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS is:
Very High
[ ]
High
[ ]
Moderate
I ]
Low
I ]
Very Low
I ]
No opinion
[ ]
* The proportion ofyour patients experiencing difficulty in COPING WITH PERSONAL
IFAMILY PROBLEMS is:
Very High
I ]
High
I ]
Moderate
I }
Low
I ]
Very Low
I ]
No opinion
[ ]
* How often do you feel that you give a great deal ofattention to ADMINISTRATIVE DUTIES
associated with your practice group, but get little appreciation in return?
Very Often Often OCcasionally Rarely Very Rarely No opinion[] I] I} I] I] I]
* Your level of financial compensation fairly reflects the RESPONSffiILITIES you have.
Strongly agree
[ ]
Agree
[ ]
Neutral
[ 1
Disagree
[ 1
Strongly disagree
[ 1
No Opinion
[ ]
* Your level of financial compensation fairly reflects the EXPERIENCE you have.
Strongly agree
[ ]
Agree
[ ]
Neutral
[ 1
Disagree
[ ]
Strongly disagree
[ ]
No Opinion
[ ]
* Your level of financial compensation fairly reflects the STRESSES ofyour work.
Strongly agree
[ 1
Agree
[ 1
Neutral
[ ]
Disagree
[ ]
Strongly disagree
[ 1
No Opinion
[ J
* The process used in your province to detennine rates ofreimbursement fairly represents ALL
AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION in the deliberations.
Strongly agree
[ ]
Agree
[ ]
Neutral
[ ]
Disagree
[ ]
Strongly disagree
[ ]
No Opinion
[ J
* How often do you play an IMPORTANT ROLE in the health ofyour patients?
Very Often Often Occasionally Rarely Very Rarely
[] (] [] [] []
No opinion
I ]
* How often do you make an IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION to your medical community?
Very Often Often Occasionally Rarely Very Rarely No opinion
I] I] [] I] [] I]
In general, the rewards (tangible and intangible) for the work that you do are:
Excellent Very Good Good Adequate Poor Very Poor Terrible
I ] I ] I ] I ] I ] I ] [ }
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3. Regular Working Hours (excluding On Call)
Please indicate whether you would like to spend more or less time devoted to specific activities.
You may wish to spend time on activities that you are not currently doing (eg. teaching or
research); this can be indicated by using the ratings of more or much more.
Much No Do Much
Patient Care More More Change Less Less
Assessment & Treatment by you alone D D D D 0
Assessment & Treatment by you as part of a team 0 0 0 0 0
Communicating Care Plan to other health personnel 0 0 0 0 0
Counselling patients on risk factors & healthy habits 0 0 0 D 0
Research & Teaching Much Much
More ,",fore Same Less Less
Research: Clinical trials, presenting papers, etc. 0 0 0 D 0
Teaching: lecturing & demonstrating techniques. 0 0 0 0 0
Maintaining Knowledge Much Much
More More Same Less Less
Reading medical journals, CME activities, etc. 0 0 D D D
Clinical Rounds, Case Conferences, etc. 0 D D D D
Management Functions lvluch Much
More J\-/ore Same Less Less
Completing paperwork associated with your practice 0 D D D D
Attending committee meetings. writing reports, etc. 0 D D D D
%
%
0/0
%
100 %
Research and Teaching
Maintaining Knowledge
Management Functions
Total
Please indicate the approximate percentage of time you now spend on these activities:
Patient Care
Approximately how many hours do you work per week (excluding on call)?
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4. On-Call
How many WEEKDAY
evenings are you On-Call in
an average month?
NOlie 1-4 per
month
D D
5-8 per
month
D
9-12 per
month
D
13-16 per 17 + per
month month
o 0
Is FRIDAY night part of the
weekend On-eaIl coverage?
Do you cover the entire
weekend alone?
How many WEEKENDS in
an average month are you On-
Call? (1.2,30( ['-~ _
Yes 0 NoO Yes 0 NoO
5. Managing Health and Stress
Do you: Very Often Often Sometimes Rarely Never
get regular exercise (at least 3 times per week)
eat well balanced meals (including breakfast)
get a full night's sleep
smoke cigarettes/cigars! or pipe
consume alcoholic beverages
get tasks done without feeling rushed
experience conflict between work commitments &
personal responsibilities
take time to pursue a special interest or hobby
have time to keep up with developments in your
clinical specialty
experience frustration in gaining access to
services/facilities for your patients
feel fatigued during the day
experience frustration in dealing with demanding
patients
regularly interact with coJleagues (other than
consults) to discuss professional issues
Very High High Moderate Low Very Low
• How would you rate your level of Stress? D D D D D
Very Good Good Fair Poor Very Poor
• How would you rate your level ofHealth? D D D D D
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6. Satisfaction with Medicine as a Career: In the following questions we would like you
to indicate your satisfaction with various aspects of your professional career.
How satisfied are you with:
* the predictability ofyour work schedule?
Somewhat Somewhat Very
Very satisfied Satisfied satisfied dissatisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied No opinion
[ ] [ J [ J [ J [ J [ ) [ ]
* the congeniality ofyour practice setting?
Somewhat Somewhat Very
Very satisfied Satisfied satisfied dissatisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied No opinion
[ ] [ ] [ J [ ] [ ) [ ) [ J
* the availability of resources needed to treat your patients?
Somewhat Somewhat Very
Very satisfied Satisfied satisfied dissatisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied No opinion
[ ] [ J [ J [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* the amount of time available to spend with your patients?
Somewhat Somewhat Very
Very satisfied Satisfied satisfied dissatisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied No opinion
[ ] [ ] [ J [ ] [ J [ ] [ J
* the level of awareness you have about the lives of your patients?
Somewhat Somewhat Very
Very satisfied Satisfied satisfied dissatisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied No opinion
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* the degree of trust between you and your patients?
Somewhat Somewhat Very
Very satisfied Satisfied satisfied dissatisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied No opinion
[ ] [ ] [ J [ J [ ] [ ] [ ]
* your income as a physician?
Somewhat Somewhat Very
Very satisfied Satisfied satisfied dissatisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied No opinion
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ J [ ]
* time available to be with your family and friends?
Somewhat Somewhat Very
Very satisfied Satisfied satisfied dissatisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied No opinion
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
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How satisfied are you with:
No opinion
[ J
Very
Dissatisfied
[ ]
Dissatisfied
[ ]
Satisfied
[ ]
Very satisfied
[ ]
* the autonomy you have over how you do your job?
Somewhm Somewhm
satisfied dissatisfied
[ ] [ ]
* your status within the medical community?
Very satisfied
[ J
Satisfied
[ ]
Somewhat
satisfied
[ ]
Somewhat
dissatisfied
[ ]
Dissatisfied
[ ]
Very
Dissatisfied
[ ]
No opinion
[ ]
* the variety in the work that you do?
Somewhat Somewhat Very
Very satisfied Satisfied satisfied dissatisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied No opinion
[ ] [ ] I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* your opportunities to pursue professional interests?
Somewhat Somewhat Very
Very satisfied Satisfied satisfied dissatisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied No opinion
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
No opinion
[ I
Very
Dissatisfied
[ I
Dissatisfied
[ I
Somewhat
dissatisfied
I I
Satisfied
I ]
Very satisfied
[ ]
* your development as a professional?
Somewhat
satisfied
[ . ]
* being able to minimize interruptions to your time at home?
Somewhat Somewhat Very
Very satisfied Satisfied satisfied dissatisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied No opinion
[ ] [ ] [ I [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* the type of committee work that you do?
Somewhat Somewhat Very
Very satisfied Satisfied satisfied dissatisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied No opinion
[ I [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
In general, how satisfied are you with your medical career?
Somewhat Somewhat
Very satisfied Satisfied satisfied dissatisfied Dissatisfied[ I [ ] [ I I ] [ ]
Very
Dissatisfied
[ ]
No opinion
[ ]
9
7. Your Practice
a) Organizational Arrangements
[ ] Solo/lndividual Practice
[ ] Share space and reception staff expenses
[ ] Share space, reception and clinical staff expenses
[ ] Share revenues, space, reception and
clinical staff expenses
] Other: _
Do you agree that your current organizational arrangement is the most appropriate for your practice group?
Strongly Agree
[ ]
Agree
[ ]
Neutral
[ ]
Disagree
[ ]
Strongly Disagree
[ ]
Very Difficult
[ ]
Difficult
[ ]
Somewhat Difficult
[ ]
Somewhat Easy
[ ]
Easy
[ ]
How easy or difficult would it be for you to make changes to the organizational arrangements within your
practice group?
Very Easy
[ ]
b) What percentage of your reimbursement comes from the following methods?
t------%o.w.....t Fee-for-service
t-----%~ Salary
t-----%~ Capitated rate per patient
....- %~ Sessional
10- %....... Other:
100 0/0
Do you agree that your current reimbursement method is the most appropriate for what you do?
Strongly Agree
[ ]
Agree
[ ]
Neutral
[ ]
Disagree
[ ]
Strongly Disagree
[ ]
How easy or difficult would it be for you to make changes to your current reimbunement arrangements?
Very Easy
[ ]
Easy
[ ]
Somewhat Easy
[ ]
Somewhat Difficult
[ ]
Difficult
[ ]
Very Difficult
[ ]
c) How many physicians (including yourself) are in your practice group? _
How often do you routinely meet as a practice group to discuss patient care issues?
] Daily
] Weekly
] Bi-weekly
] Monthly
] Every 6 months
] Annually
] Never
How often do nurses participate in these meetings?
Always
[ ]
Most of the time
[ ]
Sometimes
[ ]
Rarely
[ ]
Never
[ ]
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d) Within your practice setting (office/clinic) the nurse's role includes (check all that apply):
[ ] receptionist/secretarial/clerical duties
[ ] preparing the patient for examination by the physician
[ ] conducting preliminary examinations
[ ] perfonning delegated clinical duties with substantial physician supervision
[ ] perfonning delegated clinical duties with limited physician supervision
[ ] other duties _
Would you like the clinical role of Dunes in your practice setting to be enlarged or reduced?
Greatly Enlarged
[ ]
Enlarged
[ ]
Remain the same
[ ]
Reduced
[ ]
Greatly Reduced
[ ]
e) In the LAST MONTH how often did you refer a patient to an allied health professional
such as a physical therapist or dietitian.
Daily
[ ]
Every few days
[ ]
Weekly
[ ]
Every other week
[ ]
Once
[ ]
Not at all
[ ]
t) In the LAST MONTH how often did you refer a patient to a counselor such as a
psychologist or social worker.
Daily
[ ]
Every few days
[ ]
Weekly
[ ]
Every other week
[ ]
Once
[ ]
Not at all
[ ]
g) In general, what is your approach when making complex clinical decisions:
[ ] To gather all of the relevant facts myself and make the clinical decision myself
[ ] To obtain consults from others and make the clinical decision myself
[ ] To discuss the clinical case with others and then make the clinical decision myself
[ ] To have all relevant people confer and the clinical decision is then made by the group
Would you agree that your approach to complex decisions is similar to the other members of your practice
group?
Strongly Agree
[ ]
Agree
[ ]
Neutral
[ ]
Disagree
[ ]
Strongly disagree Not Applicable
[ ] [ ]
h) The patient care philosophy of your practice is:
[ ) determined by me a/one, since I am in solo/individual practice.
[ ] at the discretion of each physician within the practice group.
[ ] detennined by each physician after discussions with the practice group.
[ ] detennined by group consensus.
[ ] determined by the senior physicians after discussions with the practice group.
[ ] determined by the senior physicians.
[ ] other _
i) Your efforts to develop clinical skills are supported by the other members of your group.
Strongly Agree
[ ]
Agree
[ ]
Neutral
[ ]
Disagree
[ ]
Strongly disagree Not Applicable
[ ] [ ]
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8. Demographics
a. Main area of specialization b. Additional areas of practice
c. How old are you? years d. Gender [ ] Female [ ] Male
e. How many years have you been practising? years
f. Did you work prior to entering medical school (excluding summer jobs)?
[ ] Yes [ ] No
g. If YES to (0, \\lhat position: How many years'! _
\Vbat position: How many years? _
h. l\tlarital Status:
[ ] Single
[ ] Married/Common Law
[ ] Separated
[ ] Divorced
[ ] Widowed
[ ] Other
1. Dependents:
Ages of Children still living at home
--'--'--'--'--'--
Ages of dependent adults living with you
--,--,--,--,--
9. What issues should be covered in fOllow-up surveys?
Thank-you for your cooperation in this study. The results will be analysed and reported in broad groups
to protect the identity ofindividuaIphysicians. Your identity will be held in strictest confidence.
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APPENDIX 3:
SEM Analysis - Multi-linear Pathways
".15
Cost Sharing
Share Records
Quality of long
long tenn Care
Quality of
Commuity Care
Remuneration
Process Fair
.38
.37
~ EQUITALL~--r------,.-,,; ----..,.,.,.~ ....:_.___'
~ Coping WithDISTRESS Time Demands
AGE
.41 Technical Specialist
Share of
Complex Patients
Wish to Reallocate Proportion of Time
GY Time (Construct) n TeachinglResearcProportion of Time
On Administration
opriorimodel: July 5.2001 02:07 PM
opriorimodel: 05/07/01 2:07: 14 PM
Fit Measures
Fit Measure Default model Saturated Indeoendence Macro
Discrepancy 223.188 O.oo:J 8663.071 CMIN
Degrees of freedom 110 0 153 OF
P O.o:x:l O.OO'J P
Number of parameters 60 170 17 NPAR
Discrepancy / df 2.029 56.621 CMINDF
RMR RMR
GFI GFI
Adjusted GFI AGFI
Parsimony-adjusted GFI PGFI
Normed fit index 0.974 1.00J O.cm NFl
Relative fit index 0.964 O.CXXJ RFI
Incremental fit index 0.987 1.(X)() O.roJ IFI
Tucker-lewis index 0.982 O.oo:J TU
Comparative fit index 0.987 1.CXXl O.CXXJ CFI
Parsimony ratio 0.719 O.oo:J l.CID PRATIO
Parsimony-odjusted NFl 0.700 O.(X)() O.CXX> PNFI
Parsimony-adjusted CFI 0.709 O.OCXJ O.roJ PCFI
Noncentrality parameter estimc 113.188 o.em 8510.071 NCP
NCP lower bound 74.361 O.CXJO 8208.400 NCPLO
NCP upper bound 159.793 O.QCX) 8818.055 NCPHI
FMIN 0.934 0.000 36.247 FMIN
FO 0.474 O.CXXJ 35.607 FO
Fa lower bound 0.311 O.CXXJ 34.345 FOlO
Fa upper bound 0.669 0.000 36.896 FOHI
RMSEA 0.066 0.482 RMSEA
RMSEA lower bound 0.053 0.474 RMSEALO
RMSEA upper bound 0.078 0.491 RMSEAHI
P for test of close fit 0.021 O.OOJ PClOSE
Akaike information criterion (AIC 343.188 340.000 8697.071 AIC
Browne-Cudeck criterion 352.962 367.692 8699.840 BCC
Bayes information criterion BIC
Consistent AIC CAlC
Expected cross validation inde> 1.436 1.423 36.389 ECVI
ECVllower bound 1.273 1.423 35.127 ECVILO
ECVI upper bound 1.631 1.423 37.678 ECVIHI
MECVI 1.477 1.538 36.401 MECVI
Hoelter .05 index 146 6 HFIVE
Hoelter .01 index 158 6 HONE
Page 1
opriorimodel: july 5. 2001 02:07 PM
opriorimodel: 05/07/01 2:07:14 PM
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Lobel
EQUITALl <- SPZNDUM3 -2.158 0.765 -2.819 O.ooS por-4
EQUITALl <- SPZNDUM2 -2.248 0.613 -3.665 O.CXXJ poreS
EQUITA~ <- ORGDUM2 1.579 0.498 3.172 0.002 por-6
EQUITALl <- QUALTCR2 0.788 0.305 2.554 0.010 por-7
EQUITALL <- QUALCOM2 1.133 0.356 3.186 0.001 por-8
EQUITALL <- COMMDUM4 -1.510 0.648 -2.331 0.020 por-9
EQUITALL <- SHARECDS 1.696 0.588 2.887 0.004 por-l0
EQUITALL <- PROCESS 1.776 0.326 5.A56 O.OJJ por-l1
EQUlTA~ <- COPING 0.452 0.100 4.510 O.OOJ por-12
DISTRESS <- CMPLPT2 -0.894 0.323 -2.765 0.006 por-l
DISTRESS <- SPZNDUM4 -2.285 0.426 -5.362 O.OJJ por-2
DISTRESS <- AGE -0.033 0.018 -1.819 0.069 por-3
DISTRESS <- COPING 0.401 0.068 5.892 O.OOJ por-14
DISTRESS <- EQUITALL 0.251 0.035 7.151 O.OJJ por-16
Timpref8 <- COPING 0.229 0.079 2.912 0.004 por- 13
Timpret8 <- DISTRESS 0.423 0.061 6.987 O.CXX) por-15
Timpret8 <- MANTRINO 0.844 0.268 3.148 0.002 por-17
Timpref8 <- RANDT3 0.525 0.234 2.247 0.025 por-18
Standardized Regression Weights
Estimate
EQUITALl <- SPZNDUM3 -0.161
EQUITALL <- SPZNDUM2 -0.200
EQUITALL <- ORGDUM2 0.166
EQUITALL <- QUALTCR2 0.168
EQUITALl <- QUALCOM2 0.204
EQUITALL <- COMMDUM4 -0.124
EQUITA~ <- SHARECDS 0.168
EQUITALL <- PROCESS 0.295
EQUITALl <- COPING 0.233
DISTRESS <- CMPLPT2 -0.141
DISTRESS <- SPZNDUM4 -0.272
DISTRESS <- AGE -0.092
DISTRESS <- COPING 0.308
DISTRESS <- EQUITALL 0.375
Timpref8 <- COPING 0.172
Timpref8 <- DISTRESS 0.413
Timpref8 <- MANTRINO 0.171
Timpret8 <- RANDT3 0.122
Means
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Lobel
QUALCOM2 2.597 0.055 46.894 O.CXX> por-30
COMMDUM4 0.182 0.025 7.221 O.CXX> por-31
SPZNDUM2 0.230 0.027 8.463 a.em por-32
SPZNDUM3 0.142 0.023 6.202 o.em por-33
ORGDUM2 0.434 0.032 13.457 O.CXXJ por-34
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opriorimodel: July 5.2001 02:07 PM
opriorimodel: 05/07/01 2:07:14 PM
SHARECDS 1.326 0.032 41.996 O.COO pa-35
COPING 11.746 0.158 74.379 O.COO por-36
QUALTCR2 2.928 0.065 44.772 o.em par-42
PROCESS 2.041 0.051 39.805 O.COO par-43
AGE 46.088 0.567 81.324 O.COO por-37
SPZNDUM4 0.172 0.024 7.020 O.CXX> por-38
CMPlPT2 1.535 0.033 47.169 O.CXX> par-39
RANDT3 2.037 0.049 41.696 O.CXXl par-40
MANTRINO 2.104 0.043 49.398 O.COO par-41
Intercepts
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
EQUITALL 9.306 1.701 5.472 O.CXX> par-27
DISTRESS 10.128 1.446 7.003 O.COO par-28
TItllPref8 3.362 1.3M 2.501 0.012 par-29
Covariances
Estimate S.E. C.R. P label
QUAlTCR2 <-> SHARECDS 0.069 0.025 2.771 0.006 par-19
QUALTCR2 <-> QUALCOM2 0.504 0.064 7.855 a.CXX> par-20
SPZNDUM2 <-> COMMDUM4 0.031 0.010 2.974 0.003 par-21
SPZNDUM3 <-> SPZNDUM2 -0.037 0.009 -3.981 O.CXX> par-22
SPZNDUM3 <-> SHARECDS 0.048 0.011 4.308 O.CXX> par-23
SHARECDS <-> PROCESS 0.069 0.025 2.771 0.006 par-24
SPZNDUM3 <-> PROCESS 0.063 0.018 3.534 a.coo par-25
ORGDUM2 <-> PROCESS 0.052 0.025 2.076 0.038 par-26
Conelations
Estimate
QUALTCR2 <-> SHARECDS 0.147
QUALTCR2 <-> QUALCOM2 0.587
SPZNDUM2 <-> COMMDUMA 0.191
SPZNDUM3 <-> SPZNDUM2 -0.247
SPZNDUM3 <-> SHARECDS 0.290
SHARECDS <-> PROCESS 0.187
SPZNDUM3 <-> PROCESS 0.228
ORGDUM2 <-> PROCESS 0.133
Variances
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
SPZNDUM3 0.124 0.011 10.987 O.OCXJ par-44
SPZNDUM2 0.176 0.016 10.936 O.CXXl par-45
ORGDUM2 0.246 0.023 10.863 0.00:> par-46
QUALTCR2 1.015 0.093 10.970 O.CXX> par-A7
QUALCOM2 0.728 0.067 10.887 O.CXXl par-48
COMMDUM4 0.149 0.014 10.818 O.CXXl par-49
SHARECDS 0.218 0.021 10.418 O.CXXl par-50
PROCESS 0.617 0.057 10.832 0.00:> par-51
COPING 5.920 0.544 10.888 O.CXX> par-52
0 13.735 1.280 10.731 O.roJ par-53
CMPLPT2 0.249 0.023 10.BAO O.roJ par-54
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opriorimodel: July 5, 2001 02:07 PM
opriorimodel: 05/07/01 2:07:14 PM
SPZNDUM4
AGE
b
MANTRINO
RANDT3
c
Squared Multiple Correlations
EQUfTAU
DISTRESS
TImpref8
0.142 0.013 10.909 a.em par-55
76.439 7.r1J7 10.909 a.em par-56
6.082 0.561 10.833 a.em par-57
0.430 0.040 10.886 a.CXXl par-58
0.566 0.052 10.886 a.CXXl par-59
7.328 0.672 10.905 a.em par-60
Estimate
0.385
0.392
0.301
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APPENDIX 4:
SEM Analysis - Main Pathway Model
parsimonious: December 14, 2001 03:20 PM
parsimonious: 14/12/01 3:20:46 PM
Fit Measures
Fit Measure Default model Saturated Independence Macro
Discrepancy 24.585 0.000 5824.000 CMIN
Degrees of freedom 19 0 36 DF
P 0.175 0.000 P
Number of parameters 25 44 8 NPAR
Discrepancy / df 1.294 161.778 CMINDF
RMR RMR
GFI GFI
Adjusted GFI AGFI
Parsimony-adjusted GFI PGFI
Normed fit index 0.996 1.000 0.000 NFl
Relative fit index 0.992 0.000 RFI
Incremental fit index 0.999 1.000 0.000 IFI
Tucker-Lewis index 0.998 0.000 TLI
Comparative fit index 0.999 1.000 0.000 CFI
Parsimony ratio 0.528 0.000 1.000 PRATIO
Parsimony-adjusted NFl 0.526 0.000 0.000 PNFI
Parsimony-adjusted CFI 0.527 0.000 0.000 PCFI
Noncentrality parameter estim< 5.585 0.000 5788.000 NCP
NCP lower bound 0.000 0.000 5540.489 NCPLO
NCP upper bound 22.544 0.000 6041.799 NCPHI
FMIN 0.103 0.000 24.368 FMIN
FO 0.023 0.000 24.218 FO
FO lower bound 0.000 0.000 23.182 FOLO
FO upper bound 0.094 0.000 25.279 FOHI
RMSEA 0.035 0.820 RMSEA
RMSEA lower bound 0.000 0.802 RMSEALO
RMSEA upper bound 0.070 0.838 RMSEAHI
P for test of close fit 0.718 0.000 PCLOSE
Akaike information criterion (AIC 74.585 88.000 5840.000 AIC
Browne-Cudeck criterion 76.541 91.443 5840.626 BCC
Bayes information criterion BIC
Consistent AIC CAlC
Expected cross validation inde> 0.312 0.368 24.435 ECVI
ECVI lower bound 0.289 0.368 23.400 ECVILO
ECVI upper bound 0.383 0.368 25.497 ECVIHI
MECVI 0.320 0.383 24.438 MECVI
Hoelter .05 index 294 3 HFIVE
Hoelter .01 index 352 3 HONE
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parsimonious: December 14, 2001 03:20 PM
parsimonious: 14/12/01 3:20:46 PM
Regression Weights
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
DISTRESS <- Distributive_Equity 0.926 0.145 6.392 0.000 par-6
Wish to_Reallocate_Time <-- DISTRESS 0.134 0.024 5.651 0.000 par-7
EXTRTANG <-- Distributive_Equity 1.000
INTRINSC <- Distributive_Equity 0.719 0.111 6.454 0.000 par-1
EXINTANG <- Distributive_Equity 0.491 0.086 5.699 0.000 par-2
TIME4 <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 1.138 0.242 4.691 0.000 par-3
TIME3 <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 0.828 0.198 4.181 0.000 par-4
TIME2 <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 1.000
TIMEl <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 0.932 0.236 3.947 0.000 par-5
Standardized Regression Weights
Estimate
DISTRESS <- Distributive_Equity 0.613
Wish to_Reallocate_Time <- DISTRESS 0.706
EXTRTANG <- Distributive_Equity 0.663
INTRINSC <- Distributive_Equity 0.631
EXINTANG <- Distributive_Equity 0.504
TIME4 <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 0.524
TIME3 <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 0.421
TIME2 <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 0.463
TIMEl <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 0.384
Intercepts
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
DISTRESS 17.925 0.201 89.271 0.000 par-13
TIME2 2.090 0.431 4.844 0.000 par-8
TIMEl 2.182 0.481 4.538 0.000 par-9
EXTRTANG 13.750 0.200 68.592 0.000 par-10
INTRINSC 11.492 0.151 75.869 0.000 par-11
EXINTANG 12.279 0.130 94.802 0.000 par-12
TIME3 1.727 0.391 4.412 0.000 par-14
TIME4 1.127 0.434 2.598 0.009 par-15
Variances
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
Distributive_Equity 4.222 0.926 4.557 0.000 par-16
d 6.012 0.750 8.013 0.000 par-17
5w 0.174 0.069 2.513 0.012 par-18
lw 1.734 0.174 9.960 0.000 par-19
1e 5.382 0.756 7.121 0.000 par-20
2e 3.302 0.428 7.722 0.000 par-21
3e 2.990 0.321 9.322 0.000 par-22
3w 1.101 0.113 9.709 0.000 par-23
2w 1.270 0.136 9.362 0.000 par-24
4w 1.185 0.136 8.685 0.000 par-25
Squared MUltiple Correlations
Estimate
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parsimonious: December 14, 2001 03:20 PM
parsimonious: 14/12/01 3:20:46 PM
DISTRESS 0.376
Wish to_Reallocate_Time 0.498
TIME4 0.274
TIME2 0.214
TIME3 0.177
EXINTANG 0.254
INTRINSC 0.398
EXTRTANG 0.440
TIME1 0.148
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APPENDIX 5:
SEM Analysis - Stage ONE Model
stage 1: December 14, 2001 03:22 PM
stage 1: 14/12/01 3:22:56 PM
Fit Measures
Fit Measure Default model Saturated Independence Macro
Discrepancy 25.481 0.000 5724.445 CMIN
Degrees of freedom 16 0 36 DF
P 0.062 0.000 P
Number of parameters 28 44 8 NPAR
Discrepancy / df 1.593 159.012 CMINDF
RMR RMR
GFI GFI
Adjusted GFI AGFI
Parsimony-adjusted GFI PGFI
Normed fit index 0.996 1.000 0.000 NFl
Relative fit index 0.990 0.000 RFI
Incremental fit index 0.998 1.000 0.000 IFI
Tucker-Lewis index 0.996 0.000 TLI
Comparative fit index 0.998 1.000 0.000 CFI
Parsimony ratio 0.444 0.000 1.000 PRAllO
Parsimony-adjusted NFl 0.442 0.000 0.000 PNFI
Parsimony-adjusted CFI 0.444 0.000 0.000 PCFI
Noncentrality parameter estim< 9.481 0.000 5688.445 NCP
NCP lower bound 0.000 0.000 5443.093 NCPLO
NCP upper bound 27.332 0.000 5940.086 NCPHI
FMIN 0.107 0.000 23.952 FMIN
FO 0.040 0.000 23.801 FO
FO lower bound 0.000 0.000 22.774 FOLO
FO upper bound 0.114 0.000 24.854 FOHI
RMSEA 0.050 0.813 RMSEA
RMSEA lower bound 0.000 0.795 RMSEALO
RMSEA upper bound 0.085 0.831 RMSEAHI
P for test of close fit 0.463 0.000 PCLOSE
Akaike information criterion (AIC 81.481 88.000 5740.445 AIC
Browne-Cudeck criterion 83.673 91.443 5741.071 BCC
Bayes information criterion BIC
Consistent AIC CAlC
Expected cross validation inde> 0.341 0.368 24.019 ECVI
ECVllower bound 0.301 0.368 22.992 ECVILO
ECVI upper bound 0.416 0.368 25.071 ECVIHI
MECVI 0.350 0.383 24.021 MECVI
Hoelter .05 index 247 3 HFIVE
Hoelter .01 index 301 3 HONE
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stage 1: December 14, 2001 03:22 PM
stage 1: 14/12/01 3:22:56 PM
par-18
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
Distributive_Equity <- process 0.368 0.102 3.619 0.000 par-8
Distributive_Equity <- Local Health_System 1.440 0.409 3.520 0.000 par-9
Distributive_Equity <-- COPING 0.112 0.032 3.517 0.000 par-10
QUALCOM2 <- Local Health_System 1.217 0.292 4.175 0.000 par-1
HCSEFF2 <- Local Health_System 1.000
HBSACCS2 <- Local Health_System 1.043 0.270 3.862 0.000 par-2
INTRINSC <- Distributive_Equity 1.501 0.284 5.284 0.000 par-3
EXTRTANG <- Distributive_Equity 2.566 0.460 5.583 0.000 par-5
EXINTANG <- Distributive_Equity 1.000
Standardized Regression Weights
Estimate
Distributive_Equity <-- process 0.314
Distributive_Equity <- Local Health_System 0.594
Distributive_Equity <- COPING 0.298
QUALCOM2 <- Local Health_System 0.535
HCSEFF2 <- Local Health_System 0.510
HBSACCS2 <- Local Health_System 0.434
INTRINSC <-- Distributive_Equity 0.583
EXTRTANG <- Distributive_Equity 0.753
EXINTANG <- Distributive_Equity 0.454
Means
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
COPING 11.758 0.157 75.050 0.000 par-17
process 2.046 0.050 40.761 0.000 par-18
Intercepts
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
HCSEFF2 3.133 0.048 65.885 0.000 par-11
HBSACCS2 3.157 0.059 53.713 0.000 par-12
QUALCOM2 2.595 0.055 46.861 0.000 par-13
EXINTANG 10.212 0.490 20.858 0.000 par-14
INTRINSC 8.388 0.651 12.891 0.000 par-15
EXTRTANG 8.446 0.979 8.624 0.000 par-16
Covariances
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
process <-> COPING 0.061 0.122 0.502 0.616 par-4
process <-> Local Health_System 0.031 0.027 1.139 0.255 par-6
COPING <-> Local Health_System 0.034 0.084 0.408 0.684 par-7
Correlations
Estimate
process <->COPING 0.032
process <-> Local Health_System 0.106
COPING <-> Local Health_System 0.038
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stage 1: December 14,2001 03:22 PM
stage 1: 14/12/01 3:22:56 PM
Variances
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
Local Health_System 0.141 0.048 2.960 0.003 par-19
process 0.602 0.055 10.932 0.000 par-20
COPING 5.867 0.537 10.932 0.000 par-21
4e 0.332 0.136 2.433 0.015 par-22
ih 0.400 0.050 8.017 0.000 par-23
3h 0.519 0.069 7.581 0.000 par-24
2h 0.660 0.074 8.981 0.000 par-25
2e 3.620 0.413 8.756 0.000 par-26
3e 3.183 0.322 9.882 0.000 par-27
le 4.160 0.762 5.457 0.000 par-28
Squared Multiple Correlations
Estimate
Distributive_Equity 0.599
EXINTANG 0.206
EXTRTANG 0.567
INTRINSC 0.340
HBSACCS2 0.188
HCSEFF2 0.260
QUALCOM2 0.286
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APPENDIX 6:
SEM Analysis - Stage TWO Model
stage 2: December 14, 2001 03:24 PM
stage 2: 14/12/01 3:24:08 PM
Fit Measures
Fit Measure Default model Saturated Independence Macro
Discrepancy 30.234 0.000 6661.299 CMIN
Degrees of freedom 22 0 45 DF
P 0.113 0.000 P
Number of parameters 32 54 9 NPAR
Discrepancy / df 1.374 148.029 CMINDF
RMR RMR
GFI GFI
Adjusted GFI AGFI
Parsimony-adjusted GFI PGFI
Normed fit index 0.995 1.000 0.000 NFl
Relative fit index 0.991 0.000 RFI
Incremental fit index 0.999 1.000 0.000 IFI
Tucker-Lewis index 0.997 0.000 TLI
Comparative fit index 0.999 1.000 0.000 CFI
Parsimony ratio 0.489 0.000 1.000 PRATIO
Parsimony-adjusted NFl 0.487 0.000 0.000 PNFI
Parsimony-adjusted CFI 0.488 0.000 0.000 PCFI
Noncentrality parameter estim< 8.234 0.000 6616.299 NCP
NCP lower bound 0.000 0.000 6351.413 NCPLO
NCP upper bound 26.804 0.000 6887.475 NCPHI
FMIN 0.127 0.000 27.872 FMIN
FO 0.034 0.000 27.683 FO
FO lower bound 0.000 0.000 26.575 FOLO
FO upper bound 0.112 0.000 28.818 FOHI
RMSEA 0.040 0.784 RMSEA
RMSEA lower bound 0.000 0.768 RMSEALO
RMSEA upper bound 0.071 0.800 RMSEAHI
P for test of close fit 0.668 0.000 PCLOSE
Akaike information criterion (Ale 94.234 108.000 6679.299 AIC
Browne-Cudeck criterion 97.028 112.716 6680.085 BCC
Bayes information criterion BIC
Consistent AIC CAlC
Expected cross validation inde> 0.394 0.452 27.947 ECVI
ECVllower bound 0.360 0.452 26.839 ECVILO
ECVI upper bound 0.472 0.452 29.081 ECVIHI
MECVI 0.406 0.472 27.950 MECVI
Hoelter .05 index 269 3 HFIVE
Hoelter .01 index 319 3 HONE
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stage 2: December 14, 2001 03:24 PM
stage 2: 14/12/01 3:24:08 PM
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
Distributive_Equity <- Local Health_System 1.459 0.403 3.616 0.000 par-4
Distributive_Equity <- COPING 0.123 0.033 3.712 0.000 par-9
Distributive_Equity <- process 0.375 0.102 3.689 0.000 par-12
QUALCOM2 <- Local Health_System 1.164 0.280 4.151 0.000 par-1
EXINTANG <- Distributive_Equity 1.000
INTRINSC <- Distributive_Equity 1.472 0.257 5.725 0.000 par-2
EXTRTANG <- Distributive_Equity 2.337 0.384 6.093 0.000 par-3
HCSEFF2 <- Local Health_System 1.000
HBSACCS2 <- Local Health_System 1.070 0.272 3.939 0.000 par-5
Distress <- Distributive_Equity 1.629 0.317 5.141 0.000 par-6
Distress <- COPING 0.276 0.079 3.497 0.000 par-8
Standardized Regression Weights
Estimate
Distributive_Equity <- Local Health_System 0.576
Distributive_Equity <- COPING 0.310
Distributive_Equity <- process 0.302
QUALCOM2 <- Local Health_System 0.518
EXINTANG <- Distributive_Equity 0.481
INTRINSC <- Distributive_Equity 0.605
EXTRTANG <- Distributive_Equity 0.726
HCSEFF2 <- Local Health_System 0.517
HBSACCS2 <- Local Health_System 0.450
Distress <- Distributive_Equity 0.505
Distress <- COPING 0.216
Means
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
COPING 11.758 0.157 75.050 0.000 par-19
process 2.046 0.050 40.761 0.000 par-20
Intercepts
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
HCSEFF2 3.133 0.048 65.885 0.000 par-13
HBSACCS2 3.157 0.059 53.709 0.000 par-14
QUALCOM2 2.595 0.055 46.860 0.000 par-15
EXINTANG 10.063 0.497 20.256 0.000 par-16
INTRINSC 8.229 0.653 12.598 0.000 par-17
EXTRTANG 8.570 0.955 8.971 0.000 par-18
Distress 11.063 0.953 11.608 0.000 par-21
Covariances
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
COPING <-> Local Health_System 0.032 0.085 0.383 0.702 par-7
COPING <-> process 0.061 0.122 0.502 0.616 par-10
process <-> Local Health_System 0.031 0.028 1.129 0.259 par-11
Correlations
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stage 2: December 14, 2001 03:24 PM
stage 2: 14/12/01 3:24:08 PM
Estimate
COPING <-> Local Health_System 0.035
COPING <-> process 0.032
process <-> Local Health_System O.lOS
Variances
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
Local Health_System 0.144 0.048 2.988 0.003 par-22
COPING 5.867 .0.537 10.932 0.000 par-23
process 0.602 0.055 10.932 0.000 par-24
4e 0.394 0.146 2.696 0.007 par-25
2h 0.648 0.074 8.784 0.000 par-26
3e 3.083 0.313 9.845 0.000 par-27
2e 3.477 0.395 8.797 0.000 par-28
ih 0.396 0.050 7.904 0.000 par-29
3h 0.532 0.068 7.860 0.000 par-30
le 4.544 0.669 6.788 0.000 par-31
ld 6.014 0.642 9.371 0.000 par-32
Squared Multiple Correlations
Estimate
Distributive_Equity 0.574
Distress 0.376
HCSEFF2 0.267
EXTRTANG 0.527
INTRINSC 0.366
EXINTANG 0.231
QUALCOM2 0.269
HBSACCS2 0.203
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APPENDIX 7:
SEM Analysis - Stage THREE Model (Initial)
stage 3a: December 14,2001 03:24 PM
stage 3a: 14/12/01 3:24:58 PM
Fit Measures
Fit Measure Default model Saturated Independence Macro
Discrepancy 88.696 0.000 9770.751 CMIN
Degrees of freedom 67 0 105 DF
P 0.039 0.000 P
Number of parameters 52 119 14 NPAR
Discrepancy / df 1.324 93.055 CMINDF
RMR RMR
GFI GFI
Adjusted GFI AGFI
Parsimony-adjusted GFI PGFI
Normed fit index 0.991 1.000 0.000 NFl
Relative fit index 0.986 0.000 RFI
Incremental fit index 0.998 1.000 0.000 IFI
Tucker-Lewis index 0.996 0.000 TLI
Comparative fit index 0.998 1.000 0.000 CFI
Parsimony ratio 0.638 0.000 1.000 PRATtO
Parsimony-adjusted NFl 0.632 0.000 0.000 PNFI
Parsimony-adjusted CFI 0.637 0.000 0.000 PCFI
Noncentrality parameter estim< 21.696 0.000 9665.751 NCP
NCP lower bound 1.224 0.000 9344.606 NCPLO
NCP upper bound 50.25"3 0.000 9993.195 NCPHI
FMIN 0.371 0.000 40.882 FMIN
FO 0.091 0.000 40.442 FO
FO lower bound 0.005 0.000 39.099 FOLO
FO upper bound 0.210 0.000 41.813 FOHI
RMSEA 0.037 0.621 RMSEA
RMSEA lower bound 0.009 0.610 RMSEALO
RMSEA upper bound 0.056 0.631 RMSEAHI
P for test of close fit 0.860 0.000 PCLOSE
Akaike information criterion (AI( 192.696 238.000 9798.751 AIC
Browne-Cudeck criterion 199.660 253.938 9800.626 BCC
Bayes information criterion BIC
Consistent AIC CAlC
Expected cross validation inde> 0.806 0.996 40.999 ECVI
ECVI lower bound 0.721 0.996 39.655 ECVILO
ECVI upper bound 0.926 0.996 42.369 ECVIHI
MECVI 0.835 1.063 41.007 MECVI
Hoelter .05 index 235 4 HFIVE
Hoelter .01 index 261 4 HONE
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stage 3a: December 14, 2001 03:24 PM
stage 3a: 14/12/01 3:24:58 PM
Regression Weights
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
Distributive_Equity <- Local Health_System 1.449 0.400 3.619 0.000 par-4
Distributive_Equity <- COPING 0.124 0.033 3.717 0.000 par-11
Distributive_Equity <- process 0.375 0.102 3.692 0.000 par-12
Distress <- Distributive_Equity 1.629 0.317 5.144 0.000 par-6
Distress <- COPING 0.276 0.079 3.493 0.000 par-10
Wish to_Reallocate_Time <- COPING 0.058 0.019 3.132 0.002 par-9
Wish to_Reallocate_Time <- mantrino 0.208 0.064 3.237 0.001 par-18
Wish to_Reallocate_Time <- Distress 0.094 0.019 5.078 0.000 par-21
QUALCOM2 <- Local Health_System 1.147 0.277 4.147 0.000 par-1
EXINTANG <-- Distributive_Equity 1.000
INTRINSC <- Distributive_Equity 1.471 0.257 5.727 0.000 par-2
EXTRTANG <- Distributive_Equity 2.334 0.383 6.095 0.000 par-3
HCSEFF2 <- Local Health_System 1.000
HBSACCS2 <- Local Health_System 1.070 0.270 3.955 0.000 par-5
Time2 <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 1.005 0.238 4.215 0.000 par-7
Time3 <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 1.000
Time1 <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 0.988 0.256 3.862 0.000 par-8
time4 <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 1.444 0.283 5.096 0.000 par-17
Standardized Regression Weights
Estimate
Distributive_Equity <- Local Health_System 0.575
Distributive_Equity <- COPING 0.311
Distributive_Equity <- process 0.302
Distress <- Distributive_Equity 0.506
Distress <- COPING 0.216
Wish to_Reallocate_Time <- COPING 0.281
Wish to_Reallocate_Time <- mantrino 0.271
Wish to_Reallocate_Time <- Distress 0.583
QUALCOM2 <- Local Health_System 0.514
EXINTANG <- Distributive_Equity 0.481
INTRINSC <- Distributive_Equity 0.605
EXTRTANG <- Distributive_Equity 0.725
HCSEFF2 <- Local Health_System 0.520
HBSACCS2 <- Local Health_System 0.453
Time2 <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 0.397
Time3 <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 0.434
Time1 <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 0.348
time4 <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 0.567
Means
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
COPING 11.758 0.157 75.050 0.000 par-28
process 2.046 0.050 40.761 0.000 par-29
mantrino 2.104 0.042 49.802 0.000 par-34
Intercepts
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
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stage 3a: December 14, 2001 03:24 PM
stage 3a: 14/12/01 3:24:58 PM
Distress 11.059 0.953 11.605 0.000 par-30
HCSEFF2 3.133 0.048 65.885 0.000 par-22
HBSACCS2 3.157 0.059 53.710 0.000 par-23
QUALCOM2 2.595 0.055 46.862 0.000 par-24
EXINTANG 10.059 0.497 20.236 0.000 par-25
INTRINSC 8.225 0.653 12.589 0.000 par-26
EXTRTANG 8.567 0.955 8.972 0.000 par-27
Time3 0.901 0.477 1.890 0.059 par-31
Time2 1.662 0.527 3.153 0.002 par-32
Time1 1.640 0.595 2.756 0.006 par-33
time4 -0.205 0.S07 -0.404 0.686 par-35
Covariances
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
process <-> Local Health_System 0.031 0.028 1.126 0.260 par-13
COPING <-> Local Health_System 0.032 0.085 0.378 0.705 par-14
COPING <-> process 0.061 0.122 0.502 0.616 par-15
mantrino <-> COPING 0.159 0.103 1.541 0.123 par-16
mantrino <-> Local Health_System 0.011 0.021 0.535 0.592 par-19
mantrino <-> process 0.087 0.033 2.612 0.009 par-20
Correlations
Estimate
process <-> Local Health_System 0.105
COPING <-> Local Health_System 0.035
COPING <-> process 0.032
mantrino <-> COPING 0.100
mantrino <-> Local Health_System 0.046
mantrino <-> process 0.171
Variances
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
Local Health_System 0.146 0.049 3.002 0.003 par-36
COPING 5.867 0.537 10.932 0.000 par-37
process 0.602 0.055 10.932 0.000 par-38
4e 0.396 0.147 2.702 0.007 par-39
1d 6.011 0.642 9.366 0.000 par-40
mantrino 0.427 0.039 10.932 0.000 par-41
5t 0.086 0.041 2.088 0.037 par-42
2h 0.646 0.074 8.752 0.000 par-43
3e 3.082 0.313 9.842 0.000 par-44
2e 3.476 0.395 8.795 0.000 par-45
ih 0.395 O.OSO 7.855 0.000 par-46
3h 0.536 0.068 7.935 0.000 par-47
1e 4.551 0.670 6.796 0.000 par-48
1t 1.788 0.172 10.376 0.000 par-49
3t 1.085 0.109 9.934 0.000 par-50
2t 1.361 0.134 10.151 0.000 par-51
4t 1.106 0.129 8.555 0.000 par-52
Squared Multiple Correlations
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stage 3a: December 14, 2001 03:24 PM
stage 3a: 14/12/01 3:24:58 PM
Distributive_Equity
Distress
Wish to_Reallocate_Time
time4
Time2
Time3
Time1
HCSEFF2
EXTRTANG
INTRINSC
EXINTANG
QUALCOM2
HBSACCS2
Page 3
Estimate
0.573
0.376
0.658
0.322
0.157
0.188
0.121
0.270
0.526
0.366
0.231
0.264
0.205
APPENDIX 8:
SEM Analysis - Stage THREE Model (Alternative)
stage 3b: December 14, 2001 03:25 PM
stage 3b: 14/12/01 3:25:26 PM
Fit Measures
Fit Measure Default model Saturated Independence Macro
Discrepancy 83.164 0.000 9770.751 CMIN
Degrees of freedom 67 0 105 OF
P 0.088 0.000 P
Number of parameters 52 119 14 NPAR
Discrepancy / df 1.241 93.055 CMINDF
RMR RMR
GFI GFI
Adjusted GFI AGFI
Parsimony-adjusted GFI PGFI
Normed fit index 0.991 1.000 0.000 NFl
Relative fit index 0.987 0.000 RFI
Incremental fit index 0.998 1.000 0.000 IFI
Tucker-Lewis index 0.997 0.000 TLI
Comparative fit index 0.998 1.000 0.000 CFI
Parsimony ratio 0.638 0.000 1.000 PRATIO
Parsimony-adjusted NFl 0.633 0.000 0.000 PNFI
Parsimony-adjusted CFI 0.637 0.000 0.000 PCFI
Noncentrality parameter estim< 16.164 0.000 9665.751 NCP
NCP lower bound 0.000 0.000 9344.606 NCPLO
NCP upper bound 43.501 0.000 9993.195 NCPHI
FMIN 0.348 0.000 40.882 FMIN
FO 0.068 0.000 40.442 FO
FO lower bound 0.000 0.000 39.099 FOLO
FO upper bound 0.182 0.000 41.813 FOHI
RMSEA 0.032 0.621 RMSEA
RMSEA lower bound 0.000 0.610 RMSEALO
RMSEA upper bound 0.052 0.631 RMSEAHI
P for test of close fit 0.927 0.000 PCLOSE
Akaike information criterion (AIC 187.164 238.000 9798.751 AIC
Browne-Cudeck criterion 194.129 253.938 9800.626 BCC
Bayes information criterion BIC
Consistent AIC CAlC
Expected cross validation inde> 0.783 0.996 40.999 ECVI
ECVllower bound 0.715 0.996 39.655 ECVILO
ECVI upper bound 0.897 0.996 42.369 ECVIHI
MECVI 0.812 1.063 41.007 MECVI
Hoelter .05 index 251 4 HFIVE
Hoelter .01 index 279 4 HONE
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stage 3b: December 14, 2001 03:25 PM
stage 3b: 14/12/01 3:25:26 PM
Regression Weights
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
Distributive_Equity <- Local Health_System 1.449 0.400 3.619 0.000 par-4
Distributive_Equity <- COPING 0.124 0.033 3.717 0.000 par-12
Distributive_Equity <- process 0.375 0.102 3.692 0.000 par-13
Distress <- Distributive_Equity 1.629 0.317 5.144 0.000 par-6
Distress <- COPING 0.276 0.079 3.493 0.000 par-11
Wish to_Reallocate_Time <- Distress 0.095 0.021 4.446 0.000 par-9
Wish to_Reallocate_Time <- COPING 0.084 0.026 3.239 0.001 par-10
QUALCOM2 <- Local Health_System 1.147 0.277 4.147 0.000 par-1
EXINTANG <- Distributive_Equity 1.000
INTRINSC <- Distributive_Equity 1.471 0.257 5.727 0.000 par-2
EXTRTANG <- Distributive_Equity 2.334 0.383 6.095 0.000 par-3
HCSEFF2 <- Local Health_System 1.000
HBSACCS2 <- Local Health_System 1.070 0.270 3.955 0.000 par-5
Time2 <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 0.821 0.194 4.235 0.000 par-7
Time3 <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 1.000
Time1 <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 0.935 0.219 4.274 0.000 par-8
Time4 <- Distress 0.161 0.023 6.857 0.000 par-14
Time4 <- mantrino 0.476 0.111 4.271 0.000 par-15
Standardized Regression Weights
Estimate
Distributive_Equity <- Local Health_System 0.575
Distributive_Equity <- COPING 0.311
Distributive_Equity <- process 0.302
Distress <- Distributive_Equity 0.506
Distress <- COPING 0.216
Wish to_Reallocate_Time <- Distress 0.441
Wish to_Reallocate_Time <- COPING 0.306
QUALCOM2 <- Local Health_System 0.514
EXINTANG <- Distributive_Equity 0.481
INTRINSC <- Distributive_Equity 0.605
EXTRTANG <- Distributive_Equity 0.725
HCSEFF2 <- Local Health_System 0.520
HBSACCS2 <-- Local Health_System 0.453
Time2 <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 0.431
Time3 <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 0.577
Time1 <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 0.438
Time4 <- Distress 0.391
Time4 <- mantrino 0.244
Means
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
COPING 11.758 0.157 75.050 0.000 par-28
process 2.046 0.050 40.761 0.000 par-29
mantrino 2.104 0.042 49.802 0.000 par-35
Intercepts
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
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stage 3b: December 14, 2001 03:25 PM
stage 3b: 14/12/01 3:25:26 PM
Distress 11.059 0.953 11.605 0.000 par-30
HCSEFF2 3.133 0.048 65.885 0.000 par-22
HBSACCS2 3.157 0.059 53.710 0.000 par-23
QUALCOM2 2.595 0.055 46.862 0.000 par-24
EXINTANG 10.059 0.497 20.236 0.000 par-25
INTRINSC 8.225 0.653 12.589 0.000 par-26
EXTRTANG 8.567 0.955 8.972 0.000 par-27
Time3 1.022 0.443 2.305 0.021 par-31
Time2 2.278 0.477 4.780 0.000 par-32
Time1 1.899 0.536 3.544 0.000 par-33
Time4 -0.031 0.471 -0.065 0.948 par-34
Covariances
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
process <-> Local Health_System 0.031 0.028 1.126 0.260 par-16
COPING <-> Local Health_System 0.032 0.085 0.378 0.705 par-17
COPING <-> process 0.061 0.122 0.502 0.616 par-18
mantrino <-> Local Health_System 0.011 0.021 0.535 0.592 par-19
mantrino <-> COPING 0.159 0.103 1.541 0.123 par-20
mantrino <-> process 0.087 0.033 2.612 0.009 par-21
Correlations
Estimate
process <-> Local Health_System 0.105
COPING <-> Local Health_System 0.035
COPING <-> process 0.032
mantrino <-> Local Health_System 0.046
mantrino <-> COPING 0.100
mantrino <-> process 0.171
Variances
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
Local Health_System 0.146 0.049 3.002 0.003 par-36
COPING 5.867 0.537 10.932 0.000 par-37
process 0.602 0.055 10.932 0.000 par-38
4e 0.396 0.147 2.702 0.007 par-39
1d 6.011 0.642 9.366 0.000 par-40
4t 0.270 0.098 2.770 0.006 par-41
mantrino 0.427 0.039 10.932 0.000 par-42
2h 0.646 0.074 8.752 0.000 par-43
3e 3.082 0.313 9.842 0.000 par-44
2e 3.476 0.395 8.795 0.000 par-45
ih 0.395 0.050 7.855 0.000 par-46
3h 0.536 0.068 7.935 0.000 par-47
1e 4.551 0.670 6.796 0.000 par-48
1t 1.645 0.178 9.252 0.000 par-49
3t 0.893 0.124 7.185 0.000 par-50
2t 1.316 0.141 9.317 0.000 par-51
t5 1.260 0.115 10.932 0.000 par-52
Squared Multiple Correlations
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stage 3b: December 14, 2001 03:25 PM
stage 3b: 14/12/01 3:25:26 PM
Distributive_Equity
Distress
Wish to_Reallocate_Time
Time4
Time2
Time3
Time1
HCSEFF2
EXTRTANG
INTRINSC
EXINTANG
QUALCOM2
HBSACCS2
Page 3
Estimate
0.573
0.376
0.393
0.227
0.186
0.333
0.191
0.270
0.526
0.366
0.231
0.264
0.205
APPENDIX 9:
SEM Analysis - Stage THREE Model (Final)
stage 4: December 14, 2001 03:26 PM
stage 4: 14/12/01 3:26: 16 PM
Fit Measures
Fit Measure Default model Saturated Independence Macro
Discrepancy 94.514 0.000 10796.868 CMIN
Degrees of freedom 79 0 120 DF
P 0.112 0.000 P
Number of parameters 56 135 15 NPAR
Discrepancy / df 1.196 89.974 CMINDF
RMR RMR
GFI GFI
Adjusted GFI AGFI
Parsimony-adjusted GFI PGFI
Normed fit index 0.991 1.000 0.000 NFl
Relative fit index 0.987 0.000 RFI
Incremental fit index 0.999 1.000 0.000 IFI
Tucker-Lewis index 0.998 0.000 TLI
Comparative fit index 0.999 1.000 0.000 CFI
Parsimony ratio 0.658 0.000 1.000 PRATIO
Parsimony-adjusted NFl 0.653 0.000 0.000 PNFI
Parsimony-adjusted CFI 0.657 0.000 0.000 PCFI
Noncentrality parameter estim< 15.514 0.000 10676.868 NCP
NCP lower bound 0.000 0.000 10339.150 NCPLO
NCP upper bound 44.086 0.000 11020.885 NCPHI
FMIN 0.395 0.000 45.175 FMIN
FO 0.065 0.000 44.673 FO
FO lower bound 0.000 0.000 43.260 FOLO
FO upper bound 0.184 0.000 46.112 FOHI
RMSEA 0.029 0.610 RMSEA
RMSEA lower bound 0.000 0.600 RMSEALO
RMSEA upper bound 0.048 0.620 RMSEAHI
P for test of close fit 0.965 0.000 PCLOSE
Akaike information criterion (AIC 206.514 270.000 10826.868 AIC
Browne-Cudeck criterion 214.550 289.372 10829.020 BCC
Bayes information criterion BIC
Consistent AIC CAlC
Expected cross validation inde> 0.864 1.130 45.301 ECVI
ECVllower bound 0.799 1.130 43.888 ECVILO
ECVI upper bound 0.984 1.130 46.740 ECVIHI
MECVI 0.898 1.211 45.310 MECVI
Hoelter .05 index 255 4 HFIVE
Hoelter .01 index 282 4 HONE
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stage 4: December 14, 2001 03:26 PM
stage 4: 14/12/01 3:26:16 PM
Regression Weights
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
Distributive_Equity <- Local Health_System 1.449 0.400 3.619 0.000 par-3
Distributive_Equity <- COPING 0.124 0.033 3.717 0.000 par-5
Distributive_Equity <- process 0.375 0.102 3.692 0.000 par-6
Distress <- Distributive_Equity 1.629 0.317 5.144 0.000 par-9
Distress <- COPING 0.276 0.079 3.493 0.000 par-l0
manage <- Distress 0.086 0.016 5.362 0.000 par-7
Wish to_Reallocate_Time <- Distress 0.095 0.021 4.446 0.000 par-8
manage <- mantrino 0.239 0.074 3.253 0.001 par-ll
Wish to_Reallocate_Time <- COPING 0.084 0.026 3.239 0.001 par-12
EXINTANG <- Distributive_Equity 1.000
INTRINSC <- Distributive_Equity 1.471 0.257 5.727 0.000 par-l
EXTRTANG <- Distributive_Equity 2.334 0.383 6.095 0.000 par-2
HCSEFF2 <- Local Health_System 1.000
Time2 <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 0.821 0.194 4.235 0.000 par-4
HBSACCS2 <- Local Health_System 1.070 0.270 3.955 0.000 par-14
QUALCOM2 <- Local Health_System 1.147 0.277 4.147 0.000 par-15
Time1 <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 0.935 0.219 4.274 0.000 par-21
. MEETINGS <- manage 1.000
PAPERWRK <- manage 0.990 0.139 7.123 0.000 par-22
Time3 <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 1.000
Standardized Regression Weights
Estimate
Distributive_Equity <- Local Health_System 0.575
Distributive_Equity <- COPING 0.311
Distributive_Equity <- process 0.302
Distress <- Distributive_Equity 0.506
Distress <- COPING 0.216
manage <- Distress 0.377
Wish to_Reallocate_Time <- Distress 0.441
manage <- mantrino 0.219
Wish to_Reallocate_Time <- COPING 0.306
EXINTANG <- Distributive_Equity 0.481
INTRINSC <- Distributive_Equity 0.605
EXTRTANG <- Distributive_Equity 0.725
HCSEFF2 <- Local Health_System 0.520
Time2 <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 0.431
HBSACCS2 <- Local Health_System 0.453
QUALCOM2 <- Local Health_System 0.514
Timel <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 0.438
MEETINGS <- manage 0.834
PAPERWRK <- manage 0.811
Time3 <- Wish to_Reallocate_Time 0.577
Means
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
COPING 11.758 0.157 75.050 0.000 par-29
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stage 4: December 14,2001 03:26 PM
stage 4: 14/12/01 3:26:16 PM
process 2.046 0.050 40.761 0.000 par-30
mantrino 2.104 0.042 49.802 0.000 par-37
Intercepts
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
Distress 11.059 0.953 11.605 0.000 par-31
HCSEFF2 3.133 0.048 65.885 0.000 par-23
HBSACCS2 3.157 0.059 53.710 0.000 par-24
QUALCOM2 2.595 0.055 46.862 0.000 par-25
EXINTANG 10.059 0.497 20.236 0.000 par-26
INTRINSC 8.225 0.653 12.589 0.000 par-27
EXTRTANG 8.567 0.955 8.972 0.000 par-28
Time3 1.022 0.443 2.305 0.021 par-32
Time2 2.278 0.477 4.780 0.000 par-33
Time1 1.899 0.536 3.544 0.000 par-34
MEETINGS 1.779 0.332 5.356 0.000 par-35
PAPERWRK 1.713 0.339 5.046 0.000 par-36
Covariances
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
COPING <-> Local Health_System 0.032 0.085 0.378 0.705 par-13
process <-> Local Health_System 0.031 0.028 1.126 0.260 par-19
COPING <-> process 0.061 0.122 0.502 0.616 par-20
mantrino <-> Local Health_System 0.011 0.021 0.535 0.592 par-16
mantrino <-> process 0.087 0.033 2.612 0.009 par-17
mantrino <-> COPING 0.159 0.103 1.541 0.123 par-18
Correlations
Estimate
COPING <-> Local Health_System 0.035
process <-> Local Health_System 0.105
COPING <-> process 0.032
mantrino <-> Local Health_System 0.046
mantrino <-> process 0.171
mantrino <-> COPING 0.100
Variances
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label
Local Health_System 0.146 0.049 3.002 0.003 par-38
COPING 5.867 0.537 10.932 0.000 par-39
process 0.602 0.055 10.932 0.000 par-40
4e 0.396 0.147 2.702 0.007 par-41
1d 6.011 0.642 9.366 0.000 par-42
mantrino 0.427 0.039 10.932 0.000 par-43
3m 0.405 0.075 5.377 0.000 par-44
4t 0.270 0.098 2.770 0.006 par-45
3e 3.082 0.313 9.842 0.000 par-46
ih 0.395 0.050 7.855 0.000 par-47
3h 0.536 0.068 7.935 0.000 par-48
1e 4.551 0.670 6.796 0.000 par-49
1t 1.645 0.178 9.252 0.000 par-50
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stage 4: December 14, 2001 03:26 PM
stage 4: 14/12/01 3:26: 16 PM
3t
2t
2e
2h
1m
2m
Squared Multiple Correlations
Distributive_Equity
Distress
manage
Wish to_Reallocate_Time
MEETINGS
PAPERWRK
HBSACCS2
Time2
Time3
Time1
QUALCOM2
HCSEFF2
EXTRTANG
INTRINSC
EXINTANG
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0.893 0.124
1.316 0.141
3.476 0.395
0.646 0.074
0.258 0.068
0.222 0.069
Estimate
0.573
0.376
0.203
0.393
0.696
0.658
0.205
0.186
0.333
0.191
0.264
0.270
0.526
0.366
0.231
7.185 0.000 par-51
9.317 0.000 par-52
8.795 0.000 par-53
8.752 0.000 par-54
3.772 0.000 par-55
3.233 0.001 par-56
APPENDIX 10:
Supplemental Analysis
Oneway: Specialty x Fairness of Remuneration Process
Descriptives
Process of determining reimbursement fairly reresents all areas of specialization your work
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error
General Practitioners 105 3.8000 .9136 8.916E-02
Cognitive 55 4.0727 .8997 .1213
Procedural 33 4.4848 .5658 9.848E-02
Technical 41 3.9268 1.0097 .1577
Total 234 3.9829 .9123 5.964E-02
ANOVA
Process of determining reimbursement fairly reresents all areas of specialization your work
Sum of
Sauares df Mean Sauare F Sia.
Between Groups 12.400 3 4.133 5.237 .002
Within Groups 181.532 230 .789
Total 193.932 233
Post Hoc Tests
MUltiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: Process of determining reimbursement fairly reresents all areas of
specialization your work
Scheffe
Mean
Difference
(I) SPECCAT1 (J) SPECCAT1 (I-J) Std. Error Sia.
General Practitioners Cognitive -.2727 .1479 .336
Procedural -.6848* .1773 .002
Technical -.1268 .1636 .896
Cognitive General Practitioners .2727 .1479 .336
Procedural -.4121 .1956 .221
Technical .1459 .1833 .889
Procedural General Practitioners .6848* .1773 .002
Cognitive .4121 .1956 .221
Technical .5580 .2078 .068
Technical General Practitioners .1268 .1636 .896
Cognitive -.1459 .1833 .889
Procedural -.5580 .2078 .068
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
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Crosstabs: Practice Arrangement x Sponsorship
OWNER * ORGCAT3 Crosstabulation
Count
ORGCAT3
Solo/indivi Cost sharing Revenue
dual onlv sharina/Other Total
OWNER Physician 13 72 27 112
Corporate 36 21 49 106
Total 49 93 76 218
Chi-Square Tests
Asymp. Sig.
Value df (2-sided)"
Pearson Chi-Square 45.001 a 2 .000
Likelihood Ratio 47.099 2 .000
Linear-by-Linear
.001 1 .981Association
N of Valid Cases 218
a. 0 cells (.o%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 23.83.
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Univariate Analysis of Variance
Between-Subjects Factors
Value Label N
OWNER 1.00 Physician 85
2.00 Corporate 54
ORGCAT3 1.00 Solo/individual 46
2.00 Cost sharing only 93
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: DISTRESS
Type III Sum
Source of SQuares df Mean SQuare F Sig.
Corrected Model 95.21J8 3 31.738 3.247 .024
Intercept 31197.887 1 31197.887 3192.095 .000
OWNER 21.314 1 21.314 2.181 .142
ORGCAT3 26.541 1 26.541 2.716 .102
OWNER * ORGCAT3
13.540 13.540 1.385 .2411
Error 1319.420 135 9.773
Total 47610.000 139
Corrected Total 1414.633 138
a. R Squared = .067 (Adjusted R Squared = .047)
Between-Subjects Factor~
Value Label N
OWNER 1.00 Physician 99
2.00 Corporate 70
ORGCAT3 2.00 Cost sharing only 93
3.00 Revenue sharing/Other 76
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: DISTRESS
Type III Sum
Source of Sauares df Mean SQuare F Sia.
Corrected Model 67.108a 3 22.369 2.798 .042
Intercept 43862.123 1 43862.123 5487.370 .000
OWNER .102 1 .102 .013 .910
ORGCAT3 49.973 1 49.973 6.252 .013
OWNER * ORGCAT3
.635 1 .635 .079 .778
Error 1318.892 165 7.993
Total 57082.000 169
Corrected Total 1386.000 168
a. R Squared =.048 (Adjusted R Squared =.031)
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Correlations
Correlations
Hours worked
per week
(exclude on
COPING call)
COPING Pearson Correlation 1.000 .089
Sig. (2-tailed) .202
N 238 206
Hours worked per Pearson Correlation .089 1.000
week (exclude on call) Sig. (2-tailed)
.202
N 206 207
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Frequencies
Statistics
Efficiency of
health care
system in Access to
your community-ba
COPING PROCESS communitv sed services MANTRINO
N Valid 238 235 237 221 238
Missing 2 5 3 19 2
Mean 11.7563 2.0468 3.1350 2.9367 2.1050
Median 12.0000 2.0000 3.0000 3.0000 2.0000
Statistics
Current
method of
reimbursem
ent is
aoorooriate ORGDUM2 DISTRESS EXINTANG INTRINSC
N Valid 237 237 237 225 237
Missing 3 3 3 15 3
Mean 2.3671 .4346 17.9241 12.2978 11.4852
Median 2.0000 .0000 18.0000 12.0000 12.0000
Statistics
EXTRTANG TIME1A TIME3 TIME4
N Valid 237 240 240 240
Missing 3 0 0 0
Mean 13.7468 3.7833 3.7125 3.8542
Median 14.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000
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